Is a Prayut Comeback Possible?
It's no longer far-fetched, but challenges abound
In this weekend post, please allow me to indulge a little in the speculative realm. Paetongtarn Shinawatra is still prime minister, but her ouster is possible if not probable. So who would replace her? A while back, a journalist asked me if I thought Prayut returning as prime minister would be possible. I had initially dismissed the idea because Prayut has already retired from politics and is now serving on the Privy Council. But given the recent turn of events, I’m no longer so sure that a Prayut return is so farfetched after all. A Prayut comeback has also been increasingly discussed in the Thai media, so it is worth taking some time to dissect this scenario.
Thai Rath recently ran an article making the case that Prayut returning as prime minister would be quite plausible. Unfortunately, the piece makes one serious error: it argues that Pheu Thai’s final candidate Chaikasem Nitisiri would not have the votes in parliament because the coalition possesses only 222 seats. This is false because the article inexplicably forgets to include Kla Tham, the third largest coalition party, in their count. With Kla Tham, the Pheu Thai coalition has a majority and the freedom to pick a prime minister if all coalition members stay in line. It is still possible that Chaikasem fails for whatever reason to garner the votes, but among all the remaining candidates he has the clearest path to the premiership if Paetongtarn Shinawatra is ousted.
But let’s suppose that Chaikasem for whatever reason is not approved by the House of Representatives. A precedent set in 2023 is that a candidate cannot be nominated twice, so he would be barred from consideration permanently. The piece goes on to argue that Bhumjaithai leader Anutin Charnvirakul1, United Thai Nation leader Pirapan Salirathavibhaga, Palang Pracharath leader Prawit Wongsuwan2 and former Democrat leader Jurin Laksanawisit all suffer from various weaknesses and are also unlikely to win.
For this reason, Thai Rath argues, Prayut could emerge as the perfect consensus candidate. There is precedent: former prime ministers Sanya Dharmasakti and Surayud Chulanont all resigned from the Privy Council to become head of government. The article goes on to argue that the Prayut would possess several advantages: he would have good relations with the military, he would satisfy conservative groups, but anti-Prayut factions would have no reason to demonstrate yet as he would have returned to power legitimately. In addition, Pheu Thai and Bhumjaithai could be convinced to vote for Prayut if beneficial arrangements were made, while the People’s Party could even be persuaded if there was a pledge to amend the constitution.
I would also add one other benefit: Prayut is unlikely to ever contest an election again, so he would not necessarily pose any electoral danger to the current parties. For Pheu Thai, which has seldom supported a leader without family ties to the Shinawatras, that will soften the blow of having to vote for an outsider.
Yet for Prayut, becoming prime minister might be easier than actually being prime minister. For one, a third Prayut premiership would see him at the head of a government composed in large part of Pheu Thai MPs whose loyalties lie first and foremost to the Shinawatras. Some will be familiar to him having previously served in Palang Pracharath, and indeed almost all of the coalition members were previously members of the Prayut coalition. But unlike the military administration of 2014-2019 when all ministers officially owed their posts to him and there was no opposition to speak of, or the 2019-2023 government when the majority of coalition MPs belonged to a party that had backed him for prime minister, a third Prayut government would have very few Prayut loyalists. That may give Prayut pause. What does governing look like as a prime minister with no base in parliament to count on and few allies in the cabinet?
In the end, the answer to such a government will most likely require a close partnership with the Shinawatras. (Let’s not forget that Paetongtarn still serves as Pheu Thai leader). Indeed, the consent of Pheu Thai is already necessary for Prayut to even become prime minister to begin with. Perhaps this is not going to be as difficult as their past enmity suggests — after all, reports from 2023 suggested that senators close to Prayut had been the ones to put Srettha across the victory line in the first place. But that does not come close to actually governing together; we simply do not know how that arrangement would work yet.
I also think that Thai Rath underestimates the popular discontent that could surface with a Prayut comeback. The grand compromise between Pheu Thai and the conservative parties which established the Srettha Thavisin government — while perfectly legitimate in strict parliamentary terms — had already been derided back in 2023 amongst progressives as making a mockery of the popular will. If that same parliament ends up yielding a government that looks suspiciously similar to the one produced by the 2019 election — one where Palang Pracharath had at least won the popular vote and had a substantial share of parliamentary seats, unlike 2023 where the parties of Prayut and Prawit performed miserably — such criticism will surely intensify.
For these practical reasons, a third Prayut government is still not the most likely outcome for now, but it is becoming more and more plausible. The fact alone that it is now being discussed as a potential scenario at all shows how much the Thai political landscape has changed in the few weeks. For months, a prominent Thai astrologer has been predicting that sometime between May and August this year Prayut will “reclaim what he has lost.” We will soon get to see whether this prediction is correct.
Of these options, Anutin probably has the best claim to the premiership, as he leads the third largest party in parliament.
Prawit has recently claimed that he is still eligible for prime minister, even though his party no longer has the constitutionally-mandated minimum 25 seats, because Palang Pracharath originally won more seats than that. That is an opinion that will be highly contested by other legal experts should he make a serious play for the premiership.