
We may be about to witness the creation of a Thai government the likes of which we have never seen before.
After the defenestration of former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra yesterday, the ruling Pheu Thai Party and the opposition Bhumjaithai Party began racing to form a government. Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai called a press conference to affirm the commitment of Pheu Thai and its coalition allies to set up a new government.
But Pheu Thai, in a way, seems to have been caught a bit flat footed.1 Notably missing from that press conference were any representatives from the Kla Tham party2 — a crucial coalition member with 26 seats. Without Kla Tham, the government — which previously held 258 seats — would fall below a majority. Also notable was the fact that the Pheu Thai did not officially nominate their final candidate Chaikasem Nitisiri for prime minister, suggesting that coalitional bargaining was still taking place.
Confidence and supply
At the same time, Anutin executed a rival plan to establish a government with breakneck speed and efficiency.3 Immediately after the court ruling, reports began emerging that Anutin was planning to visit the People’s Party to ask for their support. The PP leader, Nattaphong Rueangpanyawut, declared that the PP was willing to vote for a candidate who would 1) dissolve the parliament within four months and 2) hold a referendum on amending the 2017 constitution. The PP pledged that they would not join the government and would remain in the opposition, ready to hold a no confidence debate if the terms are broken. After Anutin visited the PP headquarters (apparently for the first time ever), Bhumjaithai released a statement announcing that they were willing to accept these terms.
The PP, Bhumjaithai explained, “should have the right to be the first at establishing a government” but cannot “due to legal restrictions.” Bhumjaithai was willing to accept the PP’s conditions, however, and will return power to the people via fresh elections. Bhumjaithai called it “a government with the People’s Party as the main supporter.”
This, essentially, is a confidence and supply agreement: fairly common elsewhere, but the first I believe in Thai political history. It has already caused confusion (pundit Kam Phaka called it a contradiction to democratic principles, which is not quite true). But this development is not necessarily a surprise, as I wrote about here back in July:
…recent weeks also have indicated increased closeness between the PP and Bhumjaithai, which joined the opposition only recently. The two parties differ starkly on their stances towards Thailand’s traditional institutions, but Anutin has shown greater friendliness towards individual MPs and refused to rule out a coalition government with the PP in the future if they can “accept each other’s policies.” PP leader Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut also has not closed the door on supporting Bhumjaithai leader Anutin as prime minister….[All parties] appear prepared for more of what Dan Slater and Erica Simmons call “promiscuous power-sharing" — whether that be a renewed marriage between Pheu Thai and the progressives or a previously unthinkable alliance between the People’s Party and Bhumjaithai.
By the late evening, Anutin had finished negotiating with a variety of political groups and was able to give a press conference announcing the formation of a new Bhumjaithai-led government. Per media reports, this is the parliamentary strength now lining up behind Anutin.4 (The numbers here are based on the Thai Enquirer’s tally and reports from other sources).
Government
Bhumjaithai: 69 seats
Kla Tham: 25 seats
Palang Pracharath: 20 seats
Niphon Bunyamanee faction of the Democrat Party: 4 seats
Suchart Chomklin faction of the United Thai Nation Party: 16 seats
Sakda Vichiansin faction of the Pheu Thai Party: 10 seats
A faction of the Thai Sang Thai Party: 2 seats
Fair Party: 1 seat
Other micro-parties: 4 seats
Confidence and supply (if People’s Party finalizes deal with Anutin):
People’s Party: 143 seats
Total: 294 seats
If this new government actually gets set up, it will be a political innovation. As I previously mentioned, it will be a minority government based on a confidence and supply agreement with a partner that is almost totally ideologically unaligned with its allies in government. I actually had to do some research to investigate whether there has been cases in the world where a larger party does a confidence and supply agreement to back a much smaller party’s government. (It’s apparently been done in Scandinavia). The PP, of course, will have to police this government to make sure they stick to the reformist pledges they made, but I do wonder about whether there is possibility of foul play.
It’s not a done deal
Indeed, I’m still wondering what incentive Bhumjaithai and friends have in running an administration for for months. For one, is that sufficient time to build up popularity for the next election? What is the incentive for the non-PP parties to go to the polls this early? Or do other political concerns override this? Is it a desire to take back the Interior Ministry?
And if Bhumjaithai pulls in more coalition partners, would it be able to simply ignore the confidence and supply pledge altogether?5 One reason why pulling in coalition partners may be relatively easy for this coalition is because it has an almost total disregard for party organizations. No formal decision from their official leadership is necessary for an MP to be welcomed with open arms to this coalition. Of the major parties listed above, only two came as a whole: Bhumjaithai and Kla Tham. Palang Pracharath’s leadership has decided to join the coalition, but the party is now so plagued by defections that sometimes it is hard to determine its true strength. Meanwhile, we have factions from the Democrats, United Thai Nation, and Pheu Thai parties. In Thai parlance renegade MPs are referred to as “cobras.” In few governments have cobras made up such a high proportion of its MPs.
So there we have it: the making of a dark blue prime minister, a kaleidoscope government of parties and renegade factions, potentially backed by orange guarantors in a confidence and supply agreement. And ostensibly on a temporary reformist mission. If you thought the Thaksinite-conservative alliance resulting from the 2023 grand compromise was a surprise, this one is truly an alliance of strange bedfellows.
Given the tenuous loyalties underpinning this Bhumjaithai-led coalition, I would say that it’s not clear this is a done deal. Pheu Thai has not given up; Phumtham Wechayachai has said that Pheu Thai is also ready to accept the PP deal. In that case, the PP would have a choice to make: to either go with Pheu Thai or Bhumjaithai. At the time of writing, we still haven’t heard anything from Pheu Thai.
Pheu Thai could still have some rabbits to pull out of a hat — agreeing to nominate another compromise candidate for prime minister, perhaps, that could disrupt the other party’s calculations — which means Bhumjaithai will still have to watch its back. There is also ongoing legal debate about whether or not an acting prime minister can dissolve parliament. That is a trump card that Phumtham could try to pull to force the other parties in line if they are not ready for an election at this moment. (I don’t think that Pheu Thai presses that button because it could also be tantamount to electoral suicide for them).
The past three years of Thai politics has seen Pheu Thai betray Move Forward and ally with Bhumjaithai, followed by Bhumjaithai’s knifing of Pheu Thai and now a new friendship between Bhumjaithai and the People’s Party. If nothing else, we have learned that there are truly no permanent friends and no permanent enemies in politics — only permanent interests.
I do wonder whether Paetongtarn’s removal came as a surprise to them, because as I noted previously, she had been confident enough to not resign beforehand.
See here for context on the Kla Tham party, which interestingly had previously been seen as one of Pheu Thai’s closest allies.
He previously said he had no plans to become prime minister — “war room” ready (only a “love room”) — but the speed at which he operated suggests that this operation was planned far in advance.
Because there are so many renegade factions, it’s hard to say for sure until we see a parliamentary vote what the true numbers are.
Also fascinating is like what you said. PT has somehow been caught flat footed again. How?
This outcome was likely, or at the very least plausible. And yet once again, they've placed way too much faith in Thaksin's ability to make a deal with the establishment.
And now, they've also bungled in managing this crisis.
PT needs to hold their coalition together. This has to be done through assuring them that:
1. PT has the numbers
2. Chaikasem can actually be a leader
However, PT has only done #1, and not even convincingly. And it has ignored #2 altogether.
If they want to win the confidence of the remaining coalition partners, Chaikasem should be there in every meeting, leading the talks, and showing that he can command the room. You know, basic leadership stuff.
Instead, Phumtham is treating Chaikasem as a non factor. Once we have the numbers, we'll call him. How is this supposed to inspire any confidence?
Given this difficult dilemma for the People's Party, supporting BJT over PT is definitely the more sensible one.
Of those 2, BJT is much more likely to dissolve parliament in the agreed timeframe. In some degree, BJT would welcome an election — their numbers will only go up.
Meanwhile, PT will try to stay in power as long as possible. An election would only decimate their numbers.