Three Theories to Explain Paetongtarn’s Rise

This post originally appeared on my blog on August 17, 2024.

Something that's puzzling to essentially everyone in Thai politics right now is how and why exactly Paetongtarn Shinawatra became prime minister. And I don't mean the obvious ("she's Thaksin's daughter, duh"), but more the specific process that happened.

Part of why all of this seems so mysterious, I think, is because the number of people in Thailand who can credibly claim to know exactly what is happening next is very small. Based on what I've heard, the ruling that removed Srettha Thavisin was itself a surprise to even political insiders. (Phumtham Wechayachai, who became the acting prime minister on Srettha's removal, was in Kazakhstan on that day: hardly the most obvious place for someone who knew he was about to assume executive authority!)

And so what I have to offer, as I'm still trying to work out exactly what happened, is three competing hypotheses on how Paetongtarn became the final nominee for prime minister.

1. Theory 1: Consolidation. Thaksin intended all along for Paetongtarn to be prime minister, in order to consolidate the Shinawatras' control of government

The first hypothesis is straightforward: this was all part of the plan. Many have long suspected that Srettha was simply a seat-warmer who would hold the fort until Paetongtarn was ready to become prime minister. Some, indeed, were surprised that he was even given the position to begin with, given the long-documented inclination for Pheu Thai to trust only family members. (Before Paetongtarn, the previous two Thaksinite prime ministers were his brother-in-law and his sister.) Meanwhile, there was never any consideration of allowing a non-Pheu Thai prime minister to take the position.

Some have even gone as far as to speculate that Srettha's removal had been engineered by his erstwhile allies, the appointment of the tainted Pichit Chuenban a poison pill meant to accelerate the end of his tenure. I don't buy this argument, however: I think there are far easier and less messy ways for Pheu Thai to have asked Srettha to step down if they had wanted him to. (He doesn't have a strong base of support amongst MPs, given that he had very limited experience in politics).

So let's assume that the Srettha removal did come as a surprise. According to this theory, Paetongtarn was the intended pick of choice all along once the removal happened. The earliest reports that a meeting of coalition leaders at Thaksin's Baan Chan Song La residence resulted in an agreement to nominate former justice minister Chaikasem Nitisiri, in this view, would simply have been a smokescreen. NationWeekend, for example, speculates that party leaders may have felt an immediate decision to nominate Paetongtarn would have made Srettha's removal look like an orchestrated plot, and so Chaikasem's name was initially floated.

While plausible, this theory does have some holes. What to make of all the reports previously, then, that the Shinawatras have long been resistant to Paetongtarn becoming prime minister because of the potential legal dangers inherent to the position? If anything, this particular political juncture feels more fraught than ever. And if the goal was a consolidation of power, Chaikasem as a longtime ally of the Shinawatras would likely not have been too functionally different, while having the benefit of insulating Paetongtarn from danger.

2. Theory 2: "The political hostage." Pheu Thai did not originally want Paetongtarn to be prime minister, and was coerced into nominating her.

Another theory is that this was not the result Thaksin or Pheu Thai originally wanted, and Paetongtarn's substitution was truly a last-minute decision. Yesterday, Thai PBS posed the question: "Is Paetongtarn a prime minister of hope, or a hostage to lock down Thaksin?" This summarizes the gist of the uncertain evidence well.

The logic of the "hostage theory," if I may call it that, goes like this: Paetongtarn as prime minister is a guarantee of placing Pheu Thai on their best behavior, as they will seek to minimize the legal risks that she will have to face as prime minister. (The Thaksinites have a worrying track record: Samak, Somchai, Yingluck, and Srettha were all removed by the Constitutional Court). So the grand compromise between the conservatives and Thaksin is best served by having Paetongtarn as prime minister: for fear of legal payback, she will not do anything to buck their interests.

While compelling logically, the issue with this hypothesis is that there is scant hard evidence to support it. We do have two clues. Immediately after reports of Paetongtarn's nomination began circulating, it was rumored that Pheu Thai's flagship 10,000 baht digital wallet policy may no longer be moving forward. This is potential evidence that Pheu Thai does want to ensure Paetongtarn does not take on risky projects; there has long been legal controversy over how the scheme would be funded. This isn't necessarily surefire confirmation of the hostage theory, however: regardless of how it happened, this dynamic would be present under a Paetongtarn premiership.

Another argument would be that Chaikasem Nitisiri was turned down not by Pheu Thai members but by coalition leaders, who may have used his past openness to amending Section 112 as a reason to withdraw support. Both Bhumjaithai and the United Thai Nation Party signaled their unyielding stance on Section 112. However, Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul did eventually clarify that he would be willing to support any Pheu Thai candidate, and it was up to Pheu Thai to clear the air if it did choose Chaikasem. The evidence here, then, is mixed.

One other caveat: I think that we have to be very careful not to treat the "conservatives" as a unitary actor. Often political analysts, myself included, will resort to these shorthands because they make things easy to digest: we have conservatives, progressives, and the Thaksinites as the three main camps of Thai politics. But of course things are more nuanced than that. The conservative camp is particularly fractured. We have the Bhumjaithai Party, which has long been more amenable to Pheu Thai and Thaksin than the other conservative groups. We have Prawit Wongsuwan and his "forest house" camp. They were the ones who appear to have initiated this case against Srettha. How capable they are of coordinating in order to get a presumed preferred end-result, such as obtaining a "political hostage," is not at all clear.

3. Theory 3: Process of elimination. There was simply no other choice, as no one else who wants the premiership right now is broadly acceptable

Finally, this last theory is also simple: the Srettha removal was unexpected, and there had not been sufficient agreement on who would become prime minister, leading to a messy process in the aftermath where Paetongtarn emerged as the only acceptable option to all.

Anutin and Thaksin were known to have went golfing before the Constitutional Court ruling, although the details of what they discussed is unknown. Rumors were immediately stirred of Anutin being prepared as a "backup prime minister." Yet after Srettha's removal, Anutin was very public in his disavowal of prime ministerial ambitions at this current moment. In Thai there is a phrase that when things happen by luck, it is like an orange has fallen on you; Anutin said becoming prime minister right now would be more like a durian falling on you.

He has a point. Except for having his name placed in the list of prime ministers, Anutin gathers few advantages from becoming prime minister now. He has too few MPs to operate effectively as the head of government; he would be in office but not in power. Blame for the anemic economy would be placed on him rather than on Pheu Thai. His party is widely seen as strong — becoming an incumbent now would only weaken it. Meanwhile, the one candidate believed to desire the premiership, Prawit Wongsuwan, has seen his relationship with Thaksin deteriorate so much that it was inconceivable that Pheu Thai would have allowed Palang Pracharath to lead the coalition.

If we believe that Thaksin was truly amenable to having a non-Pheu Thai candidate become prime minister, he could perhaps have held talks with Anutin, who was unwilling to become prime minister now. Lacking another viable non-Pheu Thai choice — Pirapan Salirathvibagha from the United Thai Nation Party commands too few MPs — Thaksin was forced to turn to Chaikasem. Or, he might simply have never trusted any non-Pheu Thai candidate from the beginning. (Let's remember that Newin Chidchob, the powerbroker behind Bhumjaithai, famously told Thaksin "it's over boss" when he defected and helped the Democrats form a government in 2008).

Chaikasem had been little-discussed in previous PM speculation on the basis that he was thought to be in ill health. Pheu Thai tried to dismiss this claim, with Phumtham immediately noting after Srettha's removal that Chaikasem has been doing better. Chaikasem himself said the day after that he was ready to be prime minister. And nominating Chaikasem, if he is in good health, would have had a political logic of his own. He would have kept the premiership within Pheu Thai, and Thaksin does not have to take a risk with a non-Pheu Thai candidate. But Chaikasem potentially did face resistance from Pheu Thai itself. News reports suggested that the party's MPs did not want him and that a gathering of MPs chose Paetongtarn instead. If we thought Srettha lacked electoral appeal, Chaikasem takes that problem and compounds it even further: very few people outside of political junkies probably even know who he is. Questions about Chaikasem's past record as a justice official may also have played a role, as Pheu Thai may have wanted to minimize the risk of another ethics case being brought forward.

In short, in this theory, after being turned down by Anutin and weighing Chaikasem's pros and cons, the coalition may have eventually arrived at Paetongtarn through a process of elimination. We are assuming here, of course, that Thaksin is a more democratic leader than one might be inclined to think given his track record, and that he listened to the Pheu Thai membership's concerns about Chaikasem. That is a potential weakness in this theory: nothing about Thaksin suggests he is that kind of leader. But who knows? Perhaps there were other concerns about Chaikasem that truly made a government led by him unviable, and in the end, the pressure to ensure the premiership did not go to a (most likely unwilling) Anutin or even to Prawit forced Thaksin's hand.

At this point, I don't know if we will ever get confirmation of the inside details on how exactly this played out. And this is a major disadvantage that all of us as watchers of Thai politics are currently being faced with: we do not yet have a clear understanding of the genesis of the Paetongtarn government.