Pheu Thai Makes an Offer to the People's Party

An attempt to let bygones be bygones

“All conditions accepted.” Image Credits: Pheu Thai Party

Yesterday, I wrote about the emergence of Bhumjaithai’s new coalition. The most important immediate effect that the Bhumjaithai-led alliance has is that it denies Pheu Thai’s coalition the ability to unilaterally select a new prime minister, as the defection of key allies such as the Kla Tham Party and the Suchart Chomklin faction of the United Thai Nation Party pushed the government below a majority in parliament. Bhumjaithai said that they are willing to accept the PP’s conditions for a confidence and supply agreement (namely that parliament be dissolved within four months and holding a referendum initiating constitutional amendment).

But it was inconceivable that Pheu Thai would go down without a fight, and today they sent a delegation to the People’s Party to seek terms for a similar confidence and supply agreement. Pheu Thai says they proposed the following terms:

1. The Pheu Thai Party–led government established under this agreement will dissolve the House of Representatives within four months from the date it delivers its policy statement to Parliament. If the conditions of the agreement are fulfilled before the deadline, the government will dissolve the House immediately.

2. A constitutional referendum will include a question on whether to approve the drafting of a new constitution using the 1997 democratic constitution as the principal framework, in order to shorten the time required to produce a new charter.

3. In the same referendum, there will also be a question on whether to maintain or abolish MOU 43 and MOU 44, in order to reach a resolution and reduce domestic conflict.

4. This government will cooperate with the People’s Party and all sides to expedite legal proceedings concerning the Senate collusion case and the Khao Kradong land case, both of which are important issues of public interest, proceeding strictly in accordance with the law and the principles of the rule of law.

There are four things that Pheu Thai is trying to do here. Firstly, they are attempting to sweeten the deal from the PP’s perspective by agreeing to dissolve the House of Representatives potentially even earlier than the four month deadline that the PP has proposed. Secondly, they want to burnish their reformist credentials by proposing a temporary return to the 1997 constitution, which most political scientists will agree is the most democratic in Thai history. Third, they are trying to reduce the domestic furor arising from the Cambodia border tensions by adding a referendum on border agreements with Cambodia into the mix. Finally, they are putting legal issues faced by Bhumjaithai-linked figures in the spotlight, implying that unless the PP agrees to a deal with Pheu Thai, these cases will not get the attention they deserve.

The last three goals seem to be, in a way, poison pills for the PP: should they not accept Pheu Thai’s deal, they may be attacked for not choosing the more reformist option, neglecting national sovereignty, or colluding with Bhumjaithai to ensure these legal cases are dropped.

Who will the People’s Party pick?

The People’s Party says that they will make a decision by the afternoon of September 1st. Do we have any clues as to who they will pick?

It seems to me that we have figures who are not officially in the PP but are closely aligned with the party are speaking in similar tones. Pannika Wanich, the spokesperson of Thanathorn Juangroongrueangkit’s Progressive Movement, referred back to former Pheu Thai’s leader Cholanarn Srikaew’s remarks in 2023 that his attacks on Bhumjaithai had previously simply been “a campaigning technique.” (She did accuse both parties of being untrustworthy). Former Move Forward MP Amarat Chokepamitkul has fired a constant volley of social media attacks on Pheu Thai, and wrote six reasons why she would prefer to make a deal with Bhumjaithai. I also found it interesting that Thanathorn publicly said that Thaksin Shinawatra attempted to make a deal with him, which Thanathorn apparently rebuffed by redirecting him to official PP figures. Why expose such behind the scenes dealmaking, which could lead to accusations of “outside influence” if the deal actually gets done?

That doesn’t make it certain, of course, that the People’s Party will ally with Bhumjaithai. But the surrounding context does seem to add to that likelihood. For one, the great story of the 2023 general election’s aftermath was Pheu Thai’s decision to end its coalition agreement with Move Forward. Now, Pheu Thai’s top figures are trying to claim that they actually have “very similar DNA.” But with Pheu Thai manifestly so unready for an election, the chances of a repeated broken deal seems rather high.

If I were the PP, I would also have two questions. Where is Chaikasem Nitisiri, the Pheu Thai candidate for prime minister, in all this? So far we have not heard Chaikasem make any comment about all of this dealmaking surrounding him. Indeed, he even refused a media interview after Paetongtarn Shinawatra was removed, saying he was having dinner with his friends. Absent the candidate for prime minister, do Pheu Thai’s leaders actually have the authority to make an agreement? I could easily imagine the following happening: Paetongtarn, following the finding from the Constitutional Court that she committed unethical actions, is thus also found to be ineligible to be leader of the Pheu Thai Party. Therefore, Pheu Thai would have no current executive board to speak of.

I would also be wondering, if I were in the PP, about Thaksin’s impending legal case on his stay at the Police-General Hospital during his prison sentence. If a ruling is made there that Thaksin should be sent back to prison, what would that mean for the stability of a future Pheu Thai government?

Pheu Thai’s “trump card” is they could dissolve parliament now without initiating the process for constitutional amendment at all. But this “threat'“ doesn’t work for a couple of reasons. For one, the PP would probably be quite happy for parliament to be dissolved immediately, even releasing a flow chart, with that as the first option included. No one also believes Pheu Thai actually wants an election now. Even worse, the legal debate over whether an acting prime minister can dissolve parliament continues. Here, I think that the opinion that matters most is that of the Council of State, whose secretary-general has said that this is beyond the power of an acting prime minister. The constitutional law expert Bowornsak Uwanno has also argued that although there is no explicit prohibition, constitutional conventions would indicate that an acting prime minister should not request a dissolution of parliament.

So my guess for now is that there is a higher chance that the PP backs up Bhumjaithai. It’s a guess: I could be wrong, of course, and I wouldn’t be entirely surprised either if in the end Pheu Thai does finalize a confidence and supply agreement with the PP. Bhumjaithai and their crew of renegade factions are, as I noted in my previous piece, and even odder fit with the PP than Pheu Thai and their allied parties. A whole article could also be written about what reasons the People’s Party might cite in not forming an agreement with Bhumjaithai. But as of this moment, I think the momentum has clearly swung their way.¹

If nothing else, the fact that we have only seen defections go one way — from the Pheu Thai coalition towards the Bhumjaithai alliance — is indicative of something. Interestingly, the Democrat Party is now refusing to say who they will support. I don’t think the Democrats are the only party with second thoughts; Chart Thai Pattana leader Varawut Silpa-archa has also been mum about whether he will stay with Pheu Thai. Perhaps it demonstrates that those most in the know realize which direction the wind is heading.

1. Anutin Charnvirakul also looks so relaxed that it looks like he’s finalized all the agreements he needs.