Cambodia Conflict Update

The conflict flares up again

I’m writing today with brief updates on the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia that erupted again on December 7th and remains ongoing.

The Thai government’s official position as stated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that Cambodia “continues to engage in provocative actions that violate the Joint Declaration between the Prime Ministers of Thailand and Cambodia…On 7 December 2025, Cambodia opened fire on Thai troops who were on routine patrol in Thai territory.” One major point of escalation was what the Ministry described as “the recent incident in which Thai soldiers were injured by a newly-planted landmine on 10 November 2025.” (According to the Thai government, an ASEAN Observer team had concluded that the landmines were freshly planted). Thailand’s claims are, like in the previous round of conflict, contested by Cambodia.

The question that is most on peoples’ minds, of course, is why this has erupted again at this time, especially after a ceasefire had been signed in Kuala Lumpur. There is a lot of speculation about the domestic calculations in both countries that could lead to more hawkish behavior. Like last time, I don’t think that there is anyone who can actually confidently assert why the conflict has re-started at this exact moment; this is known probably only in a very limited circle in both Bangkok and Phnom Penh.

However, I do want to point to Diplomat editor Sebastian Strangio’s analysis, which I have found interesting. He has observed a pattern where this conflict has tended to “flare up at the border shortly after Thai actions against Cambodian tycoons connected to scam operations.” He later noted that it’s become quite clear that the Thai military has been targeting buildings known to house these scam centers inside Cambodia. These attacks on casino buildings have been well-publicized by the Thai military, arguing that they have been used as military bases. I don’t know if these scam centers were the main trigger for the origins of the conflict earlier this year — see my thoughts on the international family feud — but this flare-up may not necessarily have the same cause as the original breakout of hostilities.

One dimension to this conflict that I think has been discussed in the international media is how Cambodia’s de facto leader Hun Sen has attempted to use the playbook that he used with great effect with the Shinawatras on Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul. He released photos of Anutin dining with a Cambodian governor, arguing that Anutin has “forgotten this friendship.” But Anutin has found it relatively easy to parry these attacks, with the Thai government spokesman replying that “old personal relationships cannot be compared with Thailand’s sovereignty.” If this is the worst dirt that Hun Sen has on Anutin, it will have nowhere near the same effect as former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s leaked phone call — thus Cambodia’s ability to sway domestic Thai politics appears to now be far more limited. (And thus it may seem that for Hun Sen’s purposes, the mortal wounding of the Pheu Thai government — which he played such a decisive role in — may ironically prove quite counterproductive. That raises even more questions about what exactly he was thinking when he was releasing the original phone call and the extent to which decision-making Phnom Penh has been driven by impulse rather than calculation).

For now, the Thai government appears to be in no mood for negotiations. The army chief of staff has said that the goal is to “curb their (Cambodian military) capability…to stop them from encroaching on our territory like they did in various forms.” What this means at this point remains unclear; a BBC piece did speculate that a verified end to the use of land mines at the border is probably a major Thai requirement. Anutin has also said that there will be “no ceasefire,” while Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said that operations will continue until Thailand’s territorial integrity is no longer under threat.

In political science terms, we could say that the Thai government has raised the domestic “audience costs” with these types of statements and it will now be very difficult for Anutin to back down from military operations until some sort of satisfactory conclusion from the Thai perspective has been reached.