On the "Domestic Rivalry Theory" and the "International Family Feud Theory"
Examining the origins of the Thailand-Cambodia clash
Three days into the military conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, there are still no signs of de-escalation. Instead, the conflict spread to a new front along the maritime provinces. The Thai government’s current position is that it agrees in principle with ASEAN Chairman Anwar Ibrahim’s proposal of a ceasefire, but that “appropriate on-the-ground conditions” must be met first.
I have seen many posts on social media attributing the source of the conflict to domestic rivalries within Thailand — many arguing that the Thai military instigated this clash in order to gain some sort of domestic political advantage. One example is this op-ed in the Phnom Penh Post, where the author argues that the army provoked this conflict “to retain power and control over a nation of 71 million people that is demanding real change every single year.” Another widely shared video by The Bayon Facebook page says that “to build domestic support for their political ambitions the military is capitalizing on a powerful force in Thai society: nationalism.” In a similar vein, I’ve also seen a lot of arguments circulating online, particularly from Cambodian nationalists, along the lines that Cambodia would never seek to provoke this conflict because it is far weaker militarily than Thailand, and therefore Thailand must be the aggressor because Cambodia would never start a war that it cannot win. The gist of these theories is that a faction within Thailand must be responsible for the escalation of this conflict. I will refer to this as the “Thai domestic rivalry” theory.
I would be immensely skeptical of anyone who proclaims with absolute confidence that they know the genuine reason for this conflict. As I noted in my previous piece, one of the most confusing aspects of this conflict is how little information we have about its origins. No one outside a very small circle of Cambodian and Thai high-level officials have a complete picture of what is going on. Over the past few months I have talked to many Thai analysts and politicians, and while all have theories1 of what is driving this conflict, no one has been able to confirm them with any degree of certainty.
It’s worth saying here that this is not a unique issue to just the Thai-Cambodian conflict. Anyone who has spent the slightest bit of time in knows that we can only do so much in trying to unpack what is happening in elite-level Thai politics. I often say that one of the most frustrating things about analyzing Thai politics right now is we do not even know the full details of the grand compromise that led to the establishment of the Pheu Thai government in 2023 — and I say this as someone who has done more analysis than most on this topic. Without sure footing on even such fundamental matters that currently underpin Thai political dynamics, anyone claiming to know what sort of rivalry is currently occurring between different actors in Thailand or what Thai military commanders are thinking for certain right now is speculating at best.
What the weight of the evidence does point to is two things. Firstly, the idea that Thailand was the sole aggressor appears to be highly misleading. I would note that analysis conducted by Nathan Ruser, a satellite data analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, found “33 escalatory events instigated by Cambodia, 14 escalatory events instigated by Thailand, and 9 joint de-escalatory events.” If this analysis is correct, it points to Cambodia, not Thailand, having greater desire in escalating this conflict. (I highly recommend his detailed thread on X). Therefore, one cannot simply ignore the role of Cambodia’s domestic politics in escalating this conflict and place all of the weight on the Thai side.
Indeed, even if one chooses to believe that internal Thai rivalries were responsible for this conflict’s escalation, ironically it was Cambodia’s de facto leader Hun Sen who played a major role in destabilizing Thai politics by leaking the phone call with Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra2 and almost fatally weakening the Pheu Thai government and ensuring that the party is now boxed in and cannot do anything but take a firmer stance on the border. In the weeks since, Hun Sen has continually threatened to blackmail the Shinawatra family3 in a series of posts that TIME appropriately called “unhinged.” And so the “Thai domestic rivalry” theory suffers a major weakness: was Hun Sen himself an accomplice in this escalation? And if so, to what end?
(One additional thought I would add here is that there is a temptation to overestimate the rationality of political actors. Yes, it doesn’t make sense for Cambodia to provoke a conflict which it has little hope of winning. But Hun Sen is also a man who, as I noted in an earlier post, is known for his temper — firing pistols at air conditioners! — and is not exactly making rational decisions, including taking personal credit for commanding the conflict after the Cambodian army shelled civilian areas in Thailand.)
Another reason the Thai domestic rivalry theory does not make much sense, especially if it adopts the military as the key agent, is because it often argues that the military has done all of this in order to get rid of the Shinawatras. But why does the military have to go to such lengths to do so? Even without Hun Sen adding fuel to the fire that is the Shinawatras’ legal woes, Thaksin already was suffering from massive liabilities, especially the legal case surrounding whether he was genuinely ill during his prison sentence. A war was hardly necessary in weakening the Shinawatras; Thaksin has already served his foes many open goals. In fact, five Thaksinite prime ministers have already been removed from office in Thailand without any need to stir up conflict with a neighbor4. I am also not even sure that it is in the interests of conservative actors to damage Thaksin right now, when Pheu Thai — at least prior to its Hun Sen-initiated polling collapse —constitutes the best bulwark against a People’s Party government.
It is fair to say, of course, that some factions in Thailand will benefit more than others from this conflict; as I discuss below, the Pheu Thai government has certainly not gained any political advantage. But to say that any of these factions were the primary instigators is currently speculation unsupported by existing evidence. We simply don’t have enough information to say exactly what caused this conflict. But the Thai domestic rivalry theory, while attractive on paper, simply lacks concrete evidence5. Instead, the events leading up to the breakout of open hostilities points to what I call the “international family feud theory.” On this we are aware of some broad contours:
Hun Sen and the Shinawatras are currently driven by some sort of personal animosity, given the amount of personal attacks being fired at each other. (Hun Sen has continued to attack Thaksin, while Thaksin has now publicly said that he wants the Thai military to “teach Hun Sen a lesson” and just today called Hun Sen a social media-obsessed “zombie.”) There was no need for the two sides to personalize this conflict to such a degree, given that it only provides more fuel for popular criticism.
The Shinawatras have done something to anger Hun Sen to the point where he was willing to blow up a decades-long alliance between their two families. Important to note again that it was Hun Sen who took the first, unprecedented step to launch the political equivalent of a nuke at Paetongtarn, and to emphasize that this highly inflammatory act was already expensive to Hun Sen as it cost him any diplomatic credibility he possessed. Whatever angered Hun Sen was important enough to justify this response. And any attempts to mend relations afterwards, if there were any, clearly failed, given that Hun Sen has kept up his barrage of attacks in the weeks since.
But what exactly did the Shinawatras do? This is the point where we enter the realm of speculation. Was it Thaksin’s desire to legalize casinos in Thailand, which would have undercut a major revenue stream in Cambodia? Thailand’s crackdown on scam centers along the border? A clash over Koh Kood island and the nearby energy reserves? Again, we simply do not know.
Sui Lee-Wee of the New York Times has similarly speculated on various reasons behind the breakdown in relations between the two families:
After Mr. Thaksin returned to Thailand in 2023, he increasingly positioned the country to be an economic competitor to Cambodia. He floated the idea of an entertainment complex that would rival the casinos in Cambodia, a lucrative source of revenue for Mr. Hun Sen and his fellow tycoons. Analysts say Mr. Hun Sen was probably feeling threatened by Thailand’s warning to cut off electricity in the border area and its subsequent arrest warrants against tycoons operating casinos and online scam compounds in the area.
The sum total of what we know is this: the most likely explanation for why this conflict erupted now is because of personal rivalry between Hun Sen and the Shinawatras, not because of domestic rivalries between different factions within Thailand. And, as I have shown here, we really do not know much beyond that. So take with a grain of salt any definite claims about the origins of this conflict.
Additional Thoughts on Thailand’s Response
The past three days has seen the proliferation of large amounts of conflicting information and often outright fake news. The Second Army Region has rebutted many claims, such as reports that the Thai army took over Phra Viharn temple or that the Thai army fired artillery into Laos. But the Foreign Ministry and the Government Public Relations Department has often been slow to publicize these rebuttals. The Thai government has also failed to provide timely corrections to demonstrably misleading reports by the international media. (One particularly egregious example was a tweet by the Washington Post on Thailand’s F-16 airstrikes on military targets in Cambodia which featured a video of a 7-11 in Thailand attacked by Cambodia — something that was thankfully “community noted” on X).
In addition, the Thai government simply has not been able to find an effective spokesperson on the international stage. Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai’s English statement inexplicably failed to even mention Thailand’s call for Cambodia to cease hostilities before a ceasefire can be agreed. Ironically, the most effective and articulate communicator in the cabinet so far has been someone with no responsibility for foreign affairs: Minister of Social Development and Human Security Varawut Silpa-archa, who previous rumors had indicated could have been moved to the Foreign Ministry but eventually remained in post.
I wrote in my last post that I doubt this conflict will lead to a rally-round-the-flag effect for the Pheu Thai government. So far, that has been accurate, with continued criticism of the perceived weakness of Pheu Thai’s response. Take for example the popular response to government advisor Jakraphob Penkair’s TV interview, where he said that he “was not Hun Sen’s father” and inexplicably said that this conflict is not an issue about sovereignty6. Without putting the right people in the right jobs, Pheu Thai will continue flailing as the conflict rages on.
Another theory I think is worth dismissing off the bat is that this is simply a straightforward border conflict. As Saksith Saiyasombut noted on X, it almost feels orientalist to say this is just a fight over some temples along the border.
I think that some foreign analysts have had a tendency to downplay the significance of this phone call, some dismissing it as a mere excuse to get rid of Paetongtarn. It led to the biggest demonstration in years against the government and a major collapse in Pheu Thai’s polling. The domestic impact it had should not be underestimated.
This was clearest when Hun Sen released photos of the “Thaksin Room” at his mansion.
One, Samak Sundaravej, was removed from office for receiving payments from a cooking show he appeared on. It really doesn’t take much to kick out a prime minister in Thailand.
Perhaps some will say here that Paetongtarn’s assertion that the military was standing on “opposite sides” is evidence of the domestic rivalry theory. But that is merely evidence that there are tensions between Pheu Thai and the military, which is not news for a party that has been removed twice via military coup. If you will forgive me for indulging in my own speculation, I think it points to the fact that the government was trying to tamp down its own tensions with Hun Sen behind the scenes, and it was precisely that failure which led to this explosion in hostilities.
Edit added: A question was raised on X about how I seem to be “saying something else here entirely.” I should clarify: the Shinawatras, given their longstanding friendship as Hun Sen, have already been viewed with suspicion by many Thais on the Cambodia issue. By saying that this conflict was not an issue about sovereignty, Jakraphob heightened suspicions that the government is not serious about national security.