The FY2027 budget proposed by Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has passed its first reading in parliament, with 288 MPs voting in favor and 119 voting against. Here are some of the highlights of the parliamentary debate on the budget.

Ekniti defends government budget 2027 budget

Anutin was accompanying His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn on his visit to France, so Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanpraphas made the opening and closing speeches on the budget debate. His opening speech can be found here, and a summary of his closing speech can be found here.

Ekniti summarized the budget as follows:

The draft Annual Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2027 sets a total budget cap of 3,788,000 million Baht, which can be categorized as follows:

• Current expenditure: 2,786,367.1 million Baht (or 73.6%)

• Treasury reserves compensation: 71,038.1 million Baht (or 1.9%)

• Capital expenditure: 789,171.5 million Baht (or 20.8%)

• Principal debt repayment: 151,520 million Baht (or 4.0%)

10.7% of the budget is allocated for national security, 9.2% for building competitiveness, 16.1% for developing human capital, 25.4% for creating opportunities and social equality, 3.6% for quality of life and the environment, and 17.9% for balancing and developing systems for government administration. 17.1% is placed in emergency reserves

In his speeches, the finance minister mounted a spirited defense of the budget that he has proposed. The goverment’s economic goal, Ekniti said, was to push Thailand into one of the top twenty most competitive countries globally in four years, return GDP growth to 3% annually, and push for Thailand to become a high-income country within 12 years.1 Ekniti noted that last year, the budget deficit amounted to 4.4% of GDP, and the Bhumjaithai government will reduce this deficit to 3.9% of GDP in order to rebuild fiscal credibility. By 2029, the government hopes to reduce this deficit to under 3%.

Ekniti also noted that although it appears that the budget for government investment had decreased by 70 billion baht, the government has in fact simply shifted its method of mobilizing capital through alternative tools, such as state enterprise investment budgets, and Board of Investment incentives and deregulation to attract investment. Overall, Ekniti said: “For the FY 2027 budget, the government will move away from its old practice of under-budgeting or hiding current expenditures—tactics that forced them to draw from treasury reserves later on. Instead, they will bring these vulnerabilities out into the open so that the problems can be targeted and solved directly."

The opposition’s response

All of the major opposition parties roundly criticized the government’s proposed budget.

Leader of the opposition and People’s Party leader Nattaphong Rueangpanyawut slammed the budget as “a budget that comes from the taxes of all Thais, but will not help Thais and instead will help those who are the pillars of the dark blue government.” Meanwhile, deputy leader Sirikanya Tansakun said Thailand’s economic issues are akin to “an abscess that has burst” and without a change to how the government approaches budgeting, the budget deficit will not decrease and new projects will become impossible.

The Democrat Party zeroed in on how the proposed budget is a “budget where we cannot see a future.” Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva argued that virtually the entire investment budget this year comes from deficit spending or loans, which means that the national income is taken up entirely by routine spending and debt repayments. The tax-to-GDP ratio stands at 14.6%, Abhisit said, which is the lowest in history. He thus called for comprehensive tax reform. Deputy leader Korn Chatikavanij echoed Abhisit’s call for tax reform and also pointed out that the government’s goal of taking Thailand to high-income status in 12 years and becoming an OECD member in 2028 is likely impossible, as that would require investing at least 30% of the budget, but Thailand is barely able to invest even 20%.

Multiple MPs zeroed in on the government’s AI budget. Sirikanya noted that “any project with AI in the name or is related to AI received a substantial budget increase,” with the overall AI-related budget doubling. However, there does not appear to be a government strategy on AI, as different agencies are making their own procurement orders. Democrat deputy leader Karndee Leopairote said that although 90% of the AI-related projects are supposedly marked for investment, detailed scrutiny revealed that portions of this budget is actually being spent on building classrooms and even “AI buildings.”

People’s Party deputy leader Veerayooth Kanchoochat criticized the government’s industrial policy, arguing that the government appears to have a “fear of missing out” and is addicted to glamour, seeking foreign investment without truly building internal industrial strength. Focusing on the automobile industry, Veerayooth noted that most of the budget is focused on subsidies for EV producers, with little remaining for infrastructure building, testing centers, and workforce skill development.

Kla Tham joined in criticism of the budget. Kla Tham MP Pakpoom Boonpramook, for example, said that the area-based budgets for provinces and provincial groups had been reduced by 83 percent, which does not look like a normal budget reduction but is instead an attempt to remake devolution of budgetary power.

The biggest fireworks during the debate came when Democrat MP Jury Numkaew (who represents Hat Yai city, which suffered from a major flood last year) said that the government was allocating insufficient funds to disaster prevention. This prompted an angry response from deputy interior minister Jeseth Thaiseth, who accused Jury of not reading the budget carefully enough and suggested that the Democrats appoint him to the budget committee so he would have an opportunity to study the budget further. He was particularly incensed that Jury had said that he needed to light incense to summon a minister to reply to his question. Abhisit came to the assistance of his fellow Democrat MP, suggesting that Jury continue lighting incense until someone could give a proper answer on why there were very little funds for flood prevention in Hat Yai.

What next?

The budget will still need to pass its second and third readings. In the meantime, the cabinet and the major political parties have appointed a 72-member special committee to scrutinize the proposed budget. Particularly noteworthy members include Veera Theerapat, a famous news host who joined previous budget committees under the People’s Party quota but this year has switched to the government quota, Chaiwat Sathawornwichit (the recently defeated People’s Party Bangkok governor candidate), and Watanya Bunnag or “Madam Dear” (previously a Democrat Party politician who faded away from politics after she was refused permission to run in the 2023 party leadership race).

Chadchart Sittipunt wins a landslide victory in the governor’s race

This was one of the most predictable elections in recent Thai history. As we discussed previously in this newsletter, the incumbent governor Chadchart Sittipunt was virtually a lock to win re-election. He did so with ease. Defying a late push from his opponents to investigate internal practices within his administration, Chadchart won around 1.4 million votes (roughly 65 percent of the vote) at the time of writing with 95 percent of the vote counted. He beat his 2022 result both in terms of the vote share and in the raw vote count. It is an enormous personal mandate.

Why did Chadchart win in such a landslide? Satisfaction with his tenure so far, for one. Buy-in for his non-partisan image, as the governor successfully shed his previous Pheu Thai affiliation. Chadchart’s bet that a bigger focus on the “capillaries” of the capital rather than large megaprojects, especially paying attention to daily complaints filed by residents in the Traffy Fondue platform, has also paid off.

The scale of his victory also has much to due with the fact that he faced a field of candidates with relatively low name recognition. One suspects that even had he not campaigned, he would probably still have won almost by default. Yet this still the sort of victory which will raise chatter about whether a return to national politics will be on the cards for someone who appears to be one of the country’s most popular politicians. (Already, at his victory speech, Chadchart was forced to deny questions from reporters about whether his future ambitions would include the office of prime minister).1

No other candidate won more than 15 percent of the vote. Conservative independent candidate Mallika Boonmeetrakool Mahasook came in second place with 13 percent, narrowly besting Chaiwat Sathawornwichit from the People’s Party (who won only 8 percent). The Democrat candidate, Anucha Burapachaisri, was in fourth place with less than 5 percent of the vote. In a way, all of these candidates underperformed. There are enough combined Bhumjaithai and Democrat voters in Bangkok that both Mallika and Anucha should have theoretically performed a lot more strongly.2 Chadchart was able to build a diverse coalition of voters, and perhaps the enormous polling lead he opened discouraged anti-Chadchart voters from even turning out. (Turnout dipped dramatically from 60 percent in 2022 to only 49 percent this year).

There was no bigger underperformer than Chaiwat, however. The PP had just swept Bangkok in a landslide during the general election in February; for Chaiwat to come in a distant third place will be seen as an enormously disappointing result. Part of that comes down to Chadchart’s popularity and Chaiwat’s low name recognition, but the party leadership will be unable to escape taking responsibility: it is simply too dramatic a swing from the general election just a few months ago when they had won 1.4 million votes in Bangkok. The party made too many unforced errors, including a controversial appointment that alienated the party base. The PP’s base has become noticeably less enthusiastic about the party since the dissolution of the Move Forward Party; the election results underline this trend.

People’s Party emerges as largest group in the Bangkok Metropolitan Council, but fails to win a majority

The bright spot for the PP came in the Bangkok Metropolitan Council (BMC)3 race, where the party at the time of writing is on track to win around 22 seats. (26 seats is needed for a majority on the 50-seat council). This is a modest improvement from 2022, when the party won 14 seats. The pro-Chadchat “Khon Tum Ngarn” (Working People) group won 11 seats, while another pro-Chadchat group, Better Bangkok, won 2 seats. (These groups are not officially endorsed by Chadchart — see here). Pheu Thai, which allowed candidates to run under the party name but did not otherwise provide much official support, was reduced from 20 seats in 2022 to just 4 seats. (This was to be expected; many of the party’s candidates had switched to the independent pro-Chadchart groups).

For Chadchart, who depends on the BMC as the city legislature to meet his budgetary needs, these results are a mixed bag. No party or group has a majority, so no one will have complete veto power over Chadchart’s agenda. At the same time, however, Chadchart will likely have to continue doing what he did in his first term: negotiating with groups of councillors who may or may not be totally friendly to the governor. Will the more-dominant PP play ball with the governor? Are the pro-Chadchart candidates truly loyal to Chadchart? These questions will be tested in the governor’s second term.

It’s worth noting that Chadchart’s decision not to officially endorse BMC candidates may have backfired. Given the scale of his victory, pro-Chadchart groups probably should have been able to put in a stronger performance than what we saw. In the end, it’s likely that many voters remained confused to the end about who the Working People group were affiliated with — which is perfectly understandable given the unusual ambiguity of the one-way endorsement.4

I’m hesitant to draw too many lessons from the BMC elections for national parties, because in the end the major story there is that it was a good night for incumbents. Of the 50 councillors elected, 32 were incumbents — even though 17 of them switched parties or group affiliations between 2022 and 2026. So in the end, Bangkokians put a premium on familiar councillors with a track record of local service delivery.

Yet if forced to extrapolate from these results, I will say this. The PP’s decent performance helps alleviate some of the sting of the poor performance in the governor’s race. Almost all of the new faces elected were from the PP, showing that they are still virtually the only party in Bangkok where the brand matters more than the candidate. The fact that many former Pheu Thai members won under other labels (like the Working People group or even as Democrats) is another data point that the party may have to write off Bangkok for the time being. The Democrats appear to be in a holding state; its recruitment of strong candidates from other parties in some districts have helped the party maintain its seat count from 2022, but there is no sign yet of a revival in the capital.

With the general election and the Bangkok local election coming in quick succession, Thai politics will now enter a less electorally dramatic period. In the coming weeks, we’ll now turn our attention here at The Coffee Parliament to more policy-focused matters.

Miscellaneous notes

• The People’s Party also lost the Pattaya mayoral election to the incumbent Poramase Ngampichet. Poramase’s “We Love Pattaya” group swept the Pattaya council elections.

• Chadchart barely put up any election posters during the campaign — perhaps an indication that you don’t need to in order to win. Perhaps a sign that campaigns can reduce roadside posters moving forward?

The Race for Governor

At the start of this month, I wrote that Chadchart Sittipunt is likely to be a lock to win re-election as governor. The “Agong Regime” allegations have not hurt his polling numbers, as far as we can tell, and if that did not hurt, new scrutiny over the governor’s tenure like the Democrat Party’s examination of “suspicious” public procurement practices in the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration is unlikely to have much of a cut-through effect. All the data we have points to a Chadchart landslide, whether it be polling data or social media engagement statistics (Chadchart’s engagement statistics simply dwarfs all other candidates).

What I want to highlight today is Suan Dusit Poll’s interesting polling data where they asked respondents who they voted for in 2022 and who they intend to vote for this time. I’ve illustrated the data below. Worth noting that I don’t know the raw numbers of 2022 voters, only the percentages, so the diagram below is a little misleading in the sense that it presents all five 2022 candidates as having equal support. But for the purposes of illustrating voter flows, I think that it is useful enough:

Chadchart, who sits at 60 percent support in this poll, is retaining the majority of his 2022 voters (around 74 percent) with some minor outflows to other candidates. He is also receiving a big chunk of voters who previously cast their support for his 2022 opponents. Interestingly, 64 percent of Sakoltee voters, perhaps the most popular choice among ideological conservatives in 2022, told Suan Dusit that they plan to vote for Chadchart this time around. I imagine that this is very much an effect of seeing the People’s Party sweep Bangkok in the general election earlier this year and, fearing a repeat, choosing Chadchart as a “lesser evil.”

The People’s Party’s Chaiwat Sathawornwichit (sitting at 13 percent) retains around 44 percent of Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn’s voters. That…is not a great result for the PP, and a sign that the party has simply been unable to generate any sort of enthusiasm in the capital. While the PP probably never truly expected Chaiwat to win, the lack of enthusiasm for its gubernatorial candidate could have negative downstream effects for its Bangkok Metropolitan Council candidates.

As far as I can tell from various polls and anecdotal data, aside from backing Chadchart, the conservative vote is “coalescing” around the independent candidate Mallika Boonmeetrakul Mahasuk (7 percent). For context: Mallika has long been a popular conservative media figure. There is certainly more online buzz that I can see around Mallika in conservative circles than Anucha; I imagine that most Bhumjaithai voters will back her given that there is no Bhumjaithai candidate. (If nothing else, Mallika certainly has an interesting election poster — one gets to ponder the need for change, innovation, idealism, and freedom in Bangkok).

The Democrat Party’s Anucha Burapachaisri (with around 4 percent support) is capturing only around 23 percent of voters who previously voted for the 2022 Democrat candidate, Suchatvee Suwansawat. If accurate, that is a devastating result for the Democrats, who didn’t do that well in Bangkok in the general election earlier this year but should still be capturing a lot more than 4 percent of the vote. My unscientific, anecdotal data is that even my politically-engaged friends do not recognize his name.

This is a lot of words to say that my assessment of the race has not changed since the start of the month, and all the other candidates are probably out of time to catch up unless there are some truly earth-shattering negative revelations about Chadchart.

The Bangkok Metropolitan Council Elections

I’m disinclined to look too closely at Suan Dusit’s BMC election because the data is a little questionable (they include Bhumjaithai as an option even though the party is not running any candidates). The polling we do have does suggest that independent candidates (from various groups, but most would be pro-Chadchart) are favored to win the most seats. Yet polling here is only useful to some extent — support for BMC candidates are distributed unevenly across districts.

I did find NIDA Poll director Suvicha Pouaree’s observations on this election interesting: “BMC candidates with organized votes are advantaged.” Because the PP and the Democrats have found it so difficult to generate enthusiasm amongst their voters in this election, he notes, they are unlikely to turn out their supporters. This favors independent candidates with their own local popularity, particularly in the pro-Chadchart “Working People” (khon tum ngarn) group.

How much does this matter, you may ask — is the BMC truly that powerful. ThaiPBS calls them the “hidden shaper of Bangkok’s future.” I would argue that for Chadchart, assuming he is re-elected, whether or not he has a friendly BMC could be a critical factor determining the level of success he experiences in his second term. Chadchart did not run with any BMC candidates in 2022 and has acknowledged that this has created “limitations” for him. Given the renewed attention that other parties have now placed on scrutinizing corruption within the Bangkok city government, a BMC that is dominated by unfriendly councilors could make life quite difficult for the governor.

With only ten days to go, we’ll find out very soon what the next four years of Bangkok’s administration will look like.

In memory of Her Royal Highness Princess Bajrakitiyabha, who passed away on June 11 at the age of 47.

The Thai government released an English statement on Princess Bajrakitiyabha’s passing today:

The Bureau of the Royal Household announced on 12 June 2026 that Her Royal Highness Princess Bajrakitiyabha Narendiradebyavati Kromluangrajasarinisiribajra Mahavajrarajadhita passed away peacefully at 19.48 hr on 11 June 2026 at King Chulalongkorn Memorial Hospital in Bangkok.

Her Royal Highness had stayed in the hospital for medical treatment since 15 December 2022, after losing consciousness because of a heart condition. In April 2026, doctors detected an infection in the abdomen caused by inflammation of the large intestine. This made Her Royal Highness’s condition unstable, with low blood pressure, an irregular heartbeat, and abnormalities in blood clotting.

Although the medical team provided treatment for Her Royal Highness to the best of its ability. Her Royal Highness’s condition deteriorated and the Princess passed away peacefully on 11 June 2026 at the age of 47.

His Majesty the King has graciously issued a Royal Command directing the Bureau of the Royal Household to arrange the royal funeral rites, with the highest honors accorded to the Princess in accordance with royal tradition. The royal remains will lie in state at Biman Rataya Pavilion within the Grand Palace.

Princess Bajrakitiyabha was His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn’s eldest daughter, and the first grandchild of His Majesty King Rama IX. She was passionate about justice and human rights, working in particular to assist incarcerated women. She also served as the Thai Ambassador in Vienna between 2012 to 2014. Her full biography has been released here by the Thai government.

May the Princess rest in eternal peace.

Good morning from The Coffee Parliament. Here is your Morning Coffee Briefing for this week, with some updates on the Bangkok elections, a pardon for Thaksin Shinawatra, and the launch of a popular new economic scheme.

1. “Agong Regime" allegations put heat on Chadchart

Last week, I wrote that Chadchart Sittipunt is “virtually guaranteed” to win re-election as Bangkok governor. His competitors are going to try their best to make it as hard as possible for him, however, and in the past week we saw the first major challenge mounted against the incumbent governor. New allegations have been made on the existence of the “Agong Regime” or “Agong System.” What is an agong, you ask? It is a Teochew term referring to a grandfather. The Economic Party, which is running a candidate for governor, has alleged that a network exists where candidates for district administrators must meet with a certain individual and provide a quid pro quo to receive the office, along with other instances of corruption within the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration. Daily News has summarized all the allegations of corruption made here.

Attention on the “agong” has centered on Torsak Chotimongkol, the 69 year old former chairman of the board of advisors to the Governor of Bangkok under Chadchart. Torsak is known to be close to Chadchart and has worked with him since 2020 when Chadchart decided to run for governor, and he was nicknamed by the governor’s team as agong. Torsak firmly denied the existence of an “Agong Regime” (and so does Chadchart), and he is considering taking legal action. This hasn’t stopped Chadchart’s opponents from seizing on this issue, however. The People’s Party’s Chaiwat Sathawornwichit argued that corruption within the appointment system is indeed an issue, saying that “if the head does not shake, the tail would not move.” The Democrat candidate, Anucha Burapachaisri, made similar remarks.

These criticisms represent the first time that the popular governor has been attacked so directly during this campaign. Will it make a dent? A recent NIDA poll (fielded between June 2-4, so slightly before the Agong Regime allegations began coming out) found that Chadchart has the support of 67 percent of respondents, with Chaiwat trailing far behind at around 7 percent. This isn’t quite Assad margins, but it is approaching some pretty unassailable territory. Unless the Agong allegations really cut through, Chadchart will still be sailing towards re-election.

2. Thaksin Shinawatra pardoned

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was recently released from prison on parole, has received another royal pardon which immediately ended his probation. This pardon was issued on the occasion of Her Majesty the Queen’s birthday celebrations. As a result, Thaksin was able to remove his electronic monitoring ankle bracelet.

Thai media have reported that Thaksin is likely to soon travel to Dubai, with a telltale sign being that he does not plan to hold his customary birthday celebrations at his Chan Song Lah residence this year on July 26. It thus appears that Thaksin intends to keep a low public profile, unlike during the Pheu Thai government from 2023 to 2025 when he frequently made political statements. That should give Yodchanan Wongsawat, the new face of Pheu Thai, some breathing room to refresh the party’s image. See more here for my thoughts on what feels like the end of the Thaksin era.

3. Thai Chuay Thai scheme launches

The Thai Chuay Thai scheme launched last week. This is the successor program to Khon La Khrueng (“Let’s Go Halves”), the Prayut-era scheme where the government subsidized half the cost of payments at participating SMEs. An enormously popular policy, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul revived it during his first term last year, and promised to continue it after being re-elected. Instead of continuing the Khon La Khrueng branding, however, the Bhumjaithai government has made the scheme their own by rebranding it to Thai Chuay Thai (“Thais Help Thais”) and having the government subsidize 60 percent of the cost of payments.

By all accounts, the scheme is once again enormously popular, with 26 million people registering for the program and over 21 million actual users during the first week. There are concerns from economists, however, that this scheme will only temporarily inject demand into the economy, and the government will likely need to find other measures to continue alleviating the increasing cost of living due to the global energy crisis.

At the same time, the Ministry of Finance is moving ahead with stricter rules for holders of the state welfare card (commonly called the “poor people card”), which allows low-income Thai citizens to access a range of benefits. Finance Minister Ekniti Nititanpraphas wants to ensure that those who are not truly in dire economic straits are not included in this scheme. Expect more criticism on how the government implements these checks. Already, Anutin has reportedly put a brake on plans to use whether a parent is included on their children’s tax returns deductions as a criterion to prevent them from accessing the state welfare card.

Two political experts, Stithorn Thananithichot and Suranand Vejjajiva, recently predicted that Chadchart Sittipunt is virtually guaranteed to win re-election for Bangkok governor next month. I think that this is probably a common opinion.

As a political scientist, however, I feel compelled to do a deeper dive into why exactly Chadchart is in such a strong position. While this is not necessarily a prediction, we have enough data to say that Chadchart is almost a lock to be re-elected as governor for three reasons. 1) He remains popular, 2) His competitors are not as strong as in 2022, and 3) Bangkok voters are unlikely to prioritize party over personality. Let’s take these arguments in turn.

1. Chadchart was very popular in 2022 and appears to remain popular

It would probably not be wrong to say that Chadchart is one of Thailand’s most popular politicians. Initially fueled by memes about his “strength” and down-to-earth personality, his support base evolved into a dedicated fandom. Although initially aligned with Pheu Thai (he served as transport minister in Yingluck Shinawara’s cabinet and was one of the party’s candidates for prime minister in 2019), he has largely shed his former partisanship in favor of a less divisive independent brand. All of this produced, for Chadchart, a dominant victory in 2022.

That victory is particularly impressive because it came against a very strong field. He faced perhaps the most qualified group of candidates to ever run for Bangkok governor, a field that included the incumbent governor and deputy governor (Aswin Kwanmuang and Sakoltee Phattiyakul), a famous engineering expert with a prominent media profile (the Democrats’ Suchatvee Suwansawat), and a famous MP with high name recognition (the MFP’s Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn). Despite the tough competition, Chadchart still managed to win over 50% of the vote, relegating Suchatvee to a distant second place, clustering with Wiroj, Sakoltee and Aswin.

I wondered for a while if Chadchart would be able to retain his popularity over four years as governor. It is an unforgiving job; voters in the past have blamed governors for all of Bangkok’s intractable problems from traffic jams to flooding. But the evidence seems to indicate that Chadchart remains more or less broadly popular. A NIDA poll conducted during his third year on the job found that 48 percent of respondents planned to vote for him again, and around 74 percent of respondents were either very satisfied or largely satisfied with his performance. Given this level of satisfaction with the status quo, it begs the question of why these voters would take a risk on the unknown.

That Chadchart remains popular is visible in the fact that many Bangkok Metropolitan Council candidates are choosing to eschew party labels in order of affiliations with pro-Chadchart groups. Parties like the Democrats were publicly struggling to find a candidate to take on the governor, while Bhumjaithai chose not to even contest the race; these are indications that party polling must indicate a low likelihood of success. And speaking of struggling to find candidates…

2. Chadchart faces a lesser known field of candidates

This year, Chadchart’s competitors include:

• People’s Party candidate Chaiwat Sathornwichit

• Democrat Party candidate Anucha Burapachaisri

• Economic Party candidate Chanthep Selawet

• Independent candidate Mallika Mahasook

• Independent candidate ML Kornkasiwat Kasemsri

• Independent candidate Komsan Panwichartkul

The major party candidates are less known to the public compared to the 2022 slate of candidates, such as Suchatvee, Wiroj, or Aswin. Chaiwat has been a relatively low-profile PP MP. Anucha was a former Bangkok MP and the Prayut government’s chief spokesman, but he is not a household name. Mallika and ML Kornkasiwat are known for their media appearances and activism respectively, but whether that translates to support in a gubernatorial race is unclear. Things could change as the campaign begins in earnest, but they have a lot more to do to catch up to Chadchart’s universal name recognition.

The early polling indicates this name recognition problem. A Suan Dusit Poll found that Chadchart was supported by around 57 percent of respondents, while Chaiwat registered around 18 percent. No other candidate broke five percent. I do not know if this poll is fully accurate, but the wide margin is unlikely to be completely erroneous. While I expect the polls to tighten as the billboards go up and the other candidates become better known, the gap could well prove insurmountable.

Many of these candidates appear to acknowledge themselves that it is going to be difficult to defeat Chadchart. Chaiwat has said that “we must do better than Chadchart, who is already doing a good job.” Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva said that he would give Chadchart a better score than the 5 out of 10 that he has given himself, noting that the governor is dedicated to his job. These are not the pitches of parties that sound determined and confident about unseating the incumbent.

3. Bangkok voters prioritize personality over party in the gubernatorial election

There are two ways in which Chatchart could lose. The first is that supporters of the People’s Party can be persuaded to stick with their party. In the 2026 general election, 1.4 million voters cast a party-list ballot for the People’s Party. The party dyed the capital completely orange, in many constituencies winning more votes than the next three parties combined. If the vast majority of 2026 PP voters cast a vote for Chaiwat Sathawornwichit, there would be no question that he would win.

Another scenario is if the conservative camp manages to unify around a candidate while PP and Pheu Thai voters fragment between Chatchart and Chaiwat. In 2026, a group of political parties that I will loosely group together as conservative parties (namely Bhumjaithai, the Democrat Party, United Thai Nation, the Economic Party, and Thai Pakdee) won a little over a million votes collectively. They are a group I would broadly characterize as anti-orange and anti-Thaksin (and hence the disapproval extends to Chadchart). The conservative-leaning Naewna newspaper has suggested that if the conservative camp can “dissolve their conflicts and unify their votes as a singular power, the game can be changed.”

On paper these are plausible suggestions; the graph above shows that the “progressive” and “conservative” camps both potentially have enough voters to defeat Chadchart. In practice, this is highly unlikely.

Take a look at a comparison of candidate performances in 2022 against political party performances on the party-list ballot in the 2023 general election. Chadchart outperformed his old party, Pheu Thai, by over 700,000 votes. It indicates that Chadchart possesses cross-party appeal and is able to attract votes from across the political spectrum. He received support from far more than just his natural base of supporters (Pheu Thai fans), meaning that he was able to draw in votes from progressive and conservative voters as well. His independent affiliation has allowed him to successfully erase his image as a former Pheu Thai figure and given license for people who would normally not vote for the Thaksin camp to vote for him.

Secondly, it shows that Bangkok’s progressive voters have different calculations in mind when voting in local elections. Wiroj underperformed the MFP’s subsequent performance by over 1.4 million votes. The progressives are not so loyal to the various incarnation of orange parties that it is unthinkable to vote for another non-orange candidate they like. It is thus highly unlikely that all of the PP’s 1.4 million voters will cast a vote for Chaiwat; a significant portion will certainly break for Chatchart. Larger political trends aren’t helping, either. The PP just suffered a bruising election defeat and there seems to be no indication that the party has been able to recover any semblance of wind in their sails. Unless something changes in the next month, even their supporters are probably not feeling all that enthusiastic about the party.

Meanwhile, conservative voters split in many directions in 2022, and the race became personality-driven rather than party-driven — Suchatvee significantly outperformed the Democrats’ subsequent performance in 2022. The fact that there was no clear “regime candidate” (Palang Pracharath did not field a candidate) made unification difficult. We will probably see something similar play out this time. In the past few elections, conservative voters have never shown any indication of an ability to unify. We tend to treat them as homogeneous camp, but they are anything but: of the roughly 1 million “conservative” voters, around half a million supported Bhumjaithai in 2026, while a little over 300,000 voted for the Democrats.

Given that Bhumjaithai is not fielding a candidate, the half a million will have to go somewhere. But instead of unifying behind a candidate, they will likely split between Anucha, Mallika, Chanthep, and ML Kornkasiwat. None appear to me to be a clear choice. The Democrats won four gubernatorial elections in a row this century, but that era is gone. It is not a given that the 300,000 who voted for the Democrats in the general election will vote for Anucha; at the same time, there are many Bhumjaithai voters who are probably incensed at the Democrats’ role in opposition and would not vote for him either. Indeed, in a bid to ensure that the PP’s Chaiwat does not win, some will likely cast a vote for Chatchart.

There is still a month of campaigning to go, and it will be interesting to see how the candidates’ vision for Bangkok differ. But at this early stage, the frontrunner to win is unusually clear.

It’s a long weekend in Thailand, but here is another edition of The Coffee Parliament’s Morning Coffee Briefing to start your week. I will also have another article out tomorrow about the Bangkok governor election, so today’s briefing will focus mostly on parliamentary activities.

This week’s Thailand top three:

1. Parliament voted not to allow the DSI to question Kla Tham NP Chonnaput Naksua

2. A bid to form a special committee to further evaluate the Land Bridge proposal was rejected

3. Controversy brews over a government scheme to give free pro AI subscriptions to five million users

1. Kla Tham MP protected by parliament

The House of Representatives voted to shield Kla Tham MP Chonnaput Naksua from a Department of Special Investigations (DSI) request to question him. Chonnaput has been embroiled in legal controversy, with the Attorney-General backing charges against him on alleged illegal online gambling and money laundering. MPs enjoy parliamentary immunity while the house is in session, so for any DSI case to proceed, the Speaker of the House of Representatives must grant permission. 308 MPs voted to protect Chonnaput, while 126 voted in favor of allowing the DSI to question him.

Of the 308 MPs, almost all were from Kla Tham and the government coalition. That Kla Tham would vote to defend one of their own MPs is unsurprising, but why the government MPs? Bhumjaithai’s spokesperson said that the party feels he should cooperate with the DSI without needing a parliamentary vote, while some MPs argued that the principle of parliamentary immunity must be protected. There is already speculation, however, that this is a sign that the government coalition still wants to preserve some level of friendship with Kla Tham in case they are brought in as a future coalition partner. (In fact, the original decision to exclude Kla Tham was a genuine surprise).

Undoubtedly, this was an expensive use of the government’s political capital. Judging from the social media response, even those who are generally favorable towards Bhumjaithai are unhappy with how the government MPs acted in this case. Thai Pakdee leader Warong Dechgitvigrom has found another rallying cry to add to his crusade against perceived parliamentary over-indulgence: he is now calling for the abolition of parliamentary immunity.

2. No special committee to further study Land Bridge

The House of Representatives also voted this week to reject the formation of a special committee to further study the government’s proposal to build a “land bridge” in Southern Thailand. (See here for more about Bhumjaithai’s revival of this mega-project). People’s Party leader Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut argued that a committee is needed to find a truly sustainable proposal for southern development, while Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva called the scheme a “geographical illusion” that risks environmental destruction and bringing Thailand into an unwanted geopolitical spotlight.

For the government’s part, a Bhumjaithai MP argued that studies about the land bridge have already been conducted and there is no need to study this over and over; what matters, he argues, is truly listening to the people. Deputy Prime Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakan says that he is still waiting for the results of another study.

3. Controversy over AI scheme

Digital Economy Minister Chaichanok Chidchob is spearheading a scheme called the “TH-AI Passport” which would aims to provide free access to “pro” AI tools to 5 million Thais. The primary goal, according to the Ministry of Digital Economy, is to lift Thailand’s relatively low AI adoption rate, which lags behind some of its neighbors.

This week, PP MP Pawoot Pongvitayapanu (a tech guru) raised several questions about the scheme in parliament. This included its high cost (around 1.6 billion baht) and short bidding period, along with questioning whether the winner of the bid has been “locked” by one of the scheme’s procurement specifications (the winner of the bid must be able to advertise the scheme in at least 1,500 convenience stores). He also asked why the government is not procuring AI subscriptions differently from a global tech company. Chaichanok, in parliament, argued that this scheme is urgently needed to increase Thailand’s AI capabilities. He said accusations about the short bidding period are inaccurate as the procurement process began five months ago. Chaichanok also noted that government procurement rules made direct procurement with a global tech company difficult, and that he also wanted to build up Thailand’s local AI ecosystem.

That is unlikely to be the end of the matter, as opposition politicians continue raising questions about various aspects of the scheme on defining “pro” capabilities and data ownership. One question that I have is whether procuring “pro” AI subscriptions will truly raise Thailand’s AI adoption rate (is that not aimed more at heavy users who would already be using AI)? I also have a lot of thoughts on AI giveaways here.

Good morning from The Coffee Parliament. Today, I’m going to focus on Bhumjaithai’s new proposals on how to honor the referendum result and move forward with constitutional reform. And also: a short Morning Coffee Briefing is attached at the end!

Bhumjaithai unveils their proposals on constitutional reform

On May 20, the Bhumjaithai Party officially submitted its draft bill on constitutional reform to Sophon Zaram, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. After criticism that constitutional reform appears to be stalled, the government appears eager to demonstrate that it does intend to honor the results of the constitutional referendum held earlier this year. If any bill on constitutional reform passes in this parliamentary term, it will almost certainly be the Bhumjaithai draft, given that the government holds a substantial majority. As such, it’s worth taking a look at what this draft contains.

The new draft that Bhumjaithai unveiled is quite similar to the previous version it submitted to parliament back in September 2025. The Constitution Drafting Assembly will be composed of one hundred members, including representatives from each of Thailand’s 77 provinces and 23 members with legal and political expertise. A further 300 reserve members will also be selected. From these members of the CDA, a Constitution Drafting Committee and a Committee for Public Hearings and Promoting Public Participation will be appointed. (See diagram below for full breakdown).

Technically, this legislation is submitted as an amendment to Section 256 of the 2017 Constitution (which governs how constitutional change can be conducted). One major change that Bhumjaithai has made in the 2026 version of this draft compared to the 2025 version is the parliamentary threshold by which a new constitution has to be pass in order to be approved. It mandates that a new draft requires the approval of more than half of all parliamentarians — which works out to 351 MPs and senators out of the 700 total. This must include at least 1 in 4 senators. In the previous draft, the minimum number of senators was 1 in 5. (Given what we know about the political affinities of the current Senate…) The draft also requires the approval of 20% of the MPs from parties who are not represented in the cabinet or the parliamentary leadership (i.e. opposition parties and minor coalition members).

Following the Constitutional Court’s ruling last year that the CDA cannot be directly appointed, Bhumjaithai’s draft will have the CDA be selected by parliament. Bhumjaithai proposes that the number of CDA members each party can select will be proportional to the number of MPs it has. This means that if the selection process occurs before a dissolution of parliament, the House of Representatives-selected portion of the CDA will reflect the 2026 election results, in which Bhumjaithai is the largest party. I have not seen official confirmation of how the Senate-selected portion of the CDA would be broken down yet.

The opposition parties are not entirely happy with Bhumjaithai’s draft. The People’s Party is particularly displeased with the proposed method of selecting the CDA, with leader Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut, asking whether it would allow some political groups to monopolize power in the drafting of the new charter.1 It’s also worth noting that the Bhumjaithai draft bans any amendment of Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution (which deals with the basic structure of the state and the monarchy), while the PP has long stated it does not agree with such restrictions. Meanwhile, Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva appears to be treading the middle ground, arguing that a reform proposal should allow for broader participation by the public while also putting Sections 1 and 2 off-limits. Acknowledging that the Democrats do not have enough seats to propose its own version of charter amendment, Abhisit said he will seek cooperation with other small like-minded parties.

Nikorn Chamnong, Bhumjaithai’s chief spokesperson on constitutional matters, has estimatedhttps://www.bbc.com/thai/articles/cj6p9n2y8k9o that the selection of a CDA can occur next year. Should the new draft constitution pass the two remaining required referendums, it would likely come in effect by 2029. All of that is contingent, of course, on the draft legislation passing. I do believe that Bhumjaithai will make a real attempt to pass its draft — this is likely to produce a CDA that is most friendly to its own vision. But for a party like the PP, it is caught between a rock and a hard place. This might be the only shot of pursuing constitutional change in the short term, but CDA members selected by the party will form a very small minority. In other words, it is unlikely that a new constitution will be produced that incorporates the PP’s vision.

Morning Coffee Briefing

It’s been two weeks since the last Morning Coffee Briefing; here is a roundup of some important updates since then. (I couldn’t get this out in time for morning coffee in Thailand, but hopefully you can enjoy it with your Monday lunch!)

1. The race for Bangkok governor appears to be mostly set, with Chatchart Sittipunt having resigned from office and preparing to run for re-election.

• The Democrat Party unveiled Anucha Burapachaisri, a former Bangkok MP and Prayut government spokesman, as its candidate for governor.

• For now, polling points to a race that is not at all close: a Suan Dusit Poll had Chatchart leading the field at 57.68%, with an enormous lead over his closest challenger, the People’s Party candidate Chaiwat Sathawornwichit at 17.90%. This is partly due to the campaign not having properly started yet, so all of Chadchart’s competitors suffer from lack of name recognition. But that’s a lot of ground to make up in one month.

2. The 400 billion baht loan is facing a major legal challenge, as the Constitutional Court has accepted the petition by opposition parties asking it to evaluate the bill’s constitutionality.

• See last briefing for more details about this loan decree.

3. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has spent the past few days in France, in a visit that is scheduled to take six days.

• Today, the prime minister plans to sign a “Joint Action Plan for Strengthening Thailand - France Partnership 2026-2028.” According to the Thai government: “It aims to elevate bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership, while expanding collaboration in areas that are aligned with global trends, such as transition to decarbonized energy, and promotion of Thailand’s soft power in fashion, film, and cuisine.”

• Thai firms have been urging Anutin to prioritize negotiations over the Thailand - EU Free Trade Agreement.

In the past week, I’ve done a few interviews on former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s release from prison last Monday. I wanted to gather together some thoughts into a full post. As such, there will be no Morning Coffee Briefing this week — my apologies!

I also recently wrote a piece for Latitude Ten on how Thailand is a nation of self-help books: check it out here.

From resilience to rejection

In 1996, Thaksin Shinawatra led the Palang Dharma Party into a general election. The previous year, the party had won 23 seats in parliament — a respectable number, although lower than in recent elections. But the 1996 general election proved to be fatal. Palang Dharma won only one seat. It was a mortal wound: the party would never win a seat again in an election. Thaksin felt compelled to resign from the party leadership.

Leading a party to such an electoral defeat would probably be fatal to most politicians. But of course, just five years later Thaksin would lead his new Thai Rak Thai Party to what was at that point the biggest election victory in Thai democratic history. 2001 marked the beginning of what Jonathan Head and Hataikarn Treesuwan call the “Thaksin era,” something that they note “is now almost certainly over.”

Whether or not the Thaksin era is over is a matter for legitimate debate. The former prime minister has proven to be one of the most resilient characters of Thai politics, with him and his family surviving two coups and several unfavorable judicial rulings. Thaksin has proven perfectly capable of getting up when he is knocked down: the 1996 election is firm evidence that he can never be counted out. His return to Thailand in 2023 was another example of a previously-unimaginable comeback.

Indeed, can you think of another politician who has been as politically relevant as him for as long? When Thaksin first entered politics in 1990s, the major political players were men like Chuan Leekpai, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, Banharn Silpa-archa, and Chamlong Srimuang. Banharn is dead; Chavalit and Chamlong have long retired from politics. Only Chuan remains an active politician, but as a backbencher. The sheer length of Thaksin’s level of influence is virtually unprecedented.

But the challenges that now lie against him do put into question whether or not a comeback will finally elude one of Thailand’s most wily politicians.

The question is thus: can a “Thaksin thinks, Pheu Thai acts” approach to politics still work? The Thaksin-fueled Pheu Thai brand was built on an anti-status quo orientation and generous economic schemes. But it appears that the Pheu Thai playbook has finally been exhausted. Ironically, the dealmaking of Pheu Thai in 2023 may have lost some of its political resonance, given that Thaksin has now served his prison sentence and the People’s Party engaged in curious dealmaking of its own in 2025. But its latest tenure in government was in its own terms damaging to the party brand. Its signature 10,000 baht giveaway scheme was delivered only partially, and the economy was lackluster at best.

Unfortunately, the party appears to have run out of ideas and ways to make people talk about their ideas. Twenty-five years ago Thai Rak Thai’s policies and campaigning methods were a novelty. Now they are commonplace, and room to innovate has narrowed considerably. Recall that this year, their flashiest election pledge was a proposal to give one million baht to nine people a day. In elections past it would have been one of the central talking points of the campaign. Remarkably, this proposal faded from the headlines rather quickly, and few still discuss it today. Pheu Thai’s ability to control the national conversation simply is not what it once was.

And all of this is before we even consider the baggage that comes up with the Shinawatras. Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s premiership ended in deep controversy over her phone call with Cambodia. (That was enough for me to write in July 2025 that this signaled the end of the family’s political dominance). Thaksin himself remains a deeply polarizing figure, someone who can inspire enough hatred that tens of thousands of people came out to protest against him, his brother-in-law, and his sister in the late 2000s and early 2010s.

Which brings us to where we are today: a party suffering from a precipitous decline. Take a look at the trend of Pheu Thai’s electoral performance in the past three elections where there was a two ballot system. The trend of decline is starkly visible. Between 2011 and 2026, Pheu Thai has lost about 10 million constituency votes and 8 million party-list votes. This gives us all the information we need about the declining efficacy of Pheu Thai’s electoral strategy.

Pheu Thai has clearly lost its luster even in the strongholds where the Shinawatra brand had counted most. Consider results in the last general election. The party lost major ground in the Northeast to Bhumjaithai and Kla Tham and in the North to Kla Tham and the People’s Party. In former strongholds, the results were devastating. Take Chiang Mai, Thaksin’s birthplace, for example. This was a province where Pheu Thai won 65 percent of the vote in 2011. They had lost a lot of ground in 2023 to Move Forward. Shockingly, they were completely wiped out this year.

Pheu Thai as a mid-sized player

The fundamental question facing Pheu Thai is this: is it satisfied with being a mid-sized party? Some media reports have said that it is. Already, we are seeing signs of retrenchment. The party, for example, will not be officially fielding councillors in the Bangkok local elections, even as it allows some candidates to use the party logo. This comes just four years after Pheu Thai became the largest party on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council.1

Being a medium-sized party with anything between 30 to 80 seats is not an impossible task, as long as they prevent valuable local factions from jumping ship. In this scenario, Pheu Thai could remain a relevant political player for years to come. Like Bhumjaithai or Chart Thai in the past, it could be an indispensable coalition partner that makes up the numbers for a majority and does not put too much of a fuss about the terms of joining a government. Yet this is a hazardous path. Mid-sized parties focused on just a few provinces or regions find it difficult to generate national krasae2 and thus tend to become smaller over time. The example of Chart Thai Pattana is a cautionary tale; the more it became identified with Suphanburi, the less viable it became outside the province. And the less powerful a party becomes, the more difficult the task of holding on to the local clans that are so important to powering constituency victories.

If it is not satisfied with medium-power status, however, we are not yet seeing Pheu Thai take any steps that would pave the way for a broader revival. Today in coalition with Bhumjaithai, Pheu Thai has limited opportunities to reinvigorate its own brand. It can hope that the latest member of the extended Shinawatra clan to hold high office, Deputy Prime Minister Yodchanan Wongsawat, will perform well and win back the party some votes. This could still work; few have strong opinions on Yodchanan, who is relatively fresh to the political scene. Yet Thai history is littered with examples of coalition partners hoping to “generate results” and then unfortunately finding that no one took notice.

But what would a path returning to greatness look like? The party’s existence has been so intertwined with Thaksin that it is virtually impossible to think of the party without Thaksin. But it is also increasingly difficult to think of a path forward for the party with Thaksin at the fore. To put it simply: Thaksin reminds people of the past. It is now 25 years since his first election victory. The youngest voters today were born after the first military coup that ousted his government; an even larger portion yet have basically no recollection of his premiership.

The Shinawatras’ role in politics is far from over, but the years of Pheu Thai electoral dominance is almost certainly at an end.

This week’s Thailand top three:

1. The Anutin government officially cancelled the maritime agreement with Cambodia, MOU 44

2. The cabinet is moving forward with an emergency decree to borrow 400 billion baht

3. Constitutional reform looks set to be stalled

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1. MOU 44 is officially revoked

The cabinet, on the recommendation of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, moved to unilaterally revoke MOU 44 on May 5. Anutin informed Cambodia’s prime minister, Hun Manet, of his decision at the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines. Without MOU 44, Thailand and Cambodia will fall back to UNCLOS mechanisms; Hun Manet has already pledged to move forward with compulsory conciliation, a move that Anutin welcomed. (This is a non-binding process led by a five-member commission). However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that while Thailand is aware of Cambodia’s desire to use this process, Bangkok has not necessarily agreed.

What’s MOU 44, again? This is a bilateral agreement between Thailand and Cambodia, signed in 2001 under the Thaksin Shinawatra government, where the two governments established a framework to negotiate overlapping maritime boundary claims in the Gulf of Thailand. It also proposed a Joint Development Area to explore petroleum and natural gas reserves before a final boundary is agreed upon. Critics have argued that MOU 44 posed a risk to Thailand’s sovereignty over Koh Kood island. This is also the rationale behind which the government is choosing to pitch the necessity of cancelling MOU 44. Anutin posted on Facebook that “without MOU 44, there will no longer be a line drawn through Koh Kood to cause further doubt or concern. My fellow citizens can rest assured: #KohKoodBelongsToThailand.” Of course, MOU 44 dealt with more than just Koh Kood and it remains to be seen what the outcome of UNCLOS compulsory conciliation (if it happens) would be for the maritime borders.

2. Government seeks to borrow 400 billion baht

The Anutin cabinet also approved a draft emergency decree that authorizies the Ministry of Finance to borrow up to 400 billion baht. As the Public Relations Department summarized, the funds will be used “to ease impacts on people’s living costs caused by the energy crisis and to support the restructuring of Thailand’s energy sector to reduce vulnerability and strengthen energy security in the long run.” Of these funds, 200 billion baht will be used to alleviate the impact of rising costs for vulnerable groups, and another 200 billion baht will be used to facilitate the transition to renewable energy and reduce dependence on imported fuels.

Unsurprisingly, this borrowing scheme is controversial. Thailand’s public debt already stands at around 66 percent of GDP, leading to earlier reports that the government may seek to raise the debt ceiling (currently at 70 percent).1 The constitution, however, mandates that “the issuance of an Emergency Decree under paragraph one shall be made only when the Council of Ministers is of the opinion that it is an emergency of necessity and urgency which is unavoidable.”2 Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nititanpraphas argues that to avoid cascading crises stemming from raising energy prices, which could lead to stagflation, this borrowing is necessary. However, both the People’s Party and the Democrat Party raised questions about the necessity of this borrowing and how the funds will be used. Both parties say they plan to raise a challenge on the legality of this decree with the courts.

3. Constitutional reform stalled

Our final major update concerns something the cabinet didn’t do: the cabinet did not select the constitutional amendment bills still pending from the previous parliament to carry over to the current parliament. Minister attached to the Prime Minister’s office Paradon Prissanananthakul said that the last dissolution of parliament was caused by disagreement over the constitution reform process, and that meant it would be unlikely that the draft would fail to pass once again.

I believe I am correct in saying that the 2026 constitutional referendum led to the biggest popular mandate in Thai history, with over 21 million people voting to draft a new constitution. Yet drafting a new constitution was not included as a government priority in its policy declaration to parliament. For his part, Anutin has maintained that the referendum result was a “command” from the people that is “beyond just a policy” and must be obeyed. However, the People’s Party’s Parit Wacharasindhu said that the government “lacks sincerity” in following the referendum result, while the former election commissioner, Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, asked if this meant the constitutional reform process would be delayed by another two years.

In other news…

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was released on parole today, as we discussed last week.

The People’s Party officially launched their campaign for the Bangkok local elections, with Chaiwat Sathawornwichit as their candidate for governor.

The Democrats will launch their Bangkok election campaign on May 16. Their candidate is a male businessman with political experience aged between 50 to 60. It’s anyone’s guess who that is.

This year the race for governor has felt decidedly low-energy. The incumbent, Chadchart Sittipunt, won a massive election victory in 2022, receiving over fifty percent of the vote against a crowded field that included several qualified and well-known candidates. A NIDA poll last year revealed that around 78 percent of respondents were either very satisfied or quite satisfied with Chadchart’s performance as governor. As such, any candidate seeking to prevent Chadchart’s re-election are setting themselves up for a difficult task. The People’s Party candidate Chaiwat Sathawornwichit straightforwardly acknowledged Chadchart’s high approval ratings and said unseating him will not be easy. Meanwhile, the Democrats admitted that Chadchart’s strength was making it difficult for them to attract capable challengers to take him on.1

With the race only feeling slightly more lively than the Martian surface right now, I’ll cover the gubernatorial election in more detail when the energy hopefully picks up as campaigning starts in honest. Instead, the focus today will be on the Bangkok Metropolitan Council,2 the legislative body of Bangkok’s administration.

Pro-Chadchart groups emerge

Pheu Thai won the most seats on the BMC in 2022, with 20 out of 50 seats. It was thus a surprise when the party decided that it would not field any BMC candidates this year, although the party would allow members to run and use the party logo if they wish. Yet the decision by the former champions not to officially support any BMC candidates immediately set off a torrent of party-switching.

Khrungthep Thurakij has a list of all current Bangkok councillors here and their current electoral plans. It is evident that the Pheu Thai councillors are splitting in different directions. A number may decide to take up the party’s offer to use the Pheu Thai logo and continue running as Pheu Thai members. Others have switched to other parties. Several, however, appear to be planning to run with non-partisan groups supporting Chadchart. These non-partisan groups are not formal party organizations, so members would technically run as independents, with the understanding that they are a part of these looser confederations of councilors.

Chadchart, for his part, has said that he is not currently supporting any councilor candidates and will announce his support for certain groups in due course. (He did post a call for people to join his “Work Work Work” network, which seems likely to be the name of a future group of candidates to support him). In the vacuum, there is a proliferation of groups that are using Chadchart’s green branding and announcing that they intend to support Chadchart as governor. These include a group called “Khon Tum Ngarn” (working people), “Sor Kor Phan Mai” (new breed councilors), and Better Bangkok. Some of these groups appear to be more closely connected with the governor’s team than others.

Of particular interest is Better Bangkok. It was started by former Pheu Thai councilor Surachit “Dr. John” Phongsinghvithya. “Better Bangkok” was the slogan used by Chadchart during his last campaign, and the group’s candidates have been posting graphics showing themselves with the governor. They have also been using a similar CI style to what Chadchart has been using (see right picture below). However, Chadchart released a statement saying that he had no connection to the Better Bangkok group, prompting Dr. John to clarify that while he asked the governor for permission to use a similar branding system, his group was not officially affiliated with Chadchart but will simply seek to support him.

And amidst the chaos, we have at least one group that has already folded. A number of Bangkok Councillor candidates initially appeared ready to contest under the banner of a group called "Bangkok First", but the leader of the group, a ex-Pheu Thai councillor, has already switched his allegiance to the Democrats, bringing at least one ex-People’s Party councillor with him.

Quasi-independence over party labels

The decision by so many candidates to disavow partisan affiliations in favor of less formal groups reverses the triumph of party labels in recent BMC elections. In 2022, only three of the BMC seats had been won by independents affiliated with former governor Asawin Kwanmuang’s Rak Krung Thep group; in 2010 only one independent had won. This year, with Pheu Thai’s withdrawal, we may see a large number of BMC candidates from these looser groupings win. This is actually a reversal of the trend in the provinces towards increasing party prominence. But interestingly, these “independents” are not truly independent, belonging as they do to these looser groups that are attempting to align themselves with prominent candidates like Chadchart. Running with the popular governor may now seem like a far more attractive proposition than remaining with a weakened Pheu Thai

One question worth pondering is: does the People’s Party complete sweep hold any clues for how Bangkok will vote in the BMC elections? Here, past may not be prologue. In 2022, Move Forward won only 14 out of 50 districts before (almost) sweeping the capital in the 2023 election. Long-serving councillors with a strong local record have often been more impervious to the national sentiment than MPs. I would expect all the major parties and groups fielding incumbents to win a number of seats, preventing a PP landslide.

In 2022, the Democrat candidate for governor, Suchatvee Suwansawat, sometimes made the argument that a governor cannot go it alone. His party was also fielding candidates for the Bangkok Metropolitan Council, and voters should consider choosing a governor and a councilor from the same party so that they would be able to work together effectively. Chadchart’s response was that previous independent governors had successfully run Bangkok without their own team in the BMC. If Chadchart does end up endorsing his own team of independents, it likely points to some truth to what Suchatvee said; the governor was likely frustrated without close allies on the BMC. Ironically, then, an independent governor may now want a less independent team of independents to help further his agenda.

I still can’t promise that this will be a regular feature — and to be upfront, if I do turn on paid subscriptions to this newsletter I may make some of these news roundups subscriber-only. But for now, they are completely free, and I hope you enjoy them!

This week’s Thailand Top Three:

• The Anutin government revives proposals for a land bridge in Southern Thailand

• Thaksin Shinawatra approved for early parole

• Agricultural minister Suriya Juangroongrueangkit finds himself in hot water over a bureaucratic transfer

1. A land bridge to nowhere?

The crisis in the Hormuz strait has led to a revival of plans around a “land bridge” in Southern Thailand. Instead of summarizing everything to do with this on-again, off-again mega-project vision here, recommend Aidan Jones’ article in the South China Morning Post here on the land bridge scheme. Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul pitched the land bridge vision to visiting Singaporean Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing; the Thai readout stated that “Singapore expressed interest in Thailand’s Land Bridge project, viewing it as a means of transport connection between the two coasts to reduce risks and enhance logistics capacity.”

Predictably, the revival of the land bridge has been controversial. The People’s Party has called for a re-evaluation of the land bridge. The Democrats said that Bhumjaithai did not include a land bridge in their policy proposals during the election campaign, and that shipping companies have privately told the party they would not be interested in using it. There has also been some friendly fire: Industry Minister Varawut Silpa-archa said there must be a thorough environmental assessment, leading Deputy Prime Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakan to joke that Varawut was setting out a position based on his role as the former environment minister and “may be forgetting that he is currently industry minister.”

Given the high price tag of pursuing such a scheme, expect the land bridge to continue dominating policy debates if the Anutin government is serious about pursuing it. But for the land bridge enthusiasts out there, I wouldn’t get too excited yet: a land bridge has been under discussion since the Prayut Chan-o-cha government, and so far the scheme has gotten nowhere.

2. Thaksin to go home

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was returned to prison in September year after the Supreme Court ruled that his stay at the Police-General Hospital between 2023 and 2024 was unwarranted. Since then, we have heard very little from him, aside from what his family has reported after their regular visits to see him in prison. (He reportedly sang a version of “Let It Be” after hearing about the election results in February). Now, Thaksin is coming out: he was granted early parole owing to his age and health.

We still don’t know how public a political role Thaksin will play on his return. Pheu Thai leader Julapun Amornvivat said that Thaksin is unlikely to take up an official advisory position, but remains the “spirit” of the party. Yes, Thaksin could finally make good on his pledge to focus on taking care of his grandchildren. But it’s difficult to imagine Thaksin divorcing himself entirely from politics.

3. Controversial bureaucratic transfer

Agricultural Minister Suriya Juangroongrueangkit has found himself shrouded in controversy this week. Rachen Sillaparaya, the director-general of the Royal Rainmaking Department1, resigned from the bureaucracy after he was transferred to another position in the ministry. Rachen was due to retire in only five months.

Rachen stated in his resignation letter that he was “unable to meet the demands” of the political appointees. Suriya first clarified that he had transferred Rachen because he wanted someone younger in post, “not an old person nearing retirement.” Rachen then alleged that Suriya’s nephew, who runs an airline, had tried to contact him (but that he had not taken the meeting). This prompted Suriya to respond that he had been unaware of his nephew’s attempt to contact Rachen. The drama took another turn when Rachen was also forced to respond to rumors that he was planning to field his daughter as an MP candidate in Sakhon Nakhon; Rachen dismissed these rumors by noting that his daughters are only in primary school. His sister, however, ran as a Bhumjaithai candidate in the past.

While this might initially look like standard conflict between politicians and bureaucrats, this particular controversy could have important implications. Already, a petitioner has asked the Electoral Commission to investigate whether this transfer qualifies as an ethical violation; if the case is taken up, this could potentially lead to Suriya’s removal. Pheu Thai would much prefer for publicity to be concentrated on Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Higher Education Yodchanan Wongsawat, who is currently the face of the party; the transfer controversy provides the party with unwelcome headlines instead.

In other news…

The People’s Party launched a quasi-shadow cabinet. (I say quasi because there is no shadow minister assigned to each cabinet minister).

Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce Minister Supajee Suthumpun has found herself in a prickly situation due to her decision to team up with a famous livestreamer to sell durian for 100 baht per kilogram.

Bangkok Governor Chadchart Sittipunt sent the strongest signals yet that he’s running for a second term. The People’s Party is likely to field deputy leader Chaiwat Sathawornwichit, while the Democrats say they have a candidate but cannot yet reveal who it is. The Economic Party says their candidate, whose name starts with a “J” (จ), has wide name recognition.

In 2023, the Move Forward Party campaigned on the slogan “choose Move Forward and Thailand will not be the same.” This time around, Bhumjaithai could very well have run on the slogan “Vote for Bhumjaithai and every party will remain the same.”

The People’s Party had originally been anticipated to announce a major leadership change, in the event that party leader Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut was suspended from parliament due to an ethics case against him and 43 other former Move Forward MPs. Indeed, Natthaphong had previously announced that he would step down if a suspension was handed down. Previous reports stated that Natthaphong would be replaced by deputy leader Veerayooth Kanchoochat, while Natthaphong would take on the position of secretary-general. But while the Supreme Court accepted the legal petition, it did not order a suspension of the MPs, which means Natthaphong can still perform his duties and become leader of the opposition. Accordingly, the PP did not replace Natthaphong with Veerayooth as originally anticipated, instead only appointing Picharn Chaowapatanawong as secretary-general.1

It is a little surprising, however, that the PP did not make any sweeping changes to its leadership lineup. The party’s performance in the February 2026 election had fallen short of expectations, and Natthaphong had generally polled behind his party in the NIDA surveys. Indeed, the man who the party had billed as “the programmer who will write Thailand’s future” has always seemed an unorthodox pick for party leader. But one wonders whether or not the PP is still in a “wait and see” position, unwilling to reveal new moves until there is greater clarity on the legal situation.

Pheu Thai also announced a new executive committee lineup, but there were few changes at the very top. Julapun Amornvivat will remain as party leader and Prasert Jantararuangtong as secretary-general. The party did announce the formation of a new advisory committee, which includes many heavyweights into the Thaksinverse, including former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra and the prime minister candidate (and currently deputy prime minister) Yodchanan Wongsawat. The board also includes Pheu Thai stalwarts like Suriya Juangroongrueangkit and Phumtham Wechayachai.

For a party that just suffered its worst election result in its history, these changes appear limited in scope and unlikely to alter its trajectory. But the party may also have decided that it has little choice right now but to continue on the path of being a strong mid-sized party. A piece in Khrungthep Thurakij recently stated that Pheu Thai is unlikely to field any candidates in the upcoming Bangkok Metropolitan Council elections, a clear sign that the party is scaling back its ambitions. “When it is no longer a krasae party, and it is not a baan yai party, the ‘red camp generals’ must revise their strategy, scaling down from a large party to a medium-sized party,” the piece wrote. Perhaps the Pheu Thai leadership lineup also does not really matter: all eyes are on Yodchanan as the future of the party, and there is no tradition in Pheu Thai that its most prominent member must be its official leader.

And so for different reasons, two major parties have decided to keep their leadership structures largely intact despite disappointing election performances. A smaller party that made no changes was the Democrat Party. This included making no replacement to Weeraphong Prapha, a deputy leader who had just been poached by the government to become Thailand Trade Representative.

One party did make a significant change: Kla Tham swapped out Narumon Pinyosinwat as leader for Thammanat Promphao. It was a move to formalize the party’s informal power structure, given that Thammanat had already said that he is the party’s “owner.” Thammanat had outperformed expectations in the previous election; as he said at the party meeting, despite undergoing constant attacks, Kla Tham was able to win 56 seats. As he memorably put it: “we did not just topple elephants, but something bigger than an elephant. Whales. If it were my son, he would say krakens.” Thammanat also noted that there were 45 Kla Tham candidates whose losing margin was in hundreds of votes, meaning that the party could also had conceivably won over a hundred MPs if it had more time to campaign.

The challenge for Kla Tham, of course, is the fact that it is unexpectedly now in opposition. Thammanat noted himself that party members have been in government for too long and “are not used to being in opposition.” It remains to be seen whether or not the party can hold together, but the new executive lineup (which included the appointment of 12 deputy leaders) reveals that its members remain loyal. Chalermchai Sri-orn, the former Democrat Party leader who announced last year that he would assist Kla Tham with its election campaign.

Overall, this season of party annual conferences have not yielded big changes, despite a general election that considerably shifted Thailand’s political balance of power. The 2026 general election is over, but most Thai parties appear satisfied to retain their 2025 status quo.

We learned that the People’s Party MPs have for now been spared a parliamentary suspension, and Pheu Thai restructured its executive board. I plan to write about changes in the leadership of these parties in a future post, so I won’t be covering this today. Instead, we’ll be taking a look at discussions on the debt ceiling, the prime minister’s meeting with China’s foreign minister, a move towards cancelling MOU 44 and the distribution of parliamentary committee chairmanships.

Thailand mulls raising debt ceiling

On April 20, Deputy Prime Minister Prakorn Nilprapunt revealed that the government is planning to borrow 500 billion baht. Thailand’s public debt is currently at around 66 percent of GDP, with the debt ceiling standing at 70 percent. When asked by reporters whether he was planning to raise the debt ceiling from 70 to 75 percent, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul nodded. Later, however, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanpraphas said that there was no need yet to raise the debt ceiling. He also said that a borrowing decree will only be made if there is need, noting that the government must prepare to deal with a long-term global crisis.

Ekniti has also revealed that a new phase of the Khon La Khrueng scheme is coming in June, with the ratio of government assistance and public payment likely to be adjusted from 50:50 to 60:40. It appears that the scheme will also be renamed to Thai Chuay Thai Plus (Thais Help Thais Plus).

Anutin meets Wang Yi

Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, met with Anutin at Government House on April 24. This is his first visit to Thailand since 2024, when Thailand and China officially signed a visa-exemption agreement. This visit did not yield as big of an announcement, but it appeared to be friendly, with Wang telling Anutin that he “looks very handsome” and Anutin replying that Wang is “more handsome than me.” Anutin also personally drove Wang to lunch in his BYD car.

More substantively, according to Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, China said that it will not interfere in the issue of Thai-Cambodian relations. (Before visiting Bangkok, Wang Yi was previously in Cambodia, where he called for scam centers to be “completely eradicated”).

National Security Council moves to cancel MOU 44

On the topic of Cambodia: the National Security Council approved the cancellation of MOU 44, a bilateral agreement between Thailand and Cambodia governing the maritime border in the Gulf of Thailand. (I previously wrote about MOUs 43 and 44 here). This was a major Bhumjaithai campaign pledge, and many coalition partners had also pushed for the revocation of at least one of the MOUs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will now have to determine how to move forward. According to the Chief of Staff of the Royal Navy, Thailand and Cambodia can utilize UNCLOS mechanisms moving forward.

Committee chairmanships decided

Parliament has finished allocating chairmanships of parliamentary committees. The quotas were as follows: 14 for Bhumjaithai, 9 for the People’s Party, 5 for Pheu Thai, 4 for Kla Tham, 2 for the Democrat Party and 1 for Thai Ruam Phalang. Thairath English has a full list of the committees distributed here.

NationWeekend reported that there was quite a frenzy from the parties to seize these chairmanships, with many parties fighting over the same committees. The easiest allocations were Pheu Thai’s, which received committees corresponding to their ministries under their control, but Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party expressed interest in many of the same committees. “In the last parliament,” NationWeekend notes, “the orange party received the chairmanship of many committees and used these mechanisms to scrutinize the government until they were able to use this information in no confidence debates and National Anti-Corruption Commission petitions. This time, the coalition parties must seize the chairmanships that correspond with their administrative allocations.”

Split-ballot voting in Thailand

Thailand has a parallel electoral system, composed of a constituency system (where voters choose a local candidate) and a proportional “party-list” system (where voters pick the party they like best). In this system, ballot-splitting — when a voter picks one constituency candidate from one party and then selects another party on the party-list — is quite common. But ballot-splitting is a bit of a puzzling phenomenon.

A glance at the scholarly literature on vote behavior would actually tell us that ballot splitting should actually be quite unlikely to happen. This may perhaps sound silly to many who are enthusiastic about politics (of course Thais can, as the saying goes, choose a candidate they like and a party they love, both of which need not be of the same affiliation). But as scholars like Arthur Lupia (1994) have shown, voters who — quite rationally — do not want to spend all of their valuable time consuming political information depend on “heuristics” (shortcuts), such as endorsements, to make voting decisions. The existence of large-scale ballot splitting in Thailand would indicate that voters are, in fact, not depending on a single source of heuristics: they are using different rationales to make different decisions on the two ballots.

What are those rationales? To make sense of split ballot results, we have generally treated constituency results as reflective of local attitudes (“this MP has performed exemplary service in my locality and deserves to be re-elected”), while party-list results are seen as a proxy for genuine ideological attachments or national sentiments (“I agree with this party’s policy platform and want their candidate for prime minister”). This often leads to contradictory voting decisions, where a voter might pick the People’s Party on the party-list ballot but vote Bhumjaithai on the constituency ballot — even though they do not see eye to eye on many fundamental issues and would have been unlikely to form a government together. This was certainly the case in 2023, when Move Forward was the most popular option on the party-list in 70 constituencies won by the major conservative parties (United Thai Nation, Palang Pracharath, and Bhumjaithai).

In 2026, we still see a lot of split ballot voting decisions. The People’s Party won the most party-list votes in most of the central and northeast, but won only a handful of constituency seats. Pheu Thai was still dominant in the northeast party-list vote but saw major inroads made by Bhumjaithai and Kla Tha, in the constituency ballot. The Democrats swept the south on the party-list, but a plea by the party for voters to give the party more than “half their love” failed. The map of the constituency vs party list results below illustrates this clearly:

Straight ticket voting in the 2026 general election

At the same time, the 2026 general election complicates our understanding of the party-list ballot with an increased number of straight-ballot results. Some were to be expected: many more provinces that previously voted for Bhumjaithai on the constituency ballot now also returned more votes for the party in the party-list than ever. This aligns with our theoretical expectations: the party became genuinely more popular nationally and had emerged as an ideological choice for a large segment of voters. But there were other instances where parties with little national krasae1 were topping the vote in the proportional system as well.

Consider Phayao province. Phayao has long been the homebase of Kla Tham’s prime minister candidate, Thammanat Promphao. In 2023, when Thammanat was still a member of the Palang Pracharath Party, Phayao voted in PPRP MPs in all of its three constituencies, while on the party-list two constituencies favored Pheu Thai and one constituency voted for Move Forward. As we noted earlier, this was a typical result in 2023, and an analyst extrapolating to 2026 would have predicted that Kla Tham would now sweep the province on the constituency ballot but the party-list result would likely return either Pheu Thai or the People’s Party. These expectations would prove completely wrong. Kla Tham swept in both systems, winning all three constituencies and coming in first in the party-list by a wide margin. (Kla Tham won 121,746 votes on the party-list province-wide, while the PP came in a rather distant second place at 71,108 votes).

Phayao is not the only province where this happened. In Ubon Ratchatani, the Thai Ruam Palang Party came first in the party-list vote in a number of constituencies. Meanwhile, Palang Pracharath won the most party-list votes in the constituency seat of its leader, Trinuch Thienthong. Overall, where four parties came in first on the party-list vote in any constituency in 2023, eight parties accomplished this feat in 2026.

Something similar happened in 2011 when Chart Thai Pattana won the party-list vote in three out of five provinces in Suphanburi. The deep south has also favored Prachachart on the party-list two elections in a row. This means that straight-ticket voting for regional parties is not necessarily a new phenomenon. However, both Chart Thai Pattana and Prachachart are somewhat exceptional cases; the former has built a legendary base of support in Suphanburi over decades and even this loosened up in 2023, when Move Forward won the most party-list seats in the province. Meanwhile, Prachachart is popular in the deep south for identity-related reasons that go beyond just local patronage. So the fact that we have the local baan yai2 winning considerable numbers of party-list votes is a rather fascinating result.

What this means

Perhaps we shouldn’t make too much out of the fact that three provinces decided to vote a little differently on the party-list vote compared to the rest of the country. But it does force us to update some of our priors on how voters and parties approach the parallel voting system, which can be important to analyzing future elections.

For one, it was perhaps premature in 2023 to forecast that the baan yai were at risk of being displaced by nationally popular parties. Move Forward winning big on the party-list even in the strongholds of the baan yai was perhaps a sign of the party’s exceptional popularity in 2023 but not to the vulnerability of the local clans themselves: the moment that the progressive forces began declining in popularity, the baan yai were ready to mount a renewed challenge. Urban-local convergence remains a complicated story in Thailand.

Secondly, even locally-driven parties may care more about the party-list than we originally expected. It actually doesn’t make much sense for parties with strong local capacity to spend a lot of resources canvassing for the party-list vote; there are only a hundred party-list MPs, so you would need about one percent of the vote nationally to get even one MP. It’s much more efficient to spend resources on winning constituency seats if a party has the capability. Differing ballot numbers also means that it is quite confusing for parties to give two different numbers for voters to memorize. But perhaps some parties do want at least a modest number of party-list votes, because most party leaders run on the party-list rather than the constituency. Hence a party like Kla Tham may wish to make a big party-list push in its strongest province to make sure that its two core leaders, Thammanat and Narumon Pinyosinwat, would be able to enter parliament.

Third, we still need a better understanding of the circumstances in which a voter would go straight-ticket for a local party. Even though they are outliers, the existence of constituencies where Kla Tham, Palang Pracharath, and Thai Ruam Palang won the party-list vote demonstrates that the generally accepted hypothesis of “constituency races for local matters and party-list for national matters” does not always apply. Is this due to a deep enthusiasm for a local candidate that overrides national concerns? A genuine belief that these parties are also ideological matches? We can guess, but without more data we don’t know for sure.

Two parallel election systems is, to a political scientist with an enthusiasm for electoral politics, a bit like giving Charlie (of Chocolate Factory fame) two Wonka bars instead of one. We get to study basically two elections happening at once! But they do make things more complicated to study, and leave us with a lot more food for thought.

Struggling people everywhere wonder whether their politicians are being paid too much. For a small party, this is fertile ground with which to raise their profile. In a strategically astute move, the Thai Pakdee Party’s only MP, Dr Warong Dechgitvigrom, has chosen to make MP benefits his first rallying cry on his first return to parliament after an absence of 12 years.

In his very first speech to parliament, Warong made three attention-grabbing proposal:

• Ending the practice of providing free food to MPs. (They were receiving an allowance of 1,000 baht a day for food, a budget totaling 72 million baht a year).

• Reducing the number of assistants each MP is entitled to from eight to three.

• Reconsidering the MPs’ pension system.

So far, Warong’s proposal on cutting free food has gotten the most traction. This proposal is not completely new; MPs from both Future Forward and Pheu Thai have suggested reducing this budget in the past. Warong managed to cut through the noise, however, and a wave of popular agreement on social media seems to have pushed MPs from various larger parties to also express their consent on cutting this benefit. Some minority noises, who argued that this is a reasonable benefit, were largely outweighed by those who said that an MP receiving a salary over a hundred thousand baht per month should be able to pay for their own meals.

More controversial are the other two proposals. The eight assistants that MP have are split into two three categories. There is one “personal expert” (ผู้เชี่ยวชาญประจำตัว) who is tasked with providing expert advice to the MP; they receive a salary of 24,000 baht per month. There are also two “personal specialists” (ผู้ชำนาญการประจำตัว) who help the MP with research and gathering data for use in parliamentary speeches. They receive a 15,000 baht salary. Finally, the MP is entitled to five additional assistants who assist with work outside of an MP’s official responsibilities, such as visiting their constituencies and resolving local issues. They also receive a 15,000 baht salary. In October, these salaries will be increased (the personal expert will receive 28,800 baht and the others will receive 18,000 baht).

While these salaries are not at all high, the required budget to pay for eight assistants for 500 MPs do add up. So do MPs need eight assistants? One MP told me that he makes effective use of all eight. Constituency MPs in particular probably do need a number of staff members to help with responding to local concerns. But whether all MPs need eight assistants is probably up for legitimate debate. In the UK, MPs receive a set budget that they can use to hire as few or as many staff members as they see fit; they typically employ around five, although staff there say they are overstretched. Warong himself has said that he will hire only three — but critics would probably counter that he is a party-list MP with no responsibility to any particular constituency. Expect much more discussion about this in the future, along with more pushback from other MPs than in the free food debate.

The final proposal on MPs’ pensions is perhaps the most popular with the public. The pension scheme began in 2014 and, as the Bangkok Post summarizes it, has MPs paying 3,500 baht per month to the provident fund; MPs who serve at least one year then receive monthly payments starting at a minimum of 21,300 baht (and more depending on how long the MP spent in parliament). The ex-MPs also receive additional health and child educational benefits. The Economic Party under Chris Potrananda has joined Warong’s crusade against this system, pledging not to take their pensions.

At a time of increasing economic challenges, it is unsurprising that MPs’ benefits that have gone under radar in the past now face increasing scrutiny. In Thai, the word for populism (prachaniyom) typically refers to giveaways for the people, but the global definition of populism usually refers to the taking up of the mantle of the common people in opposition to an elite group. The mood in Thailand is receptive to this second form of populism, and one wonders whether it will emerge as increasingly electorally salient.

As for Dr Warong: it’s still very early in the parliamentary term, but thus far he has broken out as someone who has punched way above his own small party’s weight.

Sometimes writing on the formation of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul’s second cabinet is it all feels a bit like déjà vu. Anutin made his new declaration of policy to parliament today — his last one was in October, just six months ago! Here we are again to analyze this latest statement. The full policy declaration is available in English here.

Anutin’s second policy declaration does differ markedly from the first, of course. Back in October, he had focused on laying out plans for a short-term premiership. Anutin alluded to his first term in this policy declaration, explaining that his government had “assumed the administration of state affairs under circumstances in which Thailand is surrounded by uncertainty on matters of the economy, society, politics, international relations and global geopolitics.” The previous government delivered “Quick Big Wins” through policies like the Khon La Khrueng scheme and resolving the Cambodian border conflict.

Anutin noted that the government had been able to increase economic growth in the fourth quarter of 2025, but Thailand is now facing renewed challenges due to the conflict in the Middle East. He thus declared that the government will be managing public resources with fiscal discipline “in order to increase flexibility in managing potential emergencies in the future to come.” Unlike in October, Anutin’s new statement also nods to his long-term vision for the country. He said that Thailand still faces several growth-reducing pressures. To this end, his government will seek to “flexibly adapt to new global rules and shifting power dynamics amidst ongoing uncertainty, while driving inclusive, high-quality growth to its maximum potential.”

Bhumjaithai is promising to follow through on many election pledges. It promises to continue the wildly popular Khon La Khrueng Plus scheme. On the security side, it also pledges to develop a 100,000-strong volunteer military program where Thai men can enlist on a four-year basis with “clear remuneration and performance evaluation systems.” And the government promises to expedite studying how to terminate MoU 44, the agreement between Thailand and Cambodia governing overlapping maritime claims and exploration of natural resources in the Gulf of Thailand. On the other hand, it doesn’t look like Pheu Thai’s flagship policies made the cut. There is no mention of the one million baht giveaway or a debt moratorium, for example — two major policies that Pheu Thai had run on during the election. This probably owes to the fact that none of the “economic ministries” (save the Ministry of Agriculture) were assigned to the party.

One thing that is new to this policy declaration is the inclusion of an “Integrated Strategic Cluster System” to manage state affairs. The five clusters are: 1. Macroeconomics, Investment and Future Industries, 2. Production, Trade and Services, 3. Infrastructure, Natural Resources and Environment, 4. Social and Welfare, and 5. Foreign Affairs and Security. Deputy government spokesperson Ratchada Dhnadirek said that the government will use these clusters to “[bring] together the private sector and the public, while repositioning the state as a supporter and facilitator for the people.” It’s probably too early to tell whether or not this is just a rebrand of pre-existing approaches or a genuine rethink of how to approach the achievement of long-term strategic goals in Thailand.

While Anutin acknowledged the holding of a referendum on amending the constitution (through which the public granted assent), there was no discussion of constitutional reform as a priority for the government. It’s probably safe to say that Bhumjaithai will not be moving forward aggressively on constitutional issues. Unless the opposition can unite on this issue (unlikely) and seek the support of some coalition partners (even more unlikely), no one will be able to force Anutin to follow through on the referendum result.

The opposition’s response

People’s Party leader Natthaphong Rueangpanyawut adopted the government’s five-cluster terminology to argue that this government is actually dominated by five clusters of powerful groups. (See here for the five clusters). He also said that the biggest challenge facing the country is not an external crisis but crises within; one example is the clean air crisis, which a trusted government would be dealing with by passing the Clean Air Act.

Kla Tham MP Atthakorn Sirilatthayakorn (who seems to be emerging as the party’s main spokesperson in parliament) acknowledged that the prime minister has “bad luck” and is facing a crisis immediately after taking office. But he then pointed out a litany of questions he had about the government, ranging from what he alleges is the limited visibility of star minister Suphajee Suthumpun, the high costs attached to policies like the volunteer military scheme, and the low likelihood of achieving the government’s goal of three percent GDP growth.

Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva called the policy statement one that is largely unobjectionable but “lacks concreteness, lacks clear time frames, and lacks indicators” for measuring success. He noted that some major election pledges made by Bhumjaithai were missing in this policy statement. He pointed out that some Bhumjaithai figures had talked about building a land bridge during the campaign, but this did not appear in the election policies submitted to the Electoral Commission nor in the policy statement, turning it into a “secretive policy.”

Given the large majority enjoyed by the Bhumjaithai-led coalition, the policy declaration is sure to pass. After that, the new government will be able to get to work. Bhumjaithai’s slogan was “we walk the talk.” Anutin has spoken; now his government will have to deliver.

Next week is the Songkran holiday. Happy Thai New Year to everyone, and we’ll be back afterwards!

In February, I had listed a couple of potential coalition configurations. We have ended up with a “purple coalition” comprising Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai, with Kla Tham excluded from the mix. But this is a more purely purple government than many analysts may have originally imagined; only Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai are represented in this cabinet, with all other coalition partners excluded.

Here’s a look at the makeup of Anutin’s second government.

By the numbers

• Of the 7 deputy PMs appointed, 5 were from Bhumjaithai, 1 from Pheu Thai, and 1 outsider.

• Bhumjaithai received 13 full ministerial roles and while Pheu Thai received 5.

• 7 Bhumjaithai members were appointed deputy ministers, while 3 Pheu Thai members were appointed.

• In total, of the 35 individuals who were appointed to this cabinet, 25 are from Bhumjaithai, 8 are from Pheu Thai, and 2 do not have partisan affiliations.

In parliament, Bhumjaithai’s MPs make up around 65 percent of the coalition, while Pheu Thai makes up around 25 percent — so Pheu Thai has received roughly a fair allocation, while Bhumjaithai is slightly overrepresented. There is room for this because the remaining 10 percent of MPs are from small parties which did not win enough seats to warrant a place in the cabinet.1

A reflection of Bhumjaithai’s internal dynamics

This cabinet reflects the internal pressures of Bhumjaithai’s party management.

Anutin kept his promise to reappoint his three popular technocrats (Supajee Suthumpun, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, and Ekniti Nitithanpraphas) to their current roles, and top it up with deputy PM positions. This is unsurprising given how central they have been to the Bhumjaithai election campaign, but must still have been difficult because of the large number of factions within the party that were demanding positions.

Bhumjaithai clearly tried to balance rewarding longtime party loyalists and the thanking the large numbers of defecting factions who had been so critical to the party’s election victory. Prominent switchers like Varawut Silpa-archa (formerly head of the Chart Thai Pattana party) and Akanat Promphan (previously secretary-general of the United Thai Nation Party) both received cabinet roles. Some newcomers received their first-ever positions, such as Sanphet Bunyamanee, son of former senior Democrat Niphon Bunyamanee.

Inevitably, some defectors were disappointed — we saw Anucha Sasomsap hint to the press that his Nakhon Pathom faction contained four MPs and that it would be up to Anutin to consider whether he should be upgraded to a ministerial role. (In the end, he did not receive a cabinet position). Some of the original batch of defectors who had helped make the first Anutin government possible also did not receive appointments, including ex-industry minister Thanakorn Wangboonkongchana and ex-deputy interior minister Sakda Vicheansil (who actually lost his own constituency seat in a shock result).

We also see the increasing prominence of what has been dubbed the “Lookthep Gang”2 . This is a faction of heirs to prominent local clans who are seen as close to Bhumjaithai’s secretary-general, Chaichanok Chidchob (son of Newin Chidchob). The origins of this grouping can be tracked back to 2024, when Bhumjaithai decided to refresh the party image by bringing in younger politicians. Several received appointments in this cabinet, but some of the older generation in Bhumjaithai are reportedly dissatisfied with this grouping’s rise in influence. In addition to the large number of cabinet seats offered to the technocrats, this is another potential flashpoint for Bhumjaithai when reshuffles are placed on the horizon.

Other noteworthy points

Pheu Thai’s division of cabinet roles was interesting. It is no surprise that Prof. Yodchanan Wongsawat, the party’s main candidate in the past election, became deputy prime minister. It is, I believe, the first time in history that this role will be held concurrently with the higher education portfolio, a reflection of Yodchanan’s academic background. Suriya Juangroongrueangkit, who will now be holding a cabinet role under his sixth prime minister (stretching back to Chuan Leekpai in the 1990s!), must be breaking some sort of record. Notably absent is Somsak Thepsuthin, who rivals Suriya in ministerial experience but seems to have been dropped in a bid to let some newer faces into cabinet.

Gen. Natthaphon Narkphanit, defense minister in the first Anutin cabinet, is out. The new defense minister is Lt Gen Adul Boonthamcharoen, who was previously deputy defense minister. I’ve classified him as a nonpartisan appointment because he is not technically a member of any party. The former commander of the second army region, he has military experience in the lower northeast, including along the Cambodian border.

It is noteworthy that Dr. Bowornsak Uwanno, who was deputy prime minister responsible for legal affairs, has departed from the cabinet. We heard conflicting reports about why this was the case, but the most likely explanation appears to be due to his independent streak. We do know that he is an original thinker with his own ideas, seen most clearly during his time as constitution drafting committee where his vision reportedly diverged from the military government’s. Anutin instead decided to appoint Pakorn Nilprapunt, secretary-general of the Council of State. Pakorn comes with legal experience, and indeed he was recommended for his previous Council of State role by the most prominent legal mind of recent Thai governments, Wissanu Kruea-ngarm.

The new cabinet will not be able to begin conducting its duties until Anutin has made his policy declaration to parliament. In the meantime, the interim government will continue in office.

Over the course of his political career, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has been dealt some bad hands. In 2019, Anutin became health minister. Less than a year later, he was confronted with the worst pandemic in a century. Now, fresh off a massive electoral victory, before he even officially begins his second term as prime minister, he must oversee Thailand’s response to the worst energy crisis in recent memory.

After the closing of the Strait of Hormuz, the Thai government sought to limit the impact of rising energy costs on consumers by significantly subsidizing fuel prices through the Oil Fuel Fund. Within three weeks, it had burned through 20 billion baht, with daily expenditure now reaching around 2 billion baht a day. The government began signaling that the dam on oil prices was about to break earlier in the week, when both Anutin and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanpraphas said that oil prices will soon have to reflect the market reality. “Resisting market forces by freezing prices is ineffective. We must tell the truth to the people. Everyone must adapt to the volatility of global markets.” The biggest single-day increase so far came on March 26th, when fuel prices went up by six baht a liter across the board.

The initial subsidies may have been a satisfactory band-aid if the situation in the Middle East had reached a quick resolution. As the crisis dragged on, however, the impact the subsidies had on the market began to backfire. As the economist Nattavudh Powdthavee wrote, in addition to being fiscally unsustainable, the price caps distorted the market in significant ways, leading to hoarding and lack of energy saving. Even as the government stated that Thailand had sufficient fuel reserves, the past few weeks have witnessed frequent shortages at gas stations, forcing the government to require frequent checks of fuel levels.

The energy crisis is, of course, not Anutin’s doing, and any government’s ability to resist the increase in gas prices is limited. Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, Thailand’s fuel prices remain relatively low. Unfortunately for the government, voters don’t operate on a comparative basis. And as we have seen from how incumbents suffered around the world in the wake of inflationary pressure caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, voters tend not to discern whether or not their government is truly to blame for their hardship. As the New York Times quoted one Thai fisherman saying, “It’s a crisis abroad. But we are the ones who get screwed.”

The optics problem may have been exacerbated due to personnel choices. The activist Srisuwan Janya recently petitioned for Anutin to remove Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn from his position on the task force responding to the energy crisis. Srisuwan argued that because Phiphat’s family members continue to be involved in the energy industry, his appointment violates the constitution. For his part, as the Bangkok Post wrote, Phiphat denies that there is any conflict of interest, “saying he left all management positions in his family's fuel retail business more than two decades ago…He said his appointment reflected his industry experience.”

The People’s Party has demanded that the government raise prices in phases (rather than the 6-baht hike we saw). Deputy leader Veerayooth Kanchoochat also called for differentiated levels of support for different segments of the population. The Democrat Party proposed cutting the diesel excise tax from 6.90 baht to 6 baht per liter and impose a windfall tax on oil refineries, with the proceeds to go to supporting the Oil Fuel Fund. The government has proved receptive to some of these proposals. On March 26th, after a special cabinet meeting, the government announced that it would be looking at reducing the fuel excise tax and increasing payments to state welfare card holders by 100 baht for one month, in order to support low income earners.

There was, however, discontent among opposition parties when no cabinet minister responded to MPs who debated responses to the energy crisis on March 25th in parliament, with Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva reminding the government that the interim cabinet is still constitutionally mandated to be held accountable by parliament. (Anutin was present during the debate but did not speak). The closest we came to a government response was when Bhumjaithai MP Akanat Promphan called on the new energy minister to have courage and to listen more from the people than from government data. The ministry, he said, must not greng jai (fear inconveniencing) anyone. The speech is notable because Akanat, according to various reports, is actually currently tipped to be the next energy minister!

If Akanat does receive this appointment, it will be worth watching how he approaches the energy crisis. When he was industry minister under the Pheu Thai government, Akanat was known for his aggressive approach to cracking down on illegal factories (to the point where he later claimed that gray businesses had put a 300-million baht bounty on his removal). Will he implement a similar take-no-prisoners approach to the energy industry? That remains to be seen.

Even as the world moves on to watching the geopolitical situation, I do want to take time to fully analyze the implications of the 2026 general election. So here is the second post in my series of election retrospectives, after my analysis of the results in Bangkok.

Last month, Joel Selway on Thai Data Points discussed the question of whether Bhumjaithai’s victory had been driven by nationalism. I encourage you to read the full piece, but the gist of his argument is that while nationalism likely played a role in motivating voters already predisposed towards Bhumjaithai, coordination in local races was the more important determinant of victory.

One thing that’s worth wondering about, however, is whether the Cambodian conflict played into voters’ calculations differently depending on where they were located. In what I will call the “regionalized nationalism” hypothesis, voters in areas that were directly affected by the conflict, or close enough to have gotten a scare from evacuation orders, would theoretically be more receptive to political pitches centered around national security.

One way to examine whether this hypothesis is accurate would be to see whether more nationalist parties performed better in provinces close to Cambodia. Two of the most stridently nationalist parties in this election were Bhumjaithai and the Economic Party. Below are maps of Thailand colored by party vote share, courtesy of Napon Jatusripitak’s election dashboard. (One note of caution: these maps are based on incomplete data at 94 percent reporting, but for our purposes here this shouldn’t significantly change the overall picture). Evacuations occurred in Buriram, Chanthaburi, Sa Kaeo, Si Sa Ket, Surin, Trat and Ubon Ratchathani.

The nationalist credentials of these two parties were very clear during the campaign. The Bhumjaithai government presided over the second round of the conflict between December 8-27 in late 2025. During the election campaign, the party pledged to build a border fence and to scrap MOU 44.

The Economic Party is, in some ways, the more interesting case study. It is a new party1 and lacks strong local networks. It was instead relying essentially solely on the nationalist wave. The party endorsed a border fence and scrapping MOU 44 and took even stronger stances on Cambodia than Bhumjaithai. Its leader, General Rangsi Kittiyanasap, made a name for himself with his straight-talking TV appearances where he proposed hardline measures on Cambodia. At one point, Rangsi said that “if Cambodia shoots at us, we must fire back with one hundred times the intensity” and appeared to suggest that Thailand can bring Hun Sen over to face justice (à la Maduro). The party also used the slogan “Thailand First” during the campaign. Thus, it’s reasonable to infer that people voting for the Economic Party did so mainly because of its policy program, not because of individual local candidates.

Bhumjaithai’s performance

Firstly, it’s worth noting that the lower northeast (which sits closest to Cambodia) voted differently on the party-list in 2026 than in 2023. Move Forward and Pheu Thai were the two parties that topped the party list vote in every constituency in this region in 2023. In 2026, Bhumjaithai had the most party-list votes in the lion’s share of constituencies. But Bhumjaithai also bested the other two parties in the Central region, where they also developed a high degree of local strength. It’s thus impossible to say for sure that the lower northeast performance was a regionalized result of nationalism.

To get a more granular picture, we’ll zoom into the border regions closest to Cambodia. Bhumjaithai saw its best performance on the party list ballot in one border province: Buriram. (See first map: the darkest shades of blue are concentrated in Buriram). Throughout the province, it won over 50 percent of the vote in every constituency, indeed in some areas winning close to 65 percent of the vote. But this is where Bhumjaithai has historically been strongest (Buriram is essentially the party’s capital city), and so its stratospheric performance here is unsurprising. Interestingly, the party failed to replicate this level of support outside of Buriram. Cross over to the border constituencies in Surin, Chanthaburi, and Sri Saket, and Bhumjaithai’s vote share decreases to closer to 30-40 percent of the vote. In Sa Kaeo, another province bordering Buriram, the party’s vote share declines to around 10 to 20 percent. In the Ubon Ratchathani constituencies directly bordering Cambodia, Bhumjaithai won as little as 6-8 percent of the vote.

This is still much higher than in 2023, of course, and given that nationally Bhumjaithai won 18 percent of the party-list vote, it can be said that in some border provinces Bhumjaithai did over-perform. Such results are perhaps attributable to nationalism. In Si Saket’s District 5, which sits on the border, Pheu Thai’s vote share collapsed from around 45 percent in 2023 to just 25 percent in 2026. That is a rather precipitous fall. Was this because voters were blaming Pheu Thai for mismanaging the border issues, and voters transferring their allegiance to Bhumjaithai? We would need survey data to draw a firm conclusion, but it would be a reasonable guess that at least some voters were behaving according to this logic.

We do have one point of caution to suggest that Cambodia was only one of many drivers of the Bhumjaithai vote in the border areas, however: the vote share varied considerably depending on which party possessed local strength. In some constituencies where Bhumjaithai faced dominant competitors, it underperformed. In Sa Kaeo’s district 2, for example, Bhumjaithai won just around 10 percent of the vote, while Palang Pracharath (which had a miserable election night otherwise) won around 27 percent. This is the district of PPRP leader Trinuch Thienthong, and this was the party’s strongest constituency nationwide. Here, local dynamics seem to have been key.

The Economic Party’s performance

What is more interesting is the Economic Party’s performance. Nationally, the party won around 3 percent of the party-list vote share (roughly a little over a million votes). But it was in the border areas that the Economic Party saw its strongest results. In the map, you can see that the darkest shades of yellow is clustered around the Cambodian border! Here were some of the party’s best constituencies:

• In Surin’s eighth district, the party won around 10 percent of the party-list vote; it had a similar performance in Sa Kaeo’s third district where they won a little over 9 percent. Both of these constituencies directly border Cambodia.

• In Sa Kaeo’s border constituencies (including Trinuch’s) it won 7 to 9 percent of the vote.

• In Chanthaburi’s third district and Si Saket’s fourth district, it won 8 percent of the vote.

It’s worth noting that we do not see similar performances anywhere else in the country. If the nationalist wave had swept through all of Thailand, you would expect to see the Economic Party to do respectably in Bangkok, the province most attuned to the national sentiment. But there, the Economic Party usually won between 1-3 percent of the party-list vote (in line with its national performance). The nationalist effect thus appears to be highly regionalized.

So what conclusions can we draw? There are too many confounding factors to say with complete certainty that Bhumjaithai performed well in the lower northeast because of the Cambodia factor. However, the strength of its performance on the party-list ballot, where voters are directly choosing a party instead of a local candidate, makes it plausible that Bhumjaithai may have indeed peeled off some nationalist voters from other parties. At least some Pheu Thai and People’s Party voters probably drifted towards Bhumjaithai because of the nationalism factor. Additionally, as Joel Selway wrote, nationalism likely played a role in turning out conservative voters who already were attuned to Bhumjaithai’s offerings in this election. In addition, the over-performance of the Economic Party in border areas indicates that the Cambodian conflict did play a role in driving the calculations of at least one major segment of the population in these provinces.

Yet if I were a party leader thinking of using nationalism as the main factor to drive support for my party, these results would give me pause. There were many facilitating causes underpinning Bhumjaithai’s victory, and nationalism was only one of them. The party that was riding solely on the nationalist wave was the Economic Party. The fact that their most outstanding performances show up clearest in constituencies that sit directly on the border and fade the further away you go indicate that even this regionalized version of nationalism may have had limited effects on voter behavior in the lower northeast. Indeed, even in some constituencies very close to the border, the Economic Party did not significantly over-perform.

The best conclusion we can draw based on the limited data we have is regionalized nationalism played at least some role in driving how voters behaved in 2026. That is not as clean a narrative as the one that the media offered in their reporting of the election results. Unfortunately, politics is rarely that clear-cut.