Bhumjaithai's Three Options
Could the Pheu Thai government collapse?
My new piece on the cracking of the grand compromise in Thailand is the lead article on East Asia Forum this week. Check out the article here. You can also check out the EAF’s accompanying editorial on the “toxic alliances” throughout Southeast Asia today here.
Last week, I wrote about the two civil wars currently raging within the cabinet. Neither have been resolved in any way, but I wanted to write another post today on the newest developments regarding Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai’s struggle over the Interior Ministry.
This week has already seen two interesting developments. Firstly, a list of 20 people who are being investigated for potentially being involved in the Senate collusion case was released. This includes several figures tied to Bhumjaithai, including Newin Chidchob (the party’s spiritual leader) and Anutin Charnvirakul (the party’s de jure leader). The political pressure is clearly being raised on Bhumjaithai.
Secondly, according to news reports, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra met with Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Anutin Charnvirakul on June 16th for an hour and a half. Thai news agencies are reporting that during this meeting, the prime minister officially tabled her offer to Bhumjaithai: Pheu Thai wanted to take back the Ministry of Interior, and in recognition of the ministry’s importance, would exchange it for two ministries currently under Pheu Thai’s control: the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Public Health. Some reports characterized this as not a request but a notification. Anutin reportedly rebuffed this offer, telling Paetongtarn that he would continue to serve at the Interior Ministry.
Anutin denied yesterday that this exchange had occurred, but made clear his position to reporters.
If we cannot stay at the Interior Ministry, then there is no choice available to the Bhumjaithai Party. We will have to retreat to the opposition…This is not a matter between the prime minister and an individual minister, but a matter between party to party…
The party must have honor. People voted [for us]. No one can just come and ravage it.
To reiterate this point, the FC Anutin page (which is Anutin’s official Facebook page) re-posted the quote on Bhumjaithai’s honor. In response, Paetongtarn said during a press conference that Anutin had “never said” he would take Bhumjaithai to the opposition during their meeting. It was noteworthy that usually cabinet ministers from various parties will stand with the prime minister during her press conferences, but only Pheu Thai ministers were standing with her yesterday.
Then, the latest reports from last night say that Pheu Thai has now given Bhumjaithai a 48 hour deadline to make their decision on whether to accept the prime minister’s formula for the cabinet reshuffle. The only hint we have on what Bhumjaithai will do, at the time of writing, is a post from the FC Anutin page, where he writes: “No matter what happens, there is nothing to feel stuck on, because P’Nhu [Anutin’s nickname] has put in his best effort — it is the best and he cannot give you any better.”
So what are the options that Bhumjaithai has now?
1. The party insists that it must keep the Interior Ministry, and Pheu Thai relents.
This would be the continuation of the status quo, and it would mean that any cabinet reshuffle is unlikely to be particularly dramatic, focusing mostly on Pheu Thai’s own ministers and the newly-divided United Thai Nation Party’s quota. In this case, the government will continue operating normally and the chances that it makes it to 2027 without a premature dissolution of parliament rises.
2. The party relents and lets Pheu Thai take the Interior Ministry, in exchange for other cabinet roles.
As the author Noom Mueang Chan analyzed yesterday, this option would pose multiple legal risks to Bhumjaithai: it could allow Pheu Thai to accelerate the legal investigations currently ongoing with Bhumjaithai’s Senate collusion case and also another case involving the Interior Ministry’s handling of Khao Kradong in Bhumjaithai province. At the same time, if Bhumjaithai does take the helm of the Commerce Ministry right now, they would be handed a politically radioactive issue: tariff negotiations with the United States. While the government has claimed that the negotiations are proceeding smoothly, so far no in-person ministerial talks have been scheduled, raising significant doubt over whether or not Thailand will be able to make a deal before US President Donald Trump’s July 9 deadline. That hardly seems like a favorable portfolio for Anutin to be taking on at this juncture.
I think the only way in which Bhumjaithai agrees to this is, as I wrote about last week, Pheu Thai agrees to hand over the Transport Ministry: its large budget makes it highly desirable for all parties, and Bhumjaithai had run it previously during the second Prayut Chan-o-cha administration. Pheu Thai appears to have no intention of giving it up, however (especially as it intends to begin its signature policy of 20 baht tickets for all train rides regardless of length in Bangkok1).
3. Both Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai stand their ground and Bhumjaithai goes into the opposition.
This would be the most dramatic scenario. Last week I wrote that Bhumjaithai leaving the coalition could potentially make the government unviable, but let me dive a little deeper into the parliamentary arithmetic today.
The House of Representatives is composed of 500 seats, so 251 seats are needed for a majority. The government currently holds 323 seats, with the following core coalition partners: Pheu Thai (142 seats), Bhumjaithai (69 seats), United Thai Nation (36 seats), Kla Tham (26 seats), and Democrat (25 seats).
If Bhumjaithai leaves the coalition, the government would at a stroke be reduced to 254 seats. In Thai political parlance, this is called a government that is “brimming with water”: just a little bit more pressure and the whole thing could topple. Were a couple more MPs to defect from the opposition, the government would fall and a new election would be called: one that Pheu Thai (and indeed, the other coalition parties) may not necessarily be ready for, given that the parliamentary term does not end until 2027.
The situation would be especially precarious because the United Thai Nation Party is currently divided in two, with around half of its MPs still loyal to party leader Pirapan Salirathvibhaga while the other half are loyal to key faction leader Suchart Chomklin. It is hard to predict, if Pheu Thai must split the cabinet positions between the two (and hence reduce the allocation to Pirapan’s faction), how MP’s loyalties may change. A clue comes from Witthaya Kaewparadai, a UTN deputy leader, who said that if Pheu Thai brings in a non-UTN figure to replace the party’s ministers, that would be tantamount to “disinviting us from the government,” and a change in ministries would potentially push the UTN into opposition. In summary, the government might not actually have a majority if Bhumjaithai leaves and the UTN continues imploding.
But Pheu Thai does have some options, should Bhumjaithai actually decide to join the opposition. There has long been discussion that the Kla Tham Party is attracting attention from some opposition MPs. If some opposition MPs do join Kla Tham, the government’s majority could expand. There are many potential sources of new recruits. The Thai Sang Thai Party’s MPs have proven to bear little loyalty to its non-parliamentary leadership: five defied the party whip to vote for Paetongtarn Shinawatra last year, which is usually a sign that they are interested in joining the government.
In addition, the Palang Pracharath Party — most of whose MPs already moved to Kla Tham — could also prove to be fertile ground. The party, after it was raided by Kla Tham, now has 20 MPs. According to a NationWeekend analysis, its MPs are currently shopping around for new options, and as few as three may remain loyal to leader General Prawit Wongsuwan. Unfortunately for Pheu Thai, however, these MPs may not necessarily join a government party. Instead, Anutin was recently photographed having dinner with MPs from Santi Promphat’s faction of MPs from Phetchaburi province.
All of this goes to prove that Bhumjaithai more or less is indispensable for the government’s stability, and it is difficult to understand why Thaksin Shinawatra is so confident in making a move on the Interior Ministry at this stage. We can only assume, then, that Pheu Thai is confident that they will be able to pull enough opposition MPs to the government to give it a modicum of stability. But that could also prove to be a miscalculation. Newin Chidchob once reportedly told Thaksin, “It’s over, boss,” leading to the Thaksinites being ousted from power in 2008. One wonders if history might repeat.
The economics of this policy deserves a whole post to itself, as questions have long been raised about how it can be sustainably funded.