Well, the text is only about the royal prerogative, not about who can initiate its usage. That's why Borwornsak moves away from using the text of the constitution in argueing his case. Can the House elect a new prime minister but the House is still dissolved? Again, legal logic indicates that in such a case the request is void. Otherwise, the prerogative could be used even without a request. The text only sets one condition: it can be used only once under the same event.
I would propose this alternative slogan for BJT: we do what we say (today only, check back tomorrow it might be different). I wonder if Bowornsak is mad at himself for not thinking of this type of situation and codifying it into the constitution.
So it sounds like the ball is in the Palace's court? Could the King dissolve parliament no matter what happens with these court cases or other machinations?
I any case, a caretaker government is per definition tasked to take care of routine issues only. It is not supposed to take any actions that have substantial consequences. And the dissolution of the House most certainly falls into this category. This should have been patently clear to Phumtham.
Seems that Yut Saeng-Uthai rejected the idea that a caretaker minister/PM is empowered to countersign the royal command to dissolve the House. But Thai lawyers should know the history of the respective stipulation better. In his 1949 book, Yut needed dozens of pages to analyze the conditions under which the House could be dissolved and the role of the king in this as the neutral Head of State. In any case, Yut stressed that a House dissolution was only a means of last resort when no other approach was feasible. Yet it seems that the arrangement found between PP and BJT is feasible (which would make it doubtful that an agreement about a House dissolution in four months was actually permissible).
Logic would suggest that Pheu Thai would have more time to work on their election hopes if they allowed Anutin to became PM and he delivers on his commitment to the PP which would likely bring an election in Feb/Mar 2026.
So why would they seek an immediate, but legally uncertain, dissolution of parliament instead, which, if approved, would result in an election by about end-October? I suspect that they (...Thaksin?) are happy to throw Phumtham under the bus, believing that the legal conundrums will drag on and on and result in an even later election than a Bhumjaithai engendered dissolution would provide. And perhaps hope that being seen as a "victim" of legal uncertainty and as a promoter of an immediate democratic voice being heard will help boost their plunging electoral chances
Well, the text is only about the royal prerogative, not about who can initiate its usage. That's why Borwornsak moves away from using the text of the constitution in argueing his case. Can the House elect a new prime minister but the House is still dissolved? Again, legal logic indicates that in such a case the request is void. Otherwise, the prerogative could be used even without a request. The text only sets one condition: it can be used only once under the same event.
I would propose this alternative slogan for BJT: we do what we say (today only, check back tomorrow it might be different). I wonder if Bowornsak is mad at himself for not thinking of this type of situation and codifying it into the constitution.
So it sounds like the ball is in the Palace's court? Could the King dissolve parliament no matter what happens with these court cases or other machinations?
I any case, a caretaker government is per definition tasked to take care of routine issues only. It is not supposed to take any actions that have substantial consequences. And the dissolution of the House most certainly falls into this category. This should have been patently clear to Phumtham.
Seems that Yut Saeng-Uthai rejected the idea that a caretaker minister/PM is empowered to countersign the royal command to dissolve the House. But Thai lawyers should know the history of the respective stipulation better. In his 1949 book, Yut needed dozens of pages to analyze the conditions under which the House could be dissolved and the role of the king in this as the neutral Head of State. In any case, Yut stressed that a House dissolution was only a means of last resort when no other approach was feasible. Yet it seems that the arrangement found between PP and BJT is feasible (which would make it doubtful that an agreement about a House dissolution in four months was actually permissible).
Logic would suggest that Pheu Thai would have more time to work on their election hopes if they allowed Anutin to became PM and he delivers on his commitment to the PP which would likely bring an election in Feb/Mar 2026.
So why would they seek an immediate, but legally uncertain, dissolution of parliament instead, which, if approved, would result in an election by about end-October? I suspect that they (...Thaksin?) are happy to throw Phumtham under the bus, believing that the legal conundrums will drag on and on and result in an even later election than a Bhumjaithai engendered dissolution would provide. And perhaps hope that being seen as a "victim" of legal uncertainty and as a promoter of an immediate democratic voice being heard will help boost their plunging electoral chances
I get a sniff of Boris Johnson here. Someone who will do anything to get into power.