Something different today…a film recommendation!

Ask a Thai person of Chinese descent where their ancestors are from, and more often than not you will hear somewhere in the Teochew dialect-speaking Chaoshan region in Guangdong province. During the upheavals that overtook China from the late Qing Dynasty to the establishment of the People’s Republic, a wave of emigrants left Chaoshan to establish a new life in Southeast Asia, including Thailand. Today, over half of Thai-Chinese are Teochew in ancestral origin.

Despite the outsized influence of Teochew in Thailand, however, the dialect is relatively obscure in China. One estimate says that only about 14 million people in Chaoshan speak the language natively1 — in a country of 1.4 billion people. The city of Shantou, from where many Thais can trace their roots, is the poorest-performing of the three original special economic zones, with its dialect isolating it from the rest of the country. So it was a surprise when Dear You, a film made in Teochew, became one of China’s biggest hits this year. As CGTN said, for a Teochew film to experience this level of success was “unprecedented.” By June, it had become China’s second-biggest hit this year, grossing almost 2 billion yuan despite being made on a budget of just 14 million yuan and featuring a largely unknown cast of non-professional actors.

Dear You is reminiscent of the success of How to Make Millions Before Grandma Dies2 (which I wrote about here last year). But unlike the latter, which follows the story of later generations of Thai Chinese who have become firmly established in Bangkok, the former focuses on the struggles of first-generation Teochew immigrants who just freshly arrived from China.

The film is about Den Bhagseng, a Teochew immigrant in Siam who fled conscription during the Chinese Civil War to try to make a new life in Bangkok’s Chinatown, but uses letters to keep in touch with his wife Sogriu in China. Today Shantou and Bangkok are easily connected by flight; back then it was an arduous journey by sea. Not quite The Odyssey, perhaps, and certainly no cyclopes are waiting. But enough to make constant travel back and forth unfeasible. Viewers are thus introduced to the qiaopi, letters and remittances from overseas Chinese sent back to families left behind in China. At a time when Chinese immigrants often arrived in Siam with just, as the traditional saying goes, “a mat and a pillow,” they worked hard to send money back to their families in Chaoshan.

I think that Dear You is a film that feels special in Thailand because it feels like taking a time machine. You can read books about the exodus from China during its century of humiliation, of course — Jeffrey Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra’s A History of the Thai-Chinese was just recently translated into Thai — yet there is something different about seeing it played out on the big screen. It appears that this film is especially emotionally resonant to the older generation who still remembers their parents or grandparents sending qiaopi. For a younger generation of Thai-Chinese, this part of the family history is now largely forgotten, but at least in this film it has been brought back to life. And for many, it is the first time they may have watched a Teochew film (although even older people in Thailand who still understand some Teochew were unable to understand the Teochew spoken by the Chinese actors — Thais’ Teochew having been frozen in time while Teochew in Chaoshan evolved!)

But Dear You also poses interesting questions of identity. Outside of Thailand, the film has become politically charged. It sparked controversy in Singapore, where a decades-long government campaign to push aside Chinese dialects in favor of Mandarin led the limiting of screenings of the film in Teochew. This was not a popular decision. Singaporeans argued that the dialects had already been marginalized to the point where they pose little threat to the ability to acquire Mandarin; one professor told the BBC the uproar felt like “grieving a loss” of ancestral dialects.

It is a comment that makes me think of Thailand, where the of Chinese dialects has become far more complete that strangely enough limits this sense of loss. After all, you cannot lose what you never really had. I personally know of not even a single person in their 20s who can understand or speak Teochew with any fluency. No, that ability virtually declined significantly a generation previously, one long-term consequence of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkram having closed down Chinese schools in the 1930s, and among my generation is essentially extinct. Today, anyone who wants to study the Chinese language today will do so in Mandarin — although of course, few of the ancestors of most Thai-Chinese spoke Mandarin.

A writer in Singapore’s Chinese-language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao had called the film a “United Front” film.3 (Predictably, this claim drew criticism from mainland Chinese papers). But Thailand probably has the most well-assimilated community of overseas Chinese anywhere in the world, all of its members having long ago prioritized the Thai identity and scarcely identifying as anything more than culturally Chinese in some sense. Ironically, then, the fact that Thailand’s nation-building project has been so successful in assimilating the Thai-Chinese means that Dear You can pose little danger. It is for Thais more a window to historical discovery than the catalyst for any awakening of a latent identity that threatens to overcome the primary national one.

If you are Thai-Chinese and are interested in the stories of ancestral origins that is quickly receding into an unreachable past, this film is worth a watch. And even if you are not, but have any curiosity in the roots of a significant segment of the Thailand’s citizenry, Dear You would be worth your time.

The origins of the potential fissure in the Bhumjaithai government lies in its decision to exclude the Kla Tham Party from the coalition, which has left its former ally out in the wilderness over the past few months. Kla Tham has done a remarkable job at keeping its MPs loyal — there has been no defections from a party that unexpectedly found itself in opposition despite what everyone thought was a sure path back to government — and as a result remains a significant political force in parliament, even if it has largely kept quiet over the past few months. This means that it could remain an important political actor, either as an alternative ally for Bhumjaithai or a supporter of an alternative coalition.

But up to this point, an alternative coalition seemed impossible. As I noted in my last post, an agreement by Pheu Thai (74 seats) and Kla Tham (58 seats) to topple Bhumjaithai (191 seats) is unworkable because that would be far off from a parliamentary majority without the People’s Party (120 seats). The People’s Party pledged during the election campaign that it would not form a government with Kla Tham, of course, which would mean that it is virtually impossible for any alternative government excluding Bhumjaithai to emerge, unless the PP is willing to form another confidence and supply agreement — and one would think that the party was sufficiently burned by its last attempt.

Such was the situation until the People’s Party deputy leader Sirikanya Tansakun gave an interview on coalition configurations this week. While she ruled out any future deal with Bhumjaithai, when asked about a red-green coalition, she signaled that the party would be open to such discussions, given that without the People’s Party the “political equation would be incomplete.” When Thammanat was asked about Sirikanya’s remarks, he said that he has now “forgotten everything that happened before the election” (a reference to the PP’s anti-Kla Tham pledge). “Before the election, people who were enemies and still come back and love each other.”

Of course, Thammanat denied that an alternative coalition is currently in the making, saying that he wants to give an opportunity for the elected government to work first, and only if “one day they can no longer proceed” should “discussions” happen. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has also moved quickly to try to squash these talks of an alternative coalition, publicly hugging Pheu Thai leader Julaphun Amornvivat.1 When reporters said that there may be a new mix of red, green, and orange, Anutin joked that red and green should be mixed with condensed milk.2

Undoubtedly, talks of an alternative coalition forming is premature. Pheu Thai does not seem like it has any appetite for risk right now, fresh from a bruising electoral fiasco and Thaksin only recently having been released from prison. The People’s Party is already being warned that should the party go back on its promise not to partner with Kla Tham, its brand would suffer even further. And Kla Tham seems content, for now, to telegraph its desire for friendship to all political parties, in order to keep its options open. All in all, I maintain my assessment that there is still no grave immediate risk to Bhumjaithai, and while a cabinet reshuffle may be headed our way at some point, the government is not yet at any risk of falling.

But the fact that an alternative “traffic light coalition” is even remotely possible certainly adds a level of political pressure on Bhumjaithai.3 Up until this point, the “purple coalition” of Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai (plus other minor parties) has been the only viable configuration because of commitments by the People’s Party and the Democrats that they will not work with Kla Tham. This meant that Bhumjaithai held all the cards over its coalition partners; there was no real alternative and any threat to leave the government was not truly credible. Now, however, public signals that these commitments are not so set in stone as to be unbreakable means Bhumjaithai will need to work harder to keep its coalition partners satisfied.

Good morning from The Coffee Parliament. My apologies that there was no newsletter last week; it’s been a bit of a busy period for me! Today we’ll take a look at the cancellation of the Land Bridge project in southern Thailand and some rumors about the state of the government coalition.

Land Bridge to nowhere?

Because this update is being sent out late, you probably have already heard that Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanpraphas announced the termination of the Land Bridge project. We’ve been discussing the Land Bridge for a few months now, and up until Ekniti’s announcement government figures from Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul down have seemed pretty resolute in their public commitments to make this happen. But according to Ekniti, feasibility studies have shown that the project requires too expensive an investment, involves risks too high, and will cause too much environmental damage.

Anutin himself threw in a curveball, however, by saying that the government has not given up on the Land Bridge: if the need arises or the geopolitical situation demands it, they can simply dust the plan and bring it back. What is clear is that the government will still look to make some form of infrastructural upgrade to southern Thailand’s connectivity. Ekniti said that the government will instead be prioritizing a project called the “Missing Link,” where an existing sea port in Ranong province will be upgraded and connected to Chumphon province with a railway line.

Hmm, doesn’t that sound familiar? Critics, as this Bangkok Post editorial notes, argue that “the Missing Link appears to be little more than a scaled-down version of the Land Bridge.” The opposition parties are looking at this new project with scrutiny, with Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva proposing a Songkhla to Penang route instead. But Tita Sanglee at The Diplomat argues that this project “makes structural sense” (her piece is worth reading in full as it is a great summary of the land bridge situation). There is guaranteed to be plenty of debate on whether or not the Missing Link is a better alternative to the Land Bridge.

Coalition rumors

The Kla Tham Party has been quiet since the general election, after it was denied an opportunity to join the Bhumjaithai-led government coalition. But the party leader Captain Thammanat Promphao broke his relative silence to deny online rumors that he recently met former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Monaco to discuss a change in prime minister. Thammanat said that while it is true that he has visited Monaco, it was a trip with his family; if anyone checked Thaksin’s traveling record they would know he had not visited Monaco. “There is no Monaco deal,” he said. Anutin laughed off these rumors, responding that “red and green mixing together would still yield dark blue.” Meanwhile, former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra also posted on Instagram: “I’m here on vacation to relax. No secret deal. The only deal is the deal with my children.”

The rumors of a Pheu Thai - Kla Tham deal is strange because it would be impossible for the two parties to form a viable coalition together without including either Bhumjaithai or the People’s Party. It is still far more likely, in my view, that Kla Tham is being kept in reserve so that, in the event of a breakdown in relations between Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai, Anutin has an alternative coalition partner he can turn to (which would produce a slim but workable government majority).

What I find more interesting are the continual rumors that there is infighting within the Bhumjaithai Party, which would be a more immediate threat to the coalition’s stability. (We covered some sources of tension within the Bhumjaithai government here a few weeks ago). Anutin has sought to dispel rumors that there is conflict between the “2 Ns” (Nhu aka Anutin’s nickname and Newin Chidchob) and “1 P” (Deputy Prime Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn) by posting a picture together. “#NNP relations are as ruptured as a Crème Brûlée,” he wrote on Facebook. (Someone tell me what that means — I can’t keep up!)

Where there is no fire, of course, there shouldn’t be any smoke — so we’ll have to keep our eyes on this front.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has had a busy trip to China, which I wrote about earlier this week. That post came out before a rather melodious end to Anutin’s visit, which has surprisingly overshadowed coverage of his entire trip.

The prime minister has become well known for his musical diplomacy, whether it be playing traditional instruments in Vietnam or playing the saxophone while Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim sings “My Way.” In his latest performance, Anutin serenaded Chinese Premier Li Qiang with the song “Tian Mi Mi” (甜蜜蜜, “Sweet as Honey”). Tian Mi Mi is one of the most famous songs in the Chinese language. Sung by Teresa Teng (Deng Lijun), the lyrics are simple and innocent, comparing a smile to the sweetness of honey and a flower that blooms in spring.

The controversy erupted when Russ Jalichandra, a former vice foreign minister under Paetongtarn Shinawatra who runs the “Alternative Ambassador” Facebook page, commented that Anutin’s choice of singing Tian Mi Mi was inappropriate because it was composed by a Taiwanese singer. “I remember that twenty years ago, a Chinese deputy premier visited Thailand and Thais wanted to please him by playing famous Chinese songs at a banquet. However, they were Taiwanese songs, including Tian Mi Mi. It turned out that after a while, the deputy premier left the room.” Other media channels and netizens pointed out that the song was once banned in China. The 101World Facebook page wrote simply: “Tian Mi Mi, a Taiwanese song originating from Indonesia, once banned by China (but sung by Anutin in China).”

Some critics have taken issue less with the song and more with the act of singing itself. The China expert Kornkit Disathan wrote a lengthy post on the history of Tian Mi Mi, noting that Teresa Teng’s songs were banned in China because it was considered “yellow music” (degenerate songs focused on romance). Kornkit noted, however, that the ban has long been lifted, and massive Teresa Teng-inspired concerts have been held in mainland China over the past few decades. Kornkit withheld judgement on whether or not singing Tian Mi Mi in the presence of Chinese officials would cause political issues, but commented that Chinese diplomatic meetings are usually serious affairs (unlike the more lighthearted tone of ASEAN leaders) and that he felt a sense of “cringe” watching Anutin’s performance.

Teresa Teng was indeed a noted pro-Kuomintang singer who allowed her voice to be used in propaganda broadcasts. In the documentary Island In Between, made in 2024, Taiwan was still broadcasting Tian Mi Mi on its propaganda speakers! But I think that Russ overstates the antipathy that China’s leaders have towards both the song and the singer. It is documented that even Chinese leaders enjoy listening to Teresa Teng. Joseph Torigian wrote about Xi Jinping’s admiration of Teresa Teng in his recent biography of Xi’s father, Xi Zhongxun. “To relax,” Torigina writes, “he listened to the romantic, decidedly nonrevolutionary musician Teresa Teng…[Xi] Jinping listened to Teresa Teng’s “Small Town Story” so often that the recording broke.”

Ultimately, the criticism appears to be overstated. In the video clip, it appears that it was the Chinese side which invited Anutin to perform a rendition of Tian Mi Mi, so it can hardly give offense if Anutin was simply responding to a request by his hosts. (The government confirmed that the prime minister was invited by the Chinese side to sing).

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow wants to close a chapter on this controversy, far less sweet than honey as it is. As Khaosod English wrote, he “urged the public not to politicize Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul's performance…saying it was simply a popular tune enjoyed by generations.” The Chinese band would not have performed the song if it was sensitive, Sihasak argued; the public should not let this episode of musical diplomacy overshadow Anutin’s successful trip.

The criticism does appear to have touched a nerve with the government, however. Government deputy spokesperson Ratchada Dhanadhirek posted: “This song is a hit song. Wherever it is sung, people there smile, except in the hearts of some people.” Meanwhile, Anutin himself posted King Rama VI’s adaptation of a verse written by William Shakespeare in The Merchant of Venice. The following is the original English verse (note that the translation does not fully match up):

The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils;
The motions of his spirit are dull as night

Sharp words, certainly. Perhaps Anutin should also have reached for Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing.

This episode will blow over in the next few days. But it is perhaps a sign that Anutin’s freewheeling musical diplomacy, up until this point seen as at worst harmless fun and at best a way for the prime minister to improve personal ties with foreign leaders, has come under greater scrutiny. Anutin’s fun-driven personality has helped him come across as more approachable than previous conservative leaders, and it remains to be seen whether that persona will survive contact with criticism.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul made an official visit to China from July 16 to July 20. Although Anutin previously visited China when he accompanied His Majesty the King on his state visit last year, this was Anutin’s first official visit as prime minister.

I’ve summarized some of the interesting takeaways from this trip here.

AI takes center stage

Anutin attended China’s 2026 World AI Conference, where Xi urged that AI development “not be a solo performance by a single country, but a symphony of international cooperation.” As Brookings fellow Kyle Chan summarizes, China (which has championed open-source AI development) is contrasting America’s “closed system where power and profits flow back to American corporations” with China’s “open system where everyone, including the Global South, can participate and benefit.” In other words: “the US is Apple and China is Android.”

Interestingly, it doesn’t appear that Thailand actually provided a full endorsement of Xi’s vision on AI. For his part, Anutin gave a rather anodyne speech where he called for AI cooperation based on the principles of “Protection, Potential, and Prosperity.”1 Most interestingly, Thailand was not among the 29 countries that signed the agreement to create a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization as proposed by Xi. I am not still not sure how to square this; Anutin was clearly one of the guests of honor at China’s AI summit, but for some reason Beijing was willing to tolerate Thailand’s decision not yet to become a full-fledged member of the WAICO.

The Cambodian subtext

Cambodia did feature in the discussions between Anutin and Xi, however, with Xi offering to facilitate further talks between the two countries. Xi also proposed holding the next Mekong-Lancang Cooperation summit in China rather than Thailand if Cambodia is reluctant to attend talks held in Thailand. Most importantly for domestic Thai perceptions, Xi apparently assured Anutin that tanks and weaponry that China has sold to Cambodia cannot be used to harm Thailand, and that a new shipment of tanks has been delayed. The FC Anutin Facebook page wrote: “On security, China gave us their word that Cambodian tanks cannot be used against Thailand. This is satisfactory.”2 The Chinese defense minister is due to visit Thailand this week, so security discussions between the two countries are expected to continue.

I saw Thais online noting the fact that in the group photo at the summit, Anutin stood next to Xi, while Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet stood slightly further away. I would not automatically read too much into this, however, as there is always a lot of diplomatic protocol that goes into the arrangements of these family photos.

“Quality Chinese capital”

During the visit, Anutin also spent a lot of time visiting Chinese tech firms. The FC Anutin Facebook page posted on July 19:

Many people might view Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Anutin Charnvirakul’s official visit to Chengdu on July 18, 2026, as merely a roadshow to invite Chinese investors to Thailand.

However, looking deeper reveals that this is a crucial strategy aimed at transforming the structure of the Thai economy—shifting it from a “traditional manufacturing base” to a global “advanced technology industrial hub.”

On this trip, Mr. Anutin led the Thai economic team…in discussions with executives from leading Chinese tech companies. These included Xiaomi, ChangAn Automobile, Innolight Technology, and Eoptolink Technology, all of which are leaders in the electric vehicle (EV), AI, data center, and digital infrastructure industries.

What the Thai government is pursuing is not simply bringing in “Chinese capital,” but selectively attracting “high-quality Chinese capital.” This approach ensures that investments come accompanied by technology, research and development (R&D), innovation, knowledge transfer, and workforce development for the Thai people—as these elements form the core of competitiveness in the modern global economy.

The usage of the term “high quality Chinese capital” is important because it contrasts with a word that has been in common Thai parlance recently: “gray Chinese,” referring to businesses operating with ambiguous legality (or outright illegality). This term has become controversial, with the Chinese ambassador to Thailand recently arguing that most Chinese businesses operating in Thailand do observe the law. This makes it interesting that Anutin is using this moment to show that his government is prioritizing “quality investments.” It helps him accomplish both domestic goals (showing that he is focused on drawing in new investment that will help boost Thailand’s industrial growth) and foreign policy goals (signaling that Thais are focused not just on China’s illicit industries but also its high-tech firms).

“One Family”

In the official Chinese readout of the Anutin-Xi meeting, Xi stuck to many of the themes that he conveyed to former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra when she visited last year, calling for an “acceleration of the construction of the Thai-China railway”3 and continuing to “vigorously combat cross-border crimes such as online gambling and telecom fraud.” It is a reminder that there are still areas of concern within the bilateral relationship. Xi did repeat his line that Chinese and Thai friendship has stretched unbroken for a thousand years and “becomes more resolute with the passing of time.”

Anutin has been keen to emphasize the closeness of ties between the two countries. On his personal Facebook page, Anutin posted a photo of himself and multiple members of the cabinet with Xi Jinping and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, complete with the caption: “中泰一家亲” (China and Thailand are one family). He also added hashtags of Xi Jinping’s name and his own Chinese name, Chen Xiyao.4 (Anutin is a fluent Chinese speaker). Xi, in the readout, also used this phrase, as has become standard for Chinese leaders in discussions with Thai government officials.

All in all, a busy trip for the prime minister — one that will give us much food for thought about Thailand-China ties.

Good morning from The Coffee Parliament. Last week was exceptionally busy in Thai politics and so I felt that a Morning Coffee Briefing is in order.

In today’s newsletter:

1. Parliament passes a bill granting amnesty to people facing cases stemming from political conflict over the past two decades

2. The Constitutional Court rules that the government’s emergency degree is legitimate

3. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul visits Malaysia, while the Shinawatra premiers visit Indonesia

1. Parliament passes Amnesty Bill

Over a decade ago, the Yingluck Shinawatra government attempted to pass an amnesty bill for those with legal cases stemming from the color-coded political conflicts of the 2000s. It proved so controversial that the bill (which failed to pass) became the main trigger for mass protests against the Pheu Thai Party. This past week, a new amnesty bill (now called the Peaceful Society Promotion Bill) sailed through parliament with relatively little fanfare.

The Peaceful Society Promotion Bill will provide amnesty for Thai citizens who were or are being prosecuted for legal cases stemming from the yellow shirt protests, red shirt protests, People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) protests, anti-coup protests, and the 2020-21 youth protests. This covers around 6,000 people. There are some major omissions, however. For one, it does not cover civil lawsuits (and as the Bangkok Post points out, yellow shirt leaders billed for their airport closure in 2008 will not become exempt from paying compensation). It does not cover those convicted of corruption.1 And finally, it does not provide amnesty for lèse-majesté cases.

This third point has proved to be a major point of controversy, with the People’s Party coming out against the bill because of is omission of lèse-majesté convicts. Pheu Thai MP Thongthai Wechayachai argued that “this draft is the furthest step that Thai society today can collectively accept.” The Democrat Party, on the other hand, pointed out that the Senate added a clause allowing amnesty to be extended to those convicted of wrongdoing regarding the Senate elections. All in all, the bill passed by a vote of 306 to 141 with a number of MPs who would be direct beneficiaries of amnesty declining to vote.

2. Constitutional Court rules that loan decree is legal

In May, the Cabinet green-lighted borrowing 400 billion baht “to ease impacts on people’s living costs caused by the energy crisis and to support the restructuring of Thailand’s energy sector.” Thai law requires that an emergency borrowing decree can only be made when there is “an emergency of necessity and urgency which is unavoidable,” and the opposition parties quickly petitioned the Constitutional Court to rule on whether or not there is an emergency of sufficient magnitude to warrant using this mechanism.

On July 9, the Constitutional Court delivered its ruling. In a unanimous ruling, the Court said that using the loan funds to alleviate cost pressures for the people is lawful. In a 7 to 2 ruling, the Court also found that using the funds to facilitate Thailand’s transition to renewable energy is also lawful. Given that this ruling was the biggest legal question hanging over the Bhumjaithai government, ministers will be relieved to have the Constitutional Court clear one of their biggest economic initiatives to date.

The ruling does leave long-term implications, however. Thammasat University professor Supreeya Kaewla-iad pointed out, for example, that this ruling may pave the way for future fiscal indiscipline, as interpretations of what is meant by “preserving the economic security of the country” may become so wide as to decrease in meaning. It may also encourage future governments to use the emergency decree mechanism to avoid legislative oversight on borrowing.

3. Prime Minister(s) visit maritime Southeast Asia

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul visited Malaysia from 9 to 10 July to resolve a seafood spat. As Channel News Asia summarizes, “Thailand restricted the import of Malaysian-caught sea bass due to concerns over chemical residues, prompting Kuala Lumpur to temporarily ban some varieties of Thai shrimp over food safety controls last month.” Anutin and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also opened a new border crossing in Songkhla province. Most memorably, Anutin and Anwar had an episode of musical bonhomie.

At the same time, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto met with not one but three former Thai prime ministers: Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck Shinawatra, and Paetongtarn Shinawatra. Thaksin is an advisor to Danantara, an Indonesian sovereign wealth fund. This is one of Thaksin’s most visible public engagements since he was released from prison in early May.

In a strange coincidence, Anutin’s Facebook account shared a post from a Pheu Thai fanclub page on rumors that Thaksin had helped Agricultural Minister Suriya Juangroongrueangkit resolve the shrimp issue with Malaysia. Anutin later posted: “Sorry, I accidentally pressed ‘share.’ That was unintentional. Thank you to the reporter who called me and let me know.” Make of that what you will…

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s second term so far has felt like one hundred days of quietude.

This state of affairs is not usual in Thai politics, especially under elected governments. For the first time this century, we have a pro-establishment government led by a political party that is clearly dominant in their own coalition. As far as we can tell, this government maintains friendly ties with other potential veto players in the political system, including the Senate and the military. The prime minister is neither beloved nor detested; in short, he is not the sort of polarizing figure who drives people to the streets in fury. If there was a government that seems likely to complete its term in office, this one would be it.

But are things genuinely as stable as it seems? There are some recent reports that the beneath the calm surface, the government is beginning to face increasing headwinds. In today’s newsletter, I want to take a look at some of the potential flashpoints facing the Anutin government.

Declining popularity

Bhumjaithai is fresh from an election victory, but new data suggests that public polling is already declining. The latest NIDA quarterly poll pointed to an almost 8% decline in the number of Anutin’s supporters, and 9% decline in the number of Bhumjaithai supporters. This is only one poll, but that is a pretty significant shift that Bhumjaithai will certainly flag as alarming.

As a NationWeekend analysis wrote, the Anutin government has faced several PR issues in its first three months, including controversy over its initial handling of the energy crisis, debate over its AI scheme, and perception of underperformance from some cabinet ministers. Another potential issue is the fact that the government contains many relatively inexperienced cabinet ministers (such as the “lookthep faction”)1. The cabinet’s most popular figure, commerce minister Supajee Suthumpun (who played a star role in the Bhumjaithai election campaign), has significantly cut back her media visibility, to the point where her Facebook page has had to explain that “Supajee has not disappeared, she is working.” Anutin recently threatened that ministers which “the world has forgotten about” (i.e. has no discernable accomplishments) will also be “forgotten by the prime minister” (i.e. reshuffled out of the cabinet). The prime minister also acknowledged that the government has not been effectively communicating its work to the people.

The saving grace is that the People’s Party has proved completely unable to capitalize on the government’s dipping popularity, with both leader of the opposition Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut and the party declining slightly as well in approval. It was instead Pheu Thai and the Democrat Party that made some modest gains. Given that it is still so early in the parliamentary term, a fall in just one poll will not be sufficient to trigger Bhumjaithai panic yet. As May Wong wrote in the Strait Times, “Regardless of the Anutin administration’s shortcomings, many voters may be willing to overlook them for now. Political stability may matter more than ambitious reform.” But if the decline in support continues, it will certainly be a data point that the government cannot ignore.

Bhumjaithai Infighting

Unlike in previous governments, there are also virtually no reports of intra-coalition infighting. The only player sizable enough to actually destabilize Bhumjaithai is Pheu Thai — with the coalition having 294 MPs, if Pheu Thai’s 74 MPs were to withdraw the government would be at immediate risk of falling. But Bhumjaithai is helped by a curious parliamentary dynamic: Kla Tham (with 58 MPs) remains in the opposition. Bhumjaithai recently sent Kla Tham a signal of friendship, and it is highly possible that should Pheu Thai turn into a rebellious actor, Anutin could turn to Kla Tham as a backup option. Hence why this coalition is stable.

But although infighting across parties within the coalition has been limited, we are seeing signs that all is not well inside Bhumjaithai itself. The biggest flashpoint appears to be tensions between the prime minister and his deputy prime minister and transport minister, Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn. In the middle of June, Phiphat was removed from his role overseeing the Eastern Economic Corridor, a move that appeared to be a surprise to Phiphat himself. (As Phiphat noted, he only found out about his removal when the order was read out at a cabinet meeting). This led to immediate speculation of a wider conflict between what has been dubed “two Ns and one P” — the Ns being Newin Chidchob and Anutin (nickname “Nhoo”) and the P being Phiphat. Phiphat, for his part, has denied these claims, arguing that Newin is not involved in the country’s administration.

The rapture between the prime minister and the deputy prime minister does not appear to be wide enough to threaten the government yet. It is worth noting, however, that Phiphat as leader of the party’s election campaign in the south was instrumental to producing the Bhumjaithai victory, and he is not someone that Anutin can easily afford to alienate. This flashpoint will be worth watching in the months to come.

Rumors of the prime minister’s replacement

The government so far has been in a legally sound spot — very important given Thailand’s recent history of judicial defenestrations of prime ministers. But the most immediate threat to the government is an upcoming Constitutional Court ruling on July 9 on the legality of its emergency borrowing decree. If the court issues a negative opinion, it is possible that there may have to be some ministerial resignations to take responsibility. I have seen some speculation that this could trigger a dissolution of parliament, but personally I doubt that things will go that far.

Recently, rumors began to float in the media that a backup has been prepared in the event that Anutin has to resign. The backup prime minister, reports stated, has a name starting with an “S.” On the surface that sounds obvious: Bhumjaithai’s second candidate for prime minister is Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow. But there are multiple “S” letters in Thai, and this particular “S” (ศ) is not how “Sihasak” (ส) is spelled. The only eligible candidate for prime minister whose name starts with the right “S” is People’s Party deputy leader Sirikanya Tansakun, who quickly denied that there are any deals being made for her to become prime minister. Bhumjaithai, for their part, have denied that there are any plans to replace Anutin with an outsider prime minister.

So what to make of these rumors? It is probably no coincidence that such a report would be floated at a moment when the Bhumjaithai government, as strong as it is, is suddenly facing some headwinds, in the form of declining popularity, party infighting, and a legal challenge. Still, talk of an imminent collapse of the government is probably premature. Making predictions is an easy way for a Thai political analyst to look foolish very quickly, but if you pushed me to say whether this government completes its term, I would still say at the moment the odds favor that scenario. Fundamentally, Anutin and his party still remain in as unassailable a position as we have seen in the past three decades of electoral politics. There are signs of trouble, but Thai governments have easily survived worse.

The FY2027 budget proposed by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has passed its first reading in parliament, with 288 MPs voting in favor and 119 voting against. Here are some of the highlights of the parliamentary debate on the budget.

Ekniti defends government budget 2027 budget

Anutin was accompanying His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn on his visit to France, so Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanpraphas made the opening and closing speeches on the budget debate. His opening speech can be found here, and a summary of his closing speech can be found here.

Ekniti summarized the budget as follows:

The draft Annual Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2027 sets a total budget cap of 3,788,000 million Baht, which can be categorized as follows:

• Current expenditure: 2,786,367.1 million Baht (or 73.6%)

• Treasury reserves compensation: 71,038.1 million Baht (or 1.9%)

• Capital expenditure: 789,171.5 million Baht (or 20.8%)

• Principal debt repayment: 151,520 million Baht (or 4.0%)

10.7% of the budget is allocated for national security, 9.2% for building competitiveness, 16.1% for developing human capital, 25.4% for creating opportunities and social equality, 3.6% for quality of life and the environment, and 17.9% for balancing and developing systems for government administration. 17.1% is placed in emergency reserves

In his speeches, the finance minister mounted a spirited defense of the budget that he has proposed. The goverment’s economic goal, Ekniti said, was to push Thailand into one of the top twenty most competitive countries globally in four years, return GDP growth to 3% annually, and push for Thailand to become a high-income country within 12 years.1 Ekniti noted that last year, the budget deficit amounted to 4.4% of GDP, and the Bhumjaithai government will reduce this deficit to 3.9% of GDP in order to rebuild fiscal credibility. By 2029, the government hopes to reduce this deficit to under 3%.

Ekniti also noted that although it appears that the budget for government investment had decreased by 70 billion baht, the government has in fact simply shifted its method of mobilizing capital through alternative tools, such as state enterprise investment budgets, and Board of Investment incentives and deregulation to attract investment. Overall, Ekniti said: “For the FY 2027 budget, the government will move away from its old practice of under-budgeting or hiding current expenditures—tactics that forced them to draw from treasury reserves later on. Instead, they will bring these vulnerabilities out into the open so that the problems can be targeted and solved directly."

The opposition’s response

All of the major opposition parties roundly criticized the government’s proposed budget.

Leader of the opposition and People’s Party leader Nattaphong Rueangpanyawut slammed the budget as “a budget that comes from the taxes of all Thais, but will not help Thais and instead will help those who are the pillars of the dark blue government.” Meanwhile, deputy leader Sirikanya Tansakun said Thailand’s economic issues are akin to “an abscess that has burst” and without a change to how the government approaches budgeting, the budget deficit will not decrease and new projects will become impossible.

The Democrat Party zeroed in on how the proposed budget is a “budget where we cannot see a future.” Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva argued that virtually the entire investment budget this year comes from deficit spending or loans, which means that the national income is taken up entirely by routine spending and debt repayments. The tax-to-GDP ratio stands at 14.6%, Abhisit said, which is the lowest in history. He thus called for comprehensive tax reform. Deputy leader Korn Chatikavanij echoed Abhisit’s call for tax reform and also pointed out that the government’s goal of taking Thailand to high-income status in 12 years and becoming an OECD member in 2028 is likely impossible, as that would require investing at least 30% of the budget, but Thailand is barely able to invest even 20%.

Multiple MPs zeroed in on the government’s AI budget. Sirikanya noted that “any project with AI in the name or is related to AI received a substantial budget increase,” with the overall AI-related budget doubling. However, there does not appear to be a government strategy on AI, as different agencies are making their own procurement orders. Democrat deputy leader Karndee Leopairote said that although 90% of the AI-related projects are supposedly marked for investment, detailed scrutiny revealed that portions of this budget is actually being spent on building classrooms and even “AI buildings.”

People’s Party deputy leader Veerayooth Kanchoochat criticized the government’s industrial policy, arguing that the government appears to have a “fear of missing out” and is addicted to glamour, seeking foreign investment without truly building internal industrial strength. Focusing on the automobile industry, Veerayooth noted that most of the budget is focused on subsidies for EV producers, with little remaining for infrastructure building, testing centers, and workforce skill development.

Kla Tham joined in criticism of the budget. Kla Tham MP Pakpoom Boonpramook, for example, said that the area-based budgets for provinces and provincial groups had been reduced by 83 percent, which does not look like a normal budget reduction but is instead an attempt to remake devolution of budgetary power.

The biggest fireworks during the debate came when Democrat MP Jury Numkaew (who represents Hat Yai city, which suffered from a major flood last year) said that the government was allocating insufficient funds to disaster prevention. This prompted an angry response from deputy interior minister Jeseth Thaiseth, who accused Jury of not reading the budget carefully enough and suggested that the Democrats appoint him to the budget committee so he would have an opportunity to study the budget further. He was particularly incensed that Jury had said that he needed to light incense to summon a minister to reply to his question. Abhisit came to the assistance of his fellow Democrat MP, suggesting that Jury continue lighting incense until someone could give a proper answer on why there were very little funds for flood prevention in Hat Yai.

What next?

The budget will still need to pass its second and third readings. In the meantime, the cabinet and the major political parties have appointed a 72-member special committee to scrutinize the proposed budget. Particularly noteworthy members include Veera Theerapat, a famous news host who joined previous budget committees under the People’s Party quota but this year has switched to the government quota, Chaiwat Sathawornwichit (the recently defeated People’s Party Bangkok governor candidate), and Watanya Bunnag or “Madam Dear” (previously a Democrat Party politician who faded away from politics after she was refused permission to run in the 2023 party leadership race).

Chadchart Sittipunt wins a landslide victory in the governor’s race

This was one of the most predictable elections in recent Thai history. As we discussed previously in this newsletter, the incumbent governor Chadchart Sittipunt was virtually a lock to win re-election. He did so with ease. Defying a late push from his opponents to investigate internal practices within his administration, Chadchart won around 1.4 million votes (roughly 65 percent of the vote) at the time of writing with 95 percent of the vote counted. He beat his 2022 result both in terms of the vote share and in the raw vote count. It is an enormous personal mandate.

Why did Chadchart win in such a landslide? Satisfaction with his tenure so far, for one. Buy-in for his non-partisan image, as the governor successfully shed his previous Pheu Thai affiliation. Chadchart’s bet that a bigger focus on the “capillaries” of the capital rather than large megaprojects, especially paying attention to daily complaints filed by residents in the Traffy Fondue platform, has also paid off.

The scale of his victory also has much to due with the fact that he faced a field of candidates with relatively low name recognition. One suspects that even had he not campaigned, he would probably still have won almost by default. Yet this still the sort of victory which will raise chatter about whether a return to national politics will be on the cards for someone who appears to be one of the country’s most popular politicians. (Already, at his victory speech, Chadchart was forced to deny questions from reporters about whether his future ambitions would include the office of prime minister).1

No other candidate won more than 15 percent of the vote. Conservative independent candidate Mallika Boonmeetrakool Mahasook came in second place with 13 percent, narrowly besting Chaiwat Sathawornwichit from the People’s Party (who won only 8 percent). The Democrat candidate, Anucha Burapachaisri, was in fourth place with less than 5 percent of the vote. In a way, all of these candidates underperformed. There are enough combined Bhumjaithai and Democrat voters in Bangkok that both Mallika and Anucha should have theoretically performed a lot more strongly.2 Chadchart was able to build a diverse coalition of voters, and perhaps the enormous polling lead he opened discouraged anti-Chadchart voters from even turning out. (Turnout dipped dramatically from 60 percent in 2022 to only 49 percent this year).

There was no bigger underperformer than Chaiwat, however. The PP had just swept Bangkok in a landslide during the general election in February; for Chaiwat to come in a distant third place will be seen as an enormously disappointing result. Part of that comes down to Chadchart’s popularity and Chaiwat’s low name recognition, but the party leadership will be unable to escape taking responsibility: it is simply too dramatic a swing from the general election just a few months ago when they had won 1.4 million votes in Bangkok. The party made too many unforced errors, including a controversial appointment that alienated the party base. The PP’s base has become noticeably less enthusiastic about the party since the dissolution of the Move Forward Party; the election results underline this trend.

People’s Party emerges as largest group in the Bangkok Metropolitan Council, but fails to win a majority

The bright spot for the PP came in the Bangkok Metropolitan Council (BMC)3 race, where the party at the time of writing is on track to win around 22 seats. (26 seats is needed for a majority on the 50-seat council). This is a modest improvement from 2022, when the party won 14 seats. The pro-Chadchat “Khon Tum Ngarn” (Working People) group won 11 seats, while another pro-Chadchat group, Better Bangkok, won 2 seats. (These groups are not officially endorsed by Chadchart — see here). Pheu Thai, which allowed candidates to run under the party name but did not otherwise provide much official support, was reduced from 20 seats in 2022 to just 4 seats. (This was to be expected; many of the party’s candidates had switched to the independent pro-Chadchart groups).

For Chadchart, who depends on the BMC as the city legislature to meet his budgetary needs, these results are a mixed bag. No party or group has a majority, so no one will have complete veto power over Chadchart’s agenda. At the same time, however, Chadchart will likely have to continue doing what he did in his first term: negotiating with groups of councillors who may or may not be totally friendly to the governor. Will the more-dominant PP play ball with the governor? Are the pro-Chadchart candidates truly loyal to Chadchart? These questions will be tested in the governor’s second term.

It’s worth noting that Chadchart’s decision not to officially endorse BMC candidates may have backfired. Given the scale of his victory, pro-Chadchart groups probably should have been able to put in a stronger performance than what we saw. In the end, it’s likely that many voters remained confused to the end about who the Working People group were affiliated with — which is perfectly understandable given the unusual ambiguity of the one-way endorsement.4

I’m hesitant to draw too many lessons from the BMC elections for national parties, because in the end the major story there is that it was a good night for incumbents. Of the 50 councillors elected, 32 were incumbents — even though 17 of them switched parties or group affiliations between 2022 and 2026. So in the end, Bangkokians put a premium on familiar councillors with a track record of local service delivery.

Yet if forced to extrapolate from these results, I will say this. The PP’s decent performance helps alleviate some of the sting of the poor performance in the governor’s race. Almost all of the new faces elected were from the PP, showing that they are still virtually the only party in Bangkok where the brand matters more than the candidate. The fact that many former Pheu Thai members won under other labels (like the Working People group or even as Democrats) is another data point that the party may have to write off Bangkok for the time being. The Democrats appear to be in a holding state; its recruitment of strong candidates from other parties in some districts have helped the party maintain its seat count from 2022, but there is no sign yet of a revival in the capital.

With the general election and the Bangkok local election coming in quick succession, Thai politics will now enter a less electorally dramatic period. In the coming weeks, we’ll now turn our attention here at The Coffee Parliament to more policy-focused matters.

Miscellaneous notes

• The People’s Party also lost the Pattaya mayoral election to the incumbent Poramase Ngampichet. Poramase’s “We Love Pattaya” group swept the Pattaya council elections.

• Chadchart barely put up any election posters during the campaign — perhaps an indication that you don’t need to in order to win. Perhaps a sign that campaigns can reduce roadside posters moving forward?

The Race for Governor

At the start of this month, I wrote that Chadchart Sittipunt is likely to be a lock to win re-election as governor. The “Agong Regime” allegations have not hurt his polling numbers, as far as we can tell, and if that did not hurt, new scrutiny over the governor’s tenure like the Democrat Party’s examination of “suspicious” public procurement practices in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration is unlikely to have much of a cut-through effect. All the data we have points to a Chadchart landslide, whether it be polling data or social media engagement statistics (Chadchart’s engagement statistics simply dwarfs all other candidates).

What I want to highlight today is Suan Dusit Poll’s interesting polling data where they asked respondents who they voted for in 2022 and who they intend to vote for this time. I’ve illustrated the data below. Worth noting that I don’t know the raw numbers of 2022 voters, only the percentages, so the diagram below is a little misleading in the sense that it presents all five 2022 candidates as having equal support. But for the purposes of illustrating voter flows, I think that it is useful enough:

Chadchart, who sits at 60 percent support in this poll, is retaining the majority of his 2022 voters (around 74 percent) with some minor outflows to other candidates. He is also receiving a big chunk of voters who previously cast their support for his 2022 opponents. Interestingly, 64 percent of Sakoltee voters, perhaps the most popular choice among ideological conservatives in 2022, told Suan Dusit that they plan to vote for Chadchart this time around. I imagine that this is very much an effect of seeing the People’s Party sweep Bangkok in the general election earlier this year and, fearing a repeat, choosing Chadchart as a “lesser evil.”

The People’s Party’s Chaiwat Sathawornwichit (sitting at 13 percent) retains around 44 percent of Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn’s voters. That…is not a great result for the PP, and a sign that the party has simply been unable to generate any sort of enthusiasm in the capital. While the PP probably never truly expected Chaiwat to win, the lack of enthusiasm for its gubernatorial candidate could have negative downstream effects for its Bangkok Metropolitan Council candidates.

As far as I can tell from various polls and anecdotal data, aside from backing Chadchart, the conservative vote is “coalescing” around the independent candidate Mallika Boonmeetrakul Mahasuk (7 percent). For context: Mallika has long been a popular conservative media figure. There is certainly more online buzz that I can see around Mallika in conservative circles than Anucha; I imagine that most Bhumjaithai voters will back her given that there is no Bhumjaithai candidate. (If nothing else, Mallika certainly has an interesting election poster — one gets to ponder the need for change, innovation, idealism, and freedom in Bangkok).

The Democrat Party’s Anucha Burapachaisri (with around 4 percent support) is capturing only around 23 percent of voters who previously voted for the 2022 Democrat candidate, Suchatvee Suwansawat. If accurate, that is a devastating result for the Democrats, who didn’t do that well in Bangkok in the general election earlier this year but should still be capturing a lot more than 4 percent of the vote. My unscientific, anecdotal data is that even my politically-engaged friends do not recognize his name.

This is a lot of words to say that my assessment of the race has not changed since the start of the month, and all the other candidates are probably out of time to catch up unless there are some truly earth-shattering negative revelations about Chadchart.

The Bangkok Metropolitan Council Elections

I’m disinclined to look too closely at Suan Dusit’s BMC election because the data is a little questionable (they include Bhumjaithai as an option even though the party is not running any candidates). The polling we do have does suggest that independent candidates (from various groups, but most would be pro-Chadchart) are favored to win the most seats. Yet polling here is only useful to some extent — support for BMC candidates are distributed unevenly across districts.

I did find NIDA Poll director Suvicha Pouaree’s observations on this election interesting: “BMC candidates with organized votes are advantaged.” Because the PP and the Democrats have found it so difficult to generate enthusiasm amongst their voters in this election, he notes, they are unlikely to turn out their supporters. This favors independent candidates with their own local popularity, particularly in the pro-Chadchart “Working People” (khon tum ngarn) group.

How much does this matter, you may ask — is the BMC truly that powerful. ThaiPBS calls them the “hidden shaper of Bangkok’s future.” I would argue that for Chadchart, assuming he is re-elected, whether or not he has a friendly BMC could be a critical factor determining the level of success he experiences in his second term. Chadchart did not run with any BMC candidates in 2022 and has acknowledged that this has created “limitations” for him. Given the renewed attention that other parties have now placed on scrutinizing corruption within the Bangkok city government, a BMC that is dominated by unfriendly councilors could make life quite difficult for the governor.

With only ten days to go, we’ll find out very soon what the next four years of Bangkok’s administration will look like.

In memory of Her Royal Highness Princess Bajrakitiyabha, who passed away on June 11 at the age of 47.

The Thai government released an English statement on Princess Bajrakitiyabha’s passing today:

The Bureau of the Royal Household announced on 12 June 2026 that Her Royal Highness Princess Bajrakitiyabha Narendiradebyavati Kromluangrajasarinisiribajra Mahavajrarajadhita passed away peacefully at 19.48 hr on 11 June 2026 at King Chulalongkorn Memorial Hospital in Bangkok.

Her Royal Highness had stayed in the hospital for medical treatment since 15 December 2022, after losing consciousness because of a heart condition. In April 2026, doctors detected an infection in the abdomen caused by inflammation of the large intestine. This made Her Royal Highness’s condition unstable, with low blood pressure, an irregular heartbeat, and abnormalities in blood clotting.

Although the medical team provided treatment for Her Royal Highness to the best of its ability. Her Royal Highness’s condition deteriorated and the Princess passed away peacefully on 11 June 2026 at the age of 47.

His Majesty the King has graciously issued a Royal Command directing the Bureau of the Royal Household to arrange the royal funeral rites, with the highest honors accorded to the Princess in accordance with royal tradition. The royal remains will lie in state at Biman Rataya Pavilion within the Grand Palace.

Princess Bajrakitiyabha was His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn’s eldest daughter, and the first grandchild of His Majesty King Rama IX. She was passionate about justice and human rights, working in particular to assist incarcerated women. She also served as the Thai Ambassador in Vienna between 2012 to 2014. Her full biography has been released here by the Thai government.

May the Princess rest in eternal peace.

Good morning from The Coffee Parliament. Here is your Morning Coffee Briefing for this week, with some updates on the Bangkok elections, a pardon for Thaksin Shinawatra, and the launch of a popular new economic scheme.

1. “Agong Regime" allegations put heat on Chadchart

Last week, I wrote that Chadchart Sittipunt is “virtually guaranteed” to win re-election as Bangkok governor. His competitors are going to try their best to make it as hard as possible for him, however, and in the past week we saw the first major challenge mounted against the incumbent governor. New allegations have been made on the existence of the “Agong Regime” or “Agong System.” What is an agong, you ask? It is a Teochew term referring to a grandfather. The Economic Party, which is running a candidate for governor, has alleged that a network exists where candidates for district administrators must meet with a certain individual and provide a quid pro quo to receive the office, along with other instances of corruption within the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. Daily News has summarized all the allegations of corruption made here.

Attention on the “agong” has centered on Torsak Chotimongkol, the 69 year old former chairman of the board of advisors to the Governor of Bangkok under Chadchart. Torsak is known to be close to Chadchart and has worked with him since 2020 when Chadchart decided to run for governor, and he was nicknamed by the governor’s team as agong. Torsak firmly denied the existence of an “Agong Regime” (and so does Chadchart), and he is considering taking legal action. This hasn’t stopped Chadchart’s opponents from seizing on this issue, however. The People’s Party’s Chaiwat Sathawornwichit argued that corruption within the appointment system is indeed an issue, saying that “if the head does not shake, the tail would not move.” The Democrat candidate, Anucha Burapachaisri, made similar remarks.

These criticisms represent the first time that the popular governor has been attacked so directly during this campaign. Will it make a dent? A recent NIDA poll (fielded between June 2-4, so slightly before the Agong Regime allegations began coming out) found that Chadchart has the support of 67 percent of respondents, with Chaiwat trailing far behind at around 7 percent. This isn’t quite Assad margins, but it is approaching some pretty unassailable territory. Unless the Agong allegations really cut through, Chadchart will still be sailing towards re-election.

2. Thaksin Shinawatra pardoned

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was recently released from prison on parole, has received another royal pardon which immediately ended his probation. This pardon was issued on the occasion of Her Majesty the Queen’s birthday celebrations. As a result, Thaksin was able to remove his electronic monitoring ankle bracelet.

Thai media have reported that Thaksin is likely to soon travel to Dubai, with a telltale sign being that he does not plan to hold his customary birthday celebrations at his Chan Song Lah residence this year on July 26. It thus appears that Thaksin intends to keep a low public profile, unlike during the Pheu Thai government from 2023 to 2025 when he frequently made political statements. That should give Yodchanan Wongsawat, the new face of Pheu Thai, some breathing room to refresh the party’s image. See more here for my thoughts on what feels like the end of the Thaksin era.

3. Thai Chuay Thai scheme launches

The Thai Chuay Thai scheme launched last week. This is the successor program to Khon La Khrueng (“Let’s Go Halves”), the Prayut-era scheme where the government subsidized half the cost of payments at participating SMEs. An enormously popular policy, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul revived it during his first term last year, and promised to continue it after being re-elected. Instead of continuing the Khon La Khrueng branding, however, the Bhumjaithai government has made the scheme their own by rebranding it to Thai Chuay Thai (“Thais Help Thais”) and having the government subsidize 60 percent of the cost of payments.

By all accounts, the scheme is once again enormously popular, with 26 million people registering for the program and over 21 million actual users during the first week. There are concerns from economists, however, that this scheme will only temporarily inject demand into the economy, and the government will likely need to find other measures to continue alleviating the increasing cost of living due to the global energy crisis.

At the same time, the Ministry of Finance is moving ahead with stricter rules for holders of the state welfare card (commonly called the “poor people card”), which allows low-income Thai citizens to access a range of benefits. Finance Minister Ekniti Nititanpraphas wants to ensure that those who are not truly in dire economic straits are not included in this scheme. Expect more criticism on how the government implements these checks. Already, Anutin has reportedly put a brake on plans to use whether a parent is included on their children’s tax returns deductions as a criterion to prevent them from accessing the state welfare card.

Two political experts, Stithorn Thananithichot and Suranand Vejjajiva, recently predicted that Chadchart Sittipunt is virtually guaranteed to win re-election for Bangkok governor next month. I think that this is probably a common opinion.

As a political scientist, however, I feel compelled to do a deeper dive into why exactly Chadchart is in such a strong position. While this is not necessarily a prediction, we have enough data to say that Chadchart is almost a lock to be re-elected as governor for three reasons. 1) He remains popular, 2) His competitors are not as strong as in 2022, and 3) Bangkok voters are unlikely to prioritize party over personality. Let’s take these arguments in turn.

1. Chadchart was very popular in 2022 and appears to remain popular

It would probably not be wrong to say that Chadchart is one of Thailand’s most popular politicians. Initially fueled by memes about his “strength” and down-to-earth personality, his support base evolved into a dedicated fandom. Although initially aligned with Pheu Thai (he served as transport minister in Yingluck Shinawara’s cabinet and was one of the party’s candidates for prime minister in 2019), he has largely shed his former partisanship in favor of a less divisive independent brand. All of this produced, for Chadchart, a dominant victory in 2022.

That victory is particularly impressive because it came against a very strong field. He faced perhaps the most qualified group of candidates to ever run for Bangkok governor, a field that included the incumbent governor and deputy governor (Aswin Kwanmuang and Sakoltee Phattiyakul), a famous engineering expert with a prominent media profile (the Democrats’ Suchatvee Suwansawat), and a famous MP with high name recognition (the MFP’s Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn). Despite the tough competition, Chadchart still managed to win over 50% of the vote, relegating Suchatvee to a distant second place, clustering with Wiroj, Sakoltee and Aswin.

I wondered for a while if Chadchart would be able to retain his popularity over four years as governor. It is an unforgiving job; voters in the past have blamed governors for all of Bangkok’s intractable problems from traffic jams to flooding. But the evidence seems to indicate that Chadchart remains more or less broadly popular. A NIDA poll conducted during his third year on the job found that 48 percent of respondents planned to vote for him again, and around 74 percent of respondents were either very satisfied or largely satisfied with his performance. Given this level of satisfaction with the status quo, it begs the question of why these voters would take a risk on the unknown.

That Chadchart remains popular is visible in the fact that many Bangkok Metropolitan Council candidates are choosing to eschew party labels in order of affiliations with pro-Chadchart groups. Parties like the Democrats were publicly struggling to find a candidate to take on the governor, while Bhumjaithai chose not to even contest the race; these are indications that party polling must indicate a low likelihood of success. And speaking of struggling to find candidates…

2. Chadchart faces a lesser known field of candidates

This year, Chadchart’s competitors include:

• People’s Party candidate Chaiwat Sathornwichit

• Democrat Party candidate Anucha Burapachaisri

• Economic Party candidate Chanthep Selawet

• Independent candidate Mallika Mahasook

• Independent candidate ML Kornkasiwat Kasemsri

• Independent candidate Komsan Panwichartkul

The major party candidates are less known to the public compared to the 2022 slate of candidates, such as Suchatvee, Wiroj, or Aswin. Chaiwat has been a relatively low-profile PP MP. Anucha was a former Bangkok MP and the Prayut government’s chief spokesman, but he is not a household name. Mallika and ML Kornkasiwat are known for their media appearances and activism respectively, but whether that translates to support in a gubernatorial race is unclear. Things could change as the campaign begins in earnest, but they have a lot more to do to catch up to Chadchart’s universal name recognition.

The early polling indicates this name recognition problem. A Suan Dusit Poll found that Chadchart was supported by around 57 percent of respondents, while Chaiwat registered around 18 percent. No other candidate broke five percent. I do not know if this poll is fully accurate, but the wide margin is unlikely to be completely erroneous. While I expect the polls to tighten as the billboards go up and the other candidates become better known, the gap could well prove insurmountable.

Many of these candidates appear to acknowledge themselves that it is going to be difficult to defeat Chadchart. Chaiwat has said that “we must do better than Chadchart, who is already doing a good job.” Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva said that he would give Chadchart a better score than the 5 out of 10 that he has given himself, noting that the governor is dedicated to his job. These are not the pitches of parties that sound determined and confident about unseating the incumbent.

3. Bangkok voters prioritize personality over party in the gubernatorial election

There are two ways in which Chatchart could lose. The first is that supporters of the People’s Party can be persuaded to stick with their party. In the 2026 general election, 1.4 million voters cast a party-list ballot for the People’s Party. The party dyed the capital completely orange, in many constituencies winning more votes than the next three parties combined. If the vast majority of 2026 PP voters cast a vote for Chaiwat Sathawornwichit, there would be no question that he would win.

Another scenario is if the conservative camp manages to unify around a candidate while PP and Pheu Thai voters fragment between Chatchart and Chaiwat. In 2026, a group of political parties that I will loosely group together as conservative parties (namely Bhumjaithai, the Democrat Party, United Thai Nation, the Economic Party, and Thai Pakdee) won a little over a million votes collectively. They are a group I would broadly characterize as anti-orange and anti-Thaksin (and hence the disapproval extends to Chadchart). The conservative-leaning Naewna newspaper has suggested that if the conservative camp can “dissolve their conflicts and unify their votes as a singular power, the game can be changed.”

On paper these are plausible suggestions; the graph above shows that the “progressive” and “conservative” camps both potentially have enough voters to defeat Chadchart. In practice, this is highly unlikely.

Take a look at a comparison of candidate performances in 2022 against political party performances on the party-list ballot in the 2023 general election. Chadchart outperformed his old party, Pheu Thai, by over 700,000 votes. It indicates that Chadchart possesses cross-party appeal and is able to attract votes from across the political spectrum. He received support from far more than just his natural base of supporters (Pheu Thai fans), meaning that he was able to draw in votes from progressive and conservative voters as well. His independent affiliation has allowed him to successfully erase his image as a former Pheu Thai figure and given license for people who would normally not vote for the Thaksin camp to vote for him.

Secondly, it shows that Bangkok’s progressive voters have different calculations in mind when voting in local elections. Wiroj underperformed the MFP’s subsequent performance by over 1.4 million votes. The progressives are not so loyal to the various incarnation of orange parties that it is unthinkable to vote for another non-orange candidate they like. It is thus highly unlikely that all of the PP’s 1.4 million voters will cast a vote for Chaiwat; a significant portion will certainly break for Chatchart. Larger political trends aren’t helping, either. The PP just suffered a bruising election defeat and there seems to be no indication that the party has been able to recover any semblance of wind in their sails. Unless something changes in the next month, even their supporters are probably not feeling all that enthusiastic about the party.

Meanwhile, conservative voters split in many directions in 2022, and the race became personality-driven rather than party-driven — Suchatvee significantly outperformed the Democrats’ subsequent performance in 2022. The fact that there was no clear “regime candidate” (Palang Pracharath did not field a candidate) made unification difficult. We will probably see something similar play out this time. In the past few elections, conservative voters have never shown any indication of an ability to unify. We tend to treat them as homogeneous camp, but they are anything but: of the roughly 1 million “conservative” voters, around half a million supported Bhumjaithai in 2026, while a little over 300,000 voted for the Democrats.

Given that Bhumjaithai is not fielding a candidate, the half a million will have to go somewhere. But instead of unifying behind a candidate, they will likely split between Anucha, Mallika, Chanthep, and ML Kornkasiwat. None appear to me to be a clear choice. The Democrats won four gubernatorial elections in a row this century, but that era is gone. It is not a given that the 300,000 who voted for the Democrats in the general election will vote for Anucha; at the same time, there are many Bhumjaithai voters who are probably incensed at the Democrats’ role in opposition and would not vote for him either. Indeed, in a bid to ensure that the PP’s Chaiwat does not win, some will likely cast a vote for Chatchart.

There is still a month of campaigning to go, and it will be interesting to see how the candidates’ vision for Bangkok differ. But at this early stage, the frontrunner to win is unusually clear.

It’s a long weekend in Thailand, but here is another edition of The Coffee Parliament’s Morning Coffee Briefing to start your week. I will also have another article out tomorrow about the Bangkok governor election, so today’s briefing will focus mostly on parliamentary activities.

This week’s Thailand top three:

1. Parliament voted not to allow the DSI to question Kla Tham NP Chonnaput Naksua

2. A bid to form a special committee to further evaluate the Land Bridge proposal was rejected

3. Controversy brews over a government scheme to give free pro AI subscriptions to five million users

1. Kla Tham MP protected by parliament

The House of Representatives voted to shield Kla Tham MP Chonnaput Naksua from a Department of Special Investigations (DSI) request to question him. Chonnaput has been embroiled in legal controversy, with the Attorney-General backing charges against him on alleged illegal online gambling and money laundering. MPs enjoy parliamentary immunity while the house is in session, so for any DSI case to proceed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives must grant permission. 308 MPs voted to protect Chonnaput, while 126 voted in favor of allowing the DSI to question him.

Of the 308 MPs, almost all were from Kla Tham and the government coalition. That Kla Tham would vote to defend one of their own MPs is unsurprising, but why the government MPs? Bhumjaithai’s spokesperson said that the party feels he should cooperate with the DSI without needing a parliamentary vote, while some MPs argued that the principle of parliamentary immunity must be protected. There is already speculation, however, that this is a sign that the government coalition still wants to preserve some level of friendship with Kla Tham in case they are brought in as a future coalition partner. (In fact, the original decision to exclude Kla Tham was a genuine surprise).

Undoubtedly, this was an expensive use of the government’s political capital. Judging from the social media response, even those who are generally favorable towards Bhumjaithai are unhappy with how the government MPs acted in this case. Thai Pakdee leader Warong Dechgitvigrom has found another rallying cry to add to his crusade against perceived parliamentary over-indulgence: he is now calling for the abolition of parliamentary immunity.

2. No special committee to further study Land Bridge

The House of Representatives also voted this week to reject the formation of a special committee to further study the government’s proposal to build a “land bridge” in Southern Thailand. (See here for more about Bhumjaithai’s revival of this mega-project). People’s Party leader Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut argued that a committee is needed to find a truly sustainable proposal for southern development, while Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva called the scheme a “geographical illusion” that risks environmental destruction and bringing Thailand into an unwanted geopolitical spotlight.

For the government’s part, a Bhumjaithai MP argued that studies about the land bridge have already been conducted and there is no need to study this over and over; what matters, he argues, is truly listening to the people. Deputy Prime Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakan says that he is still waiting for the results of another study.

3. Controversy over AI scheme

Digital Economy Minister Chaichanok Chidchob is spearheading a scheme called the “TH-AI Passport” which would aims to provide free access to “pro” AI tools to 5 million Thais. The primary goal, according to the Ministry of Digital Economy, is to lift Thailand’s relatively low AI adoption rate, which lags behind some of its neighbors.

This week, PP MP Pawoot Pongvitayapanu (a tech guru) raised several questions about the scheme in parliament. This included its high cost (around 1.6 billion baht) and short bidding period, along with questioning whether the winner of the bid has been “locked” by one of the scheme’s procurement specifications (the winner of the bid must be able to advertise the scheme in at least 1,500 convenience stores). He also asked why the government is not procuring AI subscriptions differently from a global tech company. Chaichanok, in parliament, argued that this scheme is urgently needed to increase Thailand’s AI capabilities. He said accusations about the short bidding period are inaccurate as the procurement process began five months ago. Chaichanok also noted that government procurement rules made direct procurement with a global tech company difficult, and that he also wanted to build up Thailand’s local AI ecosystem.

That is unlikely to be the end of the matter, as opposition politicians continue raising questions about various aspects of the scheme on defining “pro” capabilities and data ownership. One question that I have is whether procuring “pro” AI subscriptions will truly raise Thailand’s AI adoption rate (is that not aimed more at heavy users who would already be using AI)? I also have a lot of thoughts on AI giveaways here.

Good morning from The Coffee Parliament. Today, I’m going to focus on Bhumjaithai’s new proposals on how to honor the referendum result and move forward with constitutional reform. And also: a short Morning Coffee Briefing is attached at the end!

Bhumjaithai unveils their proposals on constitutional reform

On May 20, the Bhumjaithai Party officially submitted its draft bill on constitutional reform to Sophon Zaram, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. After criticism that constitutional reform appears to be stalled, the government appears eager to demonstrate that it does intend to honor the results of the constitutional referendum held earlier this year. If any bill on constitutional reform passes in this parliamentary term, it will almost certainly be the Bhumjaithai draft, given that the government holds a substantial majority. As such, it’s worth taking a look at what this draft contains.

The new draft that Bhumjaithai unveiled is quite similar to the previous version it submitted to parliament back in September 2025. The Constitution Drafting Assembly will be composed of one hundred members, including representatives from each of Thailand’s 77 provinces and 23 members with legal and political expertise. A further 300 reserve members will also be selected. From these members of the CDA, a Constitution Drafting Committee and a Committee for Public Hearings and Promoting Public Participation will be appointed. (See diagram below for full breakdown).

Technically, this legislation is submitted as an amendment to Section 256 of the 2017 Constitution (which governs how constitutional change can be conducted). One major change that Bhumjaithai has made in the 2026 version of this draft compared to the 2025 version is the parliamentary threshold by which a new constitution has to be pass in order to be approved. It mandates that a new draft requires the approval of more than half of all parliamentarians — which works out to 351 MPs and senators out of the 700 total. This must include at least 1 in 4 senators. In the previous draft, the minimum number of senators was 1 in 5. (Given what we know about the political affinities of the current Senate…) The draft also requires the approval of 20% of the MPs from parties who are not represented in the cabinet or the parliamentary leadership (i.e. opposition parties and minor coalition members).

Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling last year that the CDA cannot be directly appointed, Bhumjaithai’s draft will have the CDA be selected by parliament. Bhumjaithai proposes that the number of CDA members each party can select will be proportional to the number of MPs it has. This means that if the selection process occurs before a dissolution of parliament, the House of Representatives-selected portion of the CDA will reflect the 2026 election results, in which Bhumjaithai is the largest party. I have not seen official confirmation of how the Senate-selected portion of the CDA would be broken down yet.

The opposition parties are not entirely happy with Bhumjaithai’s draft. The People’s Party is particularly displeased with the proposed method of selecting the CDA, with leader Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut, asking whether it would allow some political groups to monopolize power in the drafting of the new charter.1 It’s also worth noting that the Bhumjaithai draft bans any amendment of Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution (which deals with the basic structure of the state and the monarchy), while the PP has long stated it does not agree with such restrictions. Meanwhile, Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva appears to be treading the middle ground, arguing that a reform proposal should allow for broader participation by the public while also putting Sections 1 and 2 off-limits. Acknowledging that the Democrats do not have enough seats to propose its own version of charter amendment, Abhisit said he will seek cooperation with other small like-minded parties.

Nikorn Chamnong, Bhumjaithai’s chief spokesperson on constitutional matters, has estimatedhttps://www.bbc.com/thai/articles/cj6p9n2y8k9o that the selection of a CDA can occur next year. Should the new draft constitution pass the two remaining required referendums, it would likely come in effect by 2029. All of that is contingent, of course, on the draft legislation passing. I do believe that Bhumjaithai will make a real attempt to pass its draft — this is likely to produce a CDA that is most friendly to its own vision. But for a party like the PP, it is caught between a rock and a hard place. This might be the only shot of pursuing constitutional change in the short term, but CDA members selected by the party will form a very small minority. In other words, it is unlikely that a new constitution will be produced that incorporates the PP’s vision.

Morning Coffee Briefing

It’s been two weeks since the last Morning Coffee Briefing; here is a roundup of some important updates since then. (I couldn’t get this out in time for morning coffee in Thailand, but hopefully you can enjoy it with your Monday lunch!)

1. The race for Bangkok governor appears to be mostly set, with Chatchart Sittipunt having resigned from office and preparing to run for re-election.

• The Democrat Party unveiled Anucha Burapachaisri, a former Bangkok MP and Prayut government spokesman, as its candidate for governor.

• For now, polling points to a race that is not at all close: a Suan Dusit Poll had Chatchart leading the field at 57.68%, with an enormous lead over his closest challenger, the People’s Party candidate Chaiwat Sathawornwichit at 17.90%. This is partly due to the campaign not having properly started yet, so all of Chadchart’s competitors suffer from lack of name recognition. But that’s a lot of ground to make up in one month.

2. The 400 billion baht loan is facing a major legal challenge, as the Constitutional Court has accepted the petition by opposition parties asking it to evaluate the bill’s constitutionality.

• See last briefing for more details about this loan decree.

3. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has spent the past few days in France, in a visit that is scheduled to take six days.

• Today, the prime minister plans to sign a “Joint Action Plan for Strengthening Thailand - France Partnership 2026-2028.” According to the Thai government: “It aims to elevate bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership, while expanding collaboration in areas that are aligned with global trends, such as transition to decarbonized energy, and promotion of Thailand’s soft power in fashion, film, and cuisine.”

• Thai firms have been urging Anutin to prioritize negotiations over the Thailand - EU Free Trade Agreement.

In the past week, I’ve done a few interviews on former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s release from prison last Monday. I wanted to gather together some thoughts into a full post. As such, there will be no Morning Coffee Briefing this week — my apologies!

I also recently wrote a piece for Latitude Ten on how Thailand is a nation of self-help books: check it out here.

From resilience to rejection

In 1996, Thaksin Shinawatra led the Palang Dharma Party into a general election. The previous year, the party had won 23 seats in parliament — a respectable number, although lower than in recent elections. But the 1996 general election proved to be fatal. Palang Dharma won only one seat. It was a mortal wound: the party would never win a seat again in an election. Thaksin felt compelled to resign from the party leadership.

Leading a party to such an electoral defeat would probably be fatal to most politicians. But of course, just five years later Thaksin would lead his new Thai Rak Thai Party to what was at that point the biggest election victory in Thai democratic history. 2001 marked the beginning of what Jonathan Head and Hataikarn Treesuwan call the “Thaksin era,” something that they note “is now almost certainly over.”

Whether or not the Thaksin era is over is a matter for legitimate debate. The former prime minister has proven to be one of the most resilient characters of Thai politics, with him and his family surviving two coups and several unfavorable judicial rulings. Thaksin has proven perfectly capable of getting up when he is knocked down: the 1996 election is firm evidence that he can never be counted out. His return to Thailand in 2023 was another example of a previously-unimaginable comeback.

Indeed, can you think of another politician who has been as politically relevant as him for as long? When Thaksin first entered politics in 1990s, the major political players were men like Chuan Leekpai, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Banharn Silpa-archa, and Chamlong Srimuang. Banharn is dead; Chavalit and Chamlong have long retired from politics. Only Chuan remains an active politician, but as a backbencher. The sheer length of Thaksin’s level of influence is virtually unprecedented.

But the challenges that now lie against him do put into question whether or not a comeback will finally elude one of Thailand’s most wily politicians.

The question is thus: can a “Thaksin thinks, Pheu Thai acts” approach to politics still work? The Thaksin-fueled Pheu Thai brand was built on an anti-status quo orientation and generous economic schemes. But it appears that the Pheu Thai playbook has finally been exhausted. Ironically, the dealmaking of Pheu Thai in 2023 may have lost some of its political resonance, given that Thaksin has now served his prison sentence and the People’s Party engaged in curious dealmaking of its own in 2025. But its latest tenure in government was in its own terms damaging to the party brand. Its signature 10,000 baht giveaway scheme was delivered only partially, and the economy was lackluster at best.

Unfortunately, the party appears to have run out of ideas and ways to make people talk about their ideas. Twenty-five years ago Thai Rak Thai’s policies and campaigning methods were a novelty. Now they are commonplace, and room to innovate has narrowed considerably. Recall that this year, their flashiest election pledge was a proposal to give one million baht to nine people a day. In elections past it would have been one of the central talking points of the campaign. Remarkably, this proposal faded from the headlines rather quickly, and few still discuss it today. Pheu Thai’s ability to control the national conversation simply is not what it once was.

And all of this is before we even consider the baggage that comes up with the Shinawatras. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s premiership ended in deep controversy over her phone call with Cambodia. (That was enough for me to write in July 2025 that this signaled the end of the family’s political dominance). Thaksin himself remains a deeply polarizing figure, someone who can inspire enough hatred that tens of thousands of people came out to protest against him, his brother-in-law, and his sister in the late 2000s and early 2010s.

Which brings us to where we are today: a party suffering from a precipitous decline. Take a look at the trend of Pheu Thai’s electoral performance in the past three elections where there was a two ballot system. The trend of decline is starkly visible. Between 2011 and 2026, Pheu Thai has lost about 10 million constituency votes and 8 million party-list votes. This gives us all the information we need about the declining efficacy of Pheu Thai’s electoral strategy.

Pheu Thai has clearly lost its luster even in the strongholds where the Shinawatra brand had counted most. Consider results in the last general election. The party lost major ground in the Northeast to Bhumjaithai and Kla Tham and in the North to Kla Tham and the People’s Party. In former strongholds, the results were devastating. Take Chiang Mai, Thaksin’s birthplace, for example. This was a province where Pheu Thai won 65 percent of the vote in 2011. They had lost a lot of ground in 2023 to Move Forward. Shockingly, they were completely wiped out this year.

Pheu Thai as a mid-sized player

The fundamental question facing Pheu Thai is this: is it satisfied with being a mid-sized party? Some media reports have said that it is. Already, we are seeing signs of retrenchment. The party, for example, will not be officially fielding councillors in the Bangkok local elections, even as it allows some candidates to use the party logo. This comes just four years after Pheu Thai became the largest party on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council.1

Being a medium-sized party with anything between 30 to 80 seats is not an impossible task, as long as they prevent valuable local factions from jumping ship. In this scenario, Pheu Thai could remain a relevant political player for years to come. Like Bhumjaithai or Chart Thai in the past, it could be an indispensable coalition partner that makes up the numbers for a majority and does not put too much of a fuss about the terms of joining a government. Yet this is a hazardous path. Mid-sized parties focused on just a few provinces or regions find it difficult to generate national krasae2 and thus tend to become smaller over time. The example of Chart Thai Pattana is a cautionary tale; the more it became identified with Suphanburi, the less viable it became outside the province. And the less powerful a party becomes, the more difficult the task of holding on to the local clans that are so important to powering constituency victories.

If it is not satisfied with medium-power status, however, we are not yet seeing Pheu Thai take any steps that would pave the way for a broader revival. Today in coalition with Bhumjaithai, Pheu Thai has limited opportunities to reinvigorate its own brand. It can hope that the latest member of the extended Shinawatra clan to hold high office, Deputy Prime Minister Yodchanan Wongsawat, will perform well and win back the party some votes. This could still work; few have strong opinions on Yodchanan, who is relatively fresh to the political scene. Yet Thai history is littered with examples of coalition partners hoping to “generate results” and then unfortunately finding that no one took notice.

But what would a path returning to greatness look like? The party’s existence has been so intertwined with Thaksin that it is virtually impossible to think of the party without Thaksin. But it is also increasingly difficult to think of a path forward for the party with Thaksin at the fore. To put it simply: Thaksin reminds people of the past. It is now 25 years since his first election victory. The youngest voters today were born after the first military coup that ousted his government; an even larger portion yet have basically no recollection of his premiership.

The Shinawatras’ role in politics is far from over, but the years of Pheu Thai electoral dominance is almost certainly at an end.

This week’s Thailand top three:

1. The Anutin government officially cancelled the maritime agreement with Cambodia, MOU 44

2. The cabinet is moving forward with an emergency decree to borrow 400 billion baht

3. Constitutional reform looks set to be stalled

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1. MOU 44 is officially revoked

The cabinet, on the recommendation of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, moved to unilaterally revoke MOU 44 on May 5. Anutin informed Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Manet, of his decision at the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines. Without MOU 44, Thailand and Cambodia will fall back to UNCLOS mechanisms; Hun Manet has already pledged to move forward with compulsory conciliation, a move that Anutin welcomed. (This is a non-binding process led by a five-member commission). However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that while Thailand is aware of Cambodia’s desire to use this process, Bangkok has not necessarily agreed.

What’s MOU 44, again? This is a bilateral agreement between Thailand and Cambodia, signed in 2001 under the Thaksin Shinawatra government, where the two governments established a framework to negotiate overlapping maritime boundary claims in the Gulf of Thailand. It also proposed a Joint Development Area to explore petroleum and natural gas reserves before a final boundary is agreed upon. Critics have argued that MOU 44 posed a risk to Thailand’s sovereignty over Koh Kood island. This is also the rationale behind which the government is choosing to pitch the necessity of cancelling MOU 44. Anutin posted on Facebook that “without MOU 44, there will no longer be a line drawn through Koh Kood to cause further doubt or concern. My fellow citizens can rest assured: #KohKoodBelongsToThailand.” Of course, MOU 44 dealt with more than just Koh Kood and it remains to be seen what the outcome of UNCLOS compulsory conciliation (if it happens) would be for the maritime borders.

2. Government seeks to borrow 400 billion baht

The Anutin cabinet also approved a draft emergency decree that authorizies the Ministry of Finance to borrow up to 400 billion baht. As the Public Relations Department summarized, the funds will be used “to ease impacts on people’s living costs caused by the energy crisis and to support the restructuring of Thailand’s energy sector to reduce vulnerability and strengthen energy security in the long run.” Of these funds, 200 billion baht will be used to alleviate the impact of rising costs for vulnerable groups, and another 200 billion baht will be used to facilitate the transition to renewable energy and reduce dependence on imported fuels.

Unsurprisingly, this borrowing scheme is controversial. Thailand’s public debt already stands at around 66 percent of GDP, leading to earlier reports that the government may seek to raise the debt ceiling (currently at 70 percent).1 The constitution, however, mandates that “the issuance of an Emergency Decree under paragraph one shall be made only when the Council of Ministers is of the opinion that it is an emergency of necessity and urgency which is unavoidable.”2 Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nititanpraphas argues that to avoid cascading crises stemming from raising energy prices, which could lead to stagflation, this borrowing is necessary. However, both the People’s Party and the Democrat Party raised questions about the necessity of this borrowing and how the funds will be used. Both parties say they plan to raise a challenge on the legality of this decree with the courts.

3. Constitutional reform stalled

Our final major update concerns something the cabinet didn’t do: the cabinet did not select the constitutional amendment bills still pending from the previous parliament to carry over to the current parliament. Minister attached to the Prime Minister’s office Paradon Prissanananthakul said that the last dissolution of parliament was caused by disagreement over the constitution reform process, and that meant it would be unlikely that the draft would fail to pass once again.

I believe I am correct in saying that the 2026 constitutional referendum led to the biggest popular mandate in Thai history, with over 21 million people voting to draft a new constitution. Yet drafting a new constitution was not included as a government priority in its policy declaration to parliament. For his part, Anutin has maintained that the referendum result was a “command” from the people that is “beyond just a policy” and must be obeyed. However, the People’s Party’s Parit Wacharasindhu said that the government “lacks sincerity” in following the referendum result, while the former election commissioner, Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, asked if this meant the constitutional reform process would be delayed by another two years.

In other news…

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was released on parole today, as we discussed last week.

The People’s Party officially launched their campaign for the Bangkok local elections, with Chaiwat Sathawornwichit as their candidate for governor.

The Democrats will launch their Bangkok election campaign on May 16. Their candidate is a male businessman with political experience aged between 50 to 60. It’s anyone’s guess who that is.

This year the race for governor has felt decidedly low-energy. The incumbent, Chadchart Sittipunt, won a massive election victory in 2022, receiving over fifty percent of the vote against a crowded field that included several qualified and well-known candidates. A NIDA poll last year revealed that around 78 percent of respondents were either very satisfied or quite satisfied with Chadchart’s performance as governor. As such, any candidate seeking to prevent Chadchart’s re-election are setting themselves up for a difficult task. The People’s Party candidate Chaiwat Sathawornwichit straightforwardly acknowledged Chadchart’s high approval ratings and said unseating him will not be easy. Meanwhile, the Democrats admitted that Chadchart’s strength was making it difficult for them to attract capable challengers to take him on.1

With the race only feeling slightly more lively than the Martian surface right now, I’ll cover the gubernatorial election in more detail when the energy hopefully picks up as campaigning starts in honest. Instead, the focus today will be on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council,2 the legislative body of Bangkok’s administration.

Pro-Chadchart groups emerge

Pheu Thai won the most seats on the BMC in 2022, with 20 out of 50 seats. It was thus a surprise when the party decided that it would not field any BMC candidates this year, although the party would allow members to run and use the party logo if they wish. Yet the decision by the former champions not to officially support any BMC candidates immediately set off a torrent of party-switching.

Khrungthep Thurakij has a list of all current Bangkok councillors here and their current electoral plans. It is evident that the Pheu Thai councillors are splitting in different directions. A number may decide to take up the party’s offer to use the Pheu Thai logo and continue running as Pheu Thai members. Others have switched to other parties. Several, however, appear to be planning to run with non-partisan groups supporting Chadchart. These non-partisan groups are not formal party organizations, so members would technically run as independents, with the understanding that they are a part of these looser confederations of councilors.

Chadchart, for his part, has said that he is not currently supporting any councilor candidates and will announce his support for certain groups in due course. (He did post a call for people to join his “Work Work Work” network, which seems likely to be the name of a future group of candidates to support him). In the vacuum, there is a proliferation of groups that are using Chadchart’s green branding and announcing that they intend to support Chadchart as governor. These include a group called “Khon Tum Ngarn” (working people), “Sor Kor Phan Mai” (new breed councilors), and Better Bangkok. Some of these groups appear to be more closely connected with the governor’s team than others.

Of particular interest is Better Bangkok. It was started by former Pheu Thai councilor Surachit “Dr. John” Phongsinghvithya. “Better Bangkok” was the slogan used by Chadchart during his last campaign, and the group’s candidates have been posting graphics showing themselves with the governor. They have also been using a similar CI style to what Chadchart has been using (see right picture below). However, Chadchart released a statement saying that he had no connection to the Better Bangkok group, prompting Dr. John to clarify that while he asked the governor for permission to use a similar branding system, his group was not officially affiliated with Chadchart but will simply seek to support him.

And amidst the chaos, we have at least one group that has already folded. A number of Bangkok Councillor candidates initially appeared ready to contest under the banner of a group called "Bangkok First", but the leader of the group, a ex-Pheu Thai councillor, has already switched his allegiance to the Democrats, bringing at least one ex-People’s Party councillor with him.

Quasi-independence over party labels

The decision by so many candidates to disavow partisan affiliations in favor of less formal groups reverses the triumph of party labels in recent BMC elections. In 2022, only three of the BMC seats had been won by independents affiliated with former governor Asawin Kwanmuang’s Rak Krung Thep group; in 2010 only one independent had won. This year, with Pheu Thai’s withdrawal, we may see a large number of BMC candidates from these looser groupings win. This is actually a reversal of the trend in the provinces towards increasing party prominence. But interestingly, these “independents” are not truly independent, belonging as they do to these looser groups that are attempting to align themselves with prominent candidates like Chadchart. Running with the popular governor may now seem like a far more attractive proposition than remaining with a weakened Pheu Thai

One question worth pondering is: does the People’s Party complete sweep hold any clues for how Bangkok will vote in the BMC elections? Here, past may not be prologue. In 2022, Move Forward won only 14 out of 50 districts before (almost) sweeping the capital in the 2023 election. Long-serving councillors with a strong local record have often been more impervious to the national sentiment than MPs. I would expect all the major parties and groups fielding incumbents to win a number of seats, preventing a PP landslide.

In 2022, the Democrat candidate for governor, Suchatvee Suwansawat, sometimes made the argument that a governor cannot go it alone. His party was also fielding candidates for the Bangkok Metropolitan Council, and voters should consider choosing a governor and a councilor from the same party so that they would be able to work together effectively. Chadchart’s response was that previous independent governors had successfully run Bangkok without their own team in the BMC. If Chadchart does end up endorsing his own team of independents, it likely points to some truth to what Suchatvee said; the governor was likely frustrated without close allies on the BMC. Ironically, then, an independent governor may now want a less independent team of independents to help further his agenda.

I still can’t promise that this will be a regular feature — and to be upfront, if I do turn on paid subscriptions to this newsletter I may make some of these news roundups subscriber-only. But for now, they are completely free, and I hope you enjoy them!

This week’s Thailand Top Three:

• The Anutin government revives proposals for a land bridge in Southern Thailand

• Thaksin Shinawatra approved for early parole

• Agricultural minister Suriya Juangroongrueangkit finds himself in hot water over a bureaucratic transfer

1. A land bridge to nowhere?

The crisis in the Hormuz strait has led to a revival of plans around a “land bridge” in Southern Thailand. Instead of summarizing everything to do with this on-again, off-again mega-project vision here, recommend Aidan Jones’ article in the South China Morning Post here on the land bridge scheme. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul pitched the land bridge vision to visiting Singaporean Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing; the Thai readout stated that “Singapore expressed interest in Thailand’s Land Bridge project, viewing it as a means of transport connection between the two coasts to reduce risks and enhance logistics capacity.”

Predictably, the revival of the land bridge has been controversial. The People’s Party has called for a re-evaluation of the land bridge. The Democrats said that Bhumjaithai did not include a land bridge in their policy proposals during the election campaign, and that shipping companies have privately told the party they would not be interested in using it. There has also been some friendly fire: Industry Minister Varawut Silpa-archa said there must be a thorough environmental assessment, leading Deputy Prime Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakan to joke that Varawut was setting out a position based on his role as the former environment minister and “may be forgetting that he is currently industry minister.”

Given the high price tag of pursuing such a scheme, expect the land bridge to continue dominating policy debates if the Anutin government is serious about pursuing it. But for the land bridge enthusiasts out there, I wouldn’t get too excited yet: a land bridge has been under discussion since the Prayut Chan-o-cha government, and so far the scheme has gotten nowhere.

2. Thaksin to go home

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was returned to prison in September year after the Supreme Court ruled that his stay at the Police-General Hospital between 2023 and 2024 was unwarranted. Since then, we have heard very little from him, aside from what his family has reported after their regular visits to see him in prison. (He reportedly sang a version of “Let It Be” after hearing about the election results in February). Now, Thaksin is coming out: he was granted early parole owing to his age and health.

We still don’t know how public a political role Thaksin will play on his return. Pheu Thai leader Julapun Amornvivat said that Thaksin is unlikely to take up an official advisory position, but remains the “spirit” of the party. Yes, Thaksin could finally make good on his pledge to focus on taking care of his grandchildren. But it’s difficult to imagine Thaksin divorcing himself entirely from politics.

3. Controversial bureaucratic transfer

Agricultural Minister Suriya Juangroongrueangkit has found himself shrouded in controversy this week. Rachen Sillaparaya, the director-general of the Royal Rainmaking Department1, resigned from the bureaucracy after he was transferred to another position in the ministry. Rachen was due to retire in only five months.

Rachen stated in his resignation letter that he was “unable to meet the demands” of the political appointees. Suriya first clarified that he had transferred Rachen because he wanted someone younger in post, “not an old person nearing retirement.” Rachen then alleged that Suriya’s nephew, who runs an airline, had tried to contact him (but that he had not taken the meeting). This prompted Suriya to respond that he had been unaware of his nephew’s attempt to contact Rachen. The drama took another turn when Rachen was also forced to respond to rumors that he was planning to field his daughter as an MP candidate in Sakhon Nakhon; Rachen dismissed these rumors by noting that his daughters are only in primary school. His sister, however, ran as a Bhumjaithai candidate in the past.

While this might initially look like standard conflict between politicians and bureaucrats, this particular controversy could have important implications. Already, a petitioner has asked the Electoral Commission to investigate whether this transfer qualifies as an ethical violation; if the case is taken up, this could potentially lead to Suriya’s removal. Pheu Thai would much prefer for publicity to be concentrated on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Higher Education Yodchanan Wongsawat, who is currently the face of the party; the transfer controversy provides the party with unwelcome headlines instead.

In other news…

The People’s Party launched a quasi-shadow cabinet. (I say quasi because there is no shadow minister assigned to each cabinet minister).

Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Supajee Suthumpun has found herself in a prickly situation due to her decision to team up with a famous livestreamer to sell durian for 100 baht per kilogram.

Bangkok Governor Chadchart Sittipunt sent the strongest signals yet that he’s running for a second term. The People’s Party is likely to field deputy leader Chaiwat Sathawornwichit, while the Democrats say they have a candidate but cannot yet reveal who it is. The Economic Party says their candidate, whose name starts with a “J” (จ), has wide name recognition.

In 2023, the Move Forward Party campaigned on the slogan “choose Move Forward and Thailand will not be the same.” This time around, Bhumjaithai could very well have run on the slogan “Vote for Bhumjaithai and every party will remain the same.”

The People’s Party had originally been anticipated to announce a major leadership change, in the event that party leader Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut was suspended from parliament due to an ethics case against him and 43 other former Move Forward MPs. Indeed, Natthaphong had previously announced that he would step down if a suspension was handed down. Previous reports stated that Natthaphong would be replaced by deputy leader Veerayooth Kanchoochat, while Natthaphong would take on the position of secretary-general. But while the Supreme Court accepted the legal petition, it did not order a suspension of the MPs, which means Natthaphong can still perform his duties and become leader of the opposition. Accordingly, the PP did not replace Natthaphong with Veerayooth as originally anticipated, instead only appointing Picharn Chaowapatanawong as secretary-general.1

It is a little surprising, however, that the PP did not make any sweeping changes to its leadership lineup. The party’s performance in the February 2026 election had fallen short of expectations, and Natthaphong had generally polled behind his party in the NIDA surveys. Indeed, the man who the party had billed as “the programmer who will write Thailand’s future” has always seemed an unorthodox pick for party leader. But one wonders whether or not the PP is still in a “wait and see” position, unwilling to reveal new moves until there is greater clarity on the legal situation.

Pheu Thai also announced a new executive committee lineup, but there were few changes at the very top. Julapun Amornvivat will remain as party leader and Prasert Jantararuangtong as secretary-general. The party did announce the formation of a new advisory committee, which includes many heavyweights into the Thaksinverse, including former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and the prime minister candidate (and currently deputy prime minister) Yodchanan Wongsawat. The board also includes Pheu Thai stalwarts like Suriya Juangroongrueangkit and Phumtham Wechayachai.

For a party that just suffered its worst election result in its history, these changes appear limited in scope and unlikely to alter its trajectory. But the party may also have decided that it has little choice right now but to continue on the path of being a strong mid-sized party. A piece in Khrungthep Thurakij recently stated that Pheu Thai is unlikely to field any candidates in the upcoming Bangkok Metropolitan Council elections, a clear sign that the party is scaling back its ambitions. “When it is no longer a krasae party, and it is not a baan yai party, the ‘red camp generals’ must revise their strategy, scaling down from a large party to a medium-sized party,” the piece wrote. Perhaps the Pheu Thai leadership lineup also does not really matter: all eyes are on Yodchanan as the future of the party, and there is no tradition in Pheu Thai that its most prominent member must be its official leader.

And so for different reasons, two major parties have decided to keep their leadership structures largely intact despite disappointing election performances. A smaller party that made no changes was the Democrat Party. This included making no replacement to Weeraphong Prapha, a deputy leader who had just been poached by the government to become Thailand Trade Representative.

One party did make a significant change: Kla Tham swapped out Narumon Pinyosinwat as leader for Thammanat Promphao. It was a move to formalize the party’s informal power structure, given that Thammanat had already said that he is the party’s “owner.” Thammanat had outperformed expectations in the previous election; as he said at the party meeting, despite undergoing constant attacks, Kla Tham was able to win 56 seats. As he memorably put it: “we did not just topple elephants, but something bigger than an elephant. Whales. If it were my son, he would say krakens.” Thammanat also noted that there were 45 Kla Tham candidates whose losing margin was in hundreds of votes, meaning that the party could also had conceivably won over a hundred MPs if it had more time to campaign.

The challenge for Kla Tham, of course, is the fact that it is unexpectedly now in opposition. Thammanat noted himself that party members have been in government for too long and “are not used to being in opposition.” It remains to be seen whether or not the party can hold together, but the new executive lineup (which included the appointment of 12 deputy leaders) reveals that its members remain loyal. Chalermchai Sri-orn, the former Democrat Party leader who announced last year that he would assist Kla Tham with its election campaign.

Overall, this season of party annual conferences have not yielded big changes, despite a general election that considerably shifted Thailand’s political balance of power. The 2026 general election is over, but most Thai parties appear satisfied to retain their 2025 status quo.