Filling the Conservative Party Gap

An electoral niche has no perfect fit for now

In our ISEAS Perspective from March on the aftermath of the grand compromise, Dr. Napon Jatusripitak and I had described a group of voters that we term “traditional conservatives.” We had described this group as voters who were simultaneously anti-Thaksin and also deeply distrustful of the progressives represented by the People’s Party. These voters were the most likely to be disillusioned with all the options currently available on the table, as most of the conservative parties had joined Pheu Thai’s coalition, but were also unwilling to countenance a vote for the PP.

Much has changed in Thai politics since March, but something that has not changed is the fact that no political party has yet been able to fully capture the hearts and minds of this voter segment.

Back then, we wrote:

That their main parties have joined hands with a government now led by Thaksin’s daughter represents a stark contradiction to the very principles that motivated them to support these parties in the first place. The only saving grace, for some, is that this unholy, ideologically incompatible alliance has served—and can continue to serve—as a safeguard against the PP…If this fear far outstrips their contempt for Thaksin, it is plausible that some traditional conservatives will choose not to punish their parties. Instead, they may rationalize their parties’ alliance with Pheu Thai as a pragmatic solution…

But has Pheu Thai’s management of the crisis with Cambodia made it essentially impossible now for these voters to continue supporting the current coalition parties? If so, the lack of choice for this group has only intensified since the Perspective was written. Who, now, has the best claim to be the main conservative party at the next election? In this piece, I want to take some time to dissect Thailand’s conservative groupings party by party. (Spoiler alert: there’s no clear choice).

United Thai Nation

In our perspective, we wrote that the United Thai Nation Party, which had nominated General Prayut Chan-o-cha for another term as prime minister, was the party of choice for conservatives at the 2023 general election. A survey that I had run in 2023 confirmed, unsurprisingly, that UTN voters had highly unfavorable views of both Thaksin Shinawatra and Pita Limjaroenrat (two good proxies for their views of Pheu Thai and Move Forward, respectively). “Their greater fear of the possible emergence of a People’s Party-led coalition may lead them to begrudgingly accept [the UTN’s alliance with Pheu Thai] and even sympathize with the stances of parties like the UTN,” we wrote. “However, their discomfort with the alliance is likely to be high.”

Their discomfort is likely to only be higher now. The UTN appeared to make a major move back in June after reports emerged that it would call for Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra to resign after the leak of her phone call with Hun Sen, implicitly threatening to leave the coalition if she refused. She did refuse, but the UTN remained in the coalition. Although party leader Pirapan Salirathavibhaga never publicly confirmed that the party called on Paetongtarn to resign, major figures in the party did do so. They have been able to retain their major ministerial cabinet positions despite the fact that the party is deeply divided and party leader Pirapan Salirathavibhaga commands the allegiance of only around half the party’s MPs. Pirapan was pictured seated right next to Thaksin at a coalition dinner a few weeks ago.

In a way, this could be even worse for the UTN’s image amongst conservatives than if they had simply announced they would remain in the coalition, as the party raised expectations for its supporters only to leave them dashed. Pirapan’s supporters have defended this by arguing that Pirapan is like “a candle willing to burn himself to provide light for others,” discarding social criticism in order to accomplish his primary goal of energy sector reform. But given how strongly anti-Thaksin his party’s supporters are, it can be reasonably suspected that even if Pirapan succeeds in reducing energy prices further, his party’s supporters may not forgive the UTN for propping up the government¹. This is especially true given the border tensions that broke out afterwards, for which Pheu Thai has been widely criticized.

There is one wildcard: as I wrote about here, there is a possibility that the political vacuum intensifies such that Prayut returns to the premiership. I don’t know what that would mean for the UTN’s popularity, although Prayut can constitutionally only serve as premier for two more years, meaning it is unlikely he would ever run in another election.

Bhumjaithai

The party that seems most likely now to take on the mantle of Thailand’s core conservative party is Bhumjaithai. It has paved the way for this rebranding for a long time. Bhumjaithai’s departure from the coalition fully cleared the way for conservative defectors as the party clearly put themselves in opposition to Thaksin. It has continued to make clear that it has no interest in collaborating with Pheu Thai, vowing at one point that it would not vote for a Pheu Thai deputy speaker.²

But at this point, it’s still not a foregone conclusion that Bhumjaithai will become the main favored party of choice for ideological conservatives. The party has not been highly visible during the border crisis, although Newin Chidchob, widely recognized as the “dark blue principal”³ opened up his sports facilities in Buriram for evacuees to stay in. But these very facilities are also receiving unwelcome attention. After the cabinet reshuffle, Pheu Thai’s new Interior Minister Phumtham Wechayachai (who is also serving as acting PM) has accelerated investigations into legal dispute over the Khao Kradong area on which the facilities are built. And so instead of prosecuting the case against Pheu Thai, Bhumjaithai has often found itself on the defensive since entering the opposition.

Bhumjaithai looks like it will be able to continue attracting prominent local politicians, which will help with its parliamentary strength. For example, more reports have been emerging of talks between Democrat politicians in the south and Bhumjaithai. But it is also this localist image that can turn away urban voters, especially in Bangkok. To take the next step of becoming a party that can truly challenge for coalition leadership, however, Bhumjaithai will want more party-list votes — and that will likely need to come from continuing to position itself as an anti-Thaksin force. Bhumjaithai also suffers from a lack of technocratic figures who can give the party greater policymaking credibility. A question was once posed to me: if Bhumjaithai were to lead the government, can you name their economic team? The fact that these types of questions cannot be answered easily poses a challenge for the party.

Other Parties

Palang Pracharath is still planning to contest the next election. A month ago, the party unveiled 32 new constituency candidates, mostly former Pheu Thai MPs who had lost their seats in previous elections. Although the party has attempted to rebrand itself as a “modern conservative party” and has come out strongly against Pheu Thai’s casino legalization plan, at this point there has been little noticeable uptick in its popularity.

The Democrat Party has not exhibited any sign of recovery in recent polling and is currently fending off reports that its MPs could be poached by other parties. There is speculation that some members of the party’s current leadership could also leave for greener pastures, which would open up the way for anti-Thaksin party elders to retake control of the party. But until that happens, it’s difficult to predict any change in the party’s current trajectory.

An interesting new choice has emerged after Dr. Suchatvee Suwansawat, the former Democrat candidate for Bangkok governor, resigned from the Democrat Party. Suchatvee has acknowledged reports saying that he is planning to set up a new political party (reports say it will be called Thai Kao Mai, i.e. “Thai New Step”), a party that will be solely focused on education reform. Given the “lack of choice” that conservatives currently feel, this party does have potential to capture a portion of that vote. But I do wonder about whether a party that is focused only on education will be seen as too niche for most voters.

Chart Thai Pattana leader Varawut Silpa-archa was showered with praise following his English statement on Cambodia. But his party faces the UTN’s problem of having remained in the Pheu Thai coalition and Bhumjaithai’s problem of being seen as too localist in its orientation. We don’t have any polling yet to be able to see whether Varawut’s numbers have ticked up, but one video is unlikely to be sufficient to make him a new conservative banner bearer.

We are still a long way from the period of the 2000s and 2010s when anti-Thaksin (and later anti-orange camp) conservatives had a clear choice in who to vote for (first the Democrats, then Palang Pracharath, then the United Thai Nation Party). While this group has decreased in size over time, it is still substantial: the UTN received over 12 percent of the party-list vote at the last election. This segment of the Thai electorate is still ripe for the taking.

I’ll also leave open one important question, however. Given the walls closing in on the Shinawatras, could there be a possibility that the next election is the first in over two decades where no Thaksinite party is viable as a competitor to lead the government? In that case, would the question of pro or anti-Thaksin become moot, as conservatives search instead simply for a party that is most able to become a counterweight to the People’s Party? I still think at this point that each party’s track record in the Pheu Thai coalition will still matter to some degree. But that would certainly add even more flux into a fluid party landscape.

1. One potential bright spot for the UTN is that the party’s secretary-general, Industry Minister Akanat Promphan, has earned online praise for his crackdown on grey industries and illegal factories (the ministry says that more than 38 factories have been closed and substandard goods worth over a billion baht have been seized). But again, this may not be something that conservative voters focus on during the next election.

2. Bhumjaithai argued that this was because Pheu Thai already has one deputy speakership, but I think it’s also a clear piece of political signaling.

3. An increasingly common moniker for Newin in Thai media is kru yai of the dark blue camp.