
Good morning from The Coffee Parliament. I wanted to take some time today to assess three distinct threats to the Bhumjaithai government: the upcoming no-confidence debate, scrutiny from outside parliament, and protests on the streets. Spoiler alert: at this point in time I think all of these threats pose more of an annoyance than a genuine danger to the stability of the government. But it’s still worth, I believe, taking some time to examine them one by one.
1. The no-confidence debate
After some haggling between the government and the opposition over dates, Anutin Charnvirakul will be facing his first no-confidence debate as prime minister next month, between December 7 to 11. The government is expected to easily win this vote, as the Bhumjaithai-led coalition remains stable and it may receive some extra votes of support from “independent opposition” party Kla Tham as well. So in the big picture, this no-confidence debate poses very little threat to the survival of Anutin’s premiership.
Dig into the details however and some interesting elements emerge. The opposition decided that it will scrutinize the records of 18 ministers, all of whom are members of Bhumjaithai. No minister from Pheu Thai, the only other coalition member holding cabinet seats, was selected. This list is unusual for two reasons. First is the sheer number of ministers. Since 2009, the number of ministers targeted in a no-confidence debate has usually ranged between four to six, with a maximum of eleven in the 2022 no-confidence debate during Prayut’s premiership. Allocating sufficient time to discussing the records of 18 ministers is going to be a challenge for the opposition. There were some indications that not all opposition parties thought such a long list of ministers to scrutinize would be a good idea.
Secondly, these no-confidence debates have generally taken aim at ministers from across party lines (although another debate on the Prayut government in 2020 targeted only Palang Pracharath and independent ministers). Attacking eighteen ministers all from Bhumjaithai reveals that the opposition has chosen to zero in on only the core governing party, while casting a signal of friendship towards Pheu Thai (who, if the Bhumjaithai-Kla Tham merger rumors have any semblance in reality, faces a risk of being thrown out of the coalition).
Nattaphong Rueangpanyawut, the leader of the People’s Party and leader of the opposition, has noted that the goal of the no-confidence debate will be to shed light on how what he calls the “dark blue regime” has spread its influence over the entire country. (The Democrat Party’s Karndee Leopairote has a far-shorter three-word summation of what the debate will aim to expose). In the end, like most no-confidence debates in the past, I would expect a number of fireworks but no game-changers in the long term, unless the opposition is planning to reveal any previously-unknown evidence of corruption that makes any minister’s continued tenure untenable.
2. Scrutiny from outside parliament
Another threat that Bhumjaithai has faced in recent weeks has been increasing scrutiny from outside parliament. This comes particularly in the form of Sirichok Sopha, an ex-Democrat MP who failed to win election in his Songkhla constituency this year but has proven to be one of the party’s most persistent and outspoken watchdogs in recent weeks.1 By my count, he has written over fifty posts on the case of Suchada “Idea” Thaensap, whose husband’s cryptocurrency transactions came under scrutiny. ThaiPBS has a summary of the case here.
Sirichok’s attacks have touched a nerve within Bhumjaithai, with Anutin saying that Sirichok is motivated by personal hatred because he has lost to Bhumjaithai several times in his constituency (and Sirichok responding that losing an election does not deprive him of the right to scrutinize the government). On the whole, however, investigative activities from ex-MPs outside parliament on individual party members is likely to land even less of a punch on Bhumjaithai’s stability than the no-confidence debate. Already, after a few weeks, the issues raised by Sirichok are beginning to recede from the headlines.
3. Protests on the streets
Back in September, the former yellow shirt protest leader Sondhi Limthongkul raised eyebrows when he announced that he would begin demonstrations that would be aimed at criticizing the government rather than toppling it. A person of Sondhi’s stature deciding to begin protests against a conservative government was seen as a big deal. The protest that Sondhi organized outside the Israeli embassy in September was relatively limited in scale, however, and did not look likely to spark further expressions of discontent on the streets.
Recently, another protest was organized by Mano Krueakaew, a sub-district official (kamnan) from Krabi who has camped out in front of Government House (and later the Ministry of Energy). His key demand, like Sondhi, is not for the government to leave but rather for Anutin to take action on energy prices, particularly by reducing diesel prices by 10 baht per liter. The protests have gained momentum as it has been joined by famous figures such as Sondhi, Seri Ruam Thai party leader Seripisuth Temeeyaves, and energy activist Panthep Puapongpan. Thai Pakdee leader Warong Dechgitvigrom also expressed his belief that Kamnan Mano “has no color” (i.e. is a nonpartisan figure). Thai Enquirer noted that the protests may be “gaining momentum” because within an hour of livestreaming, a speech by Kamnan Mano gained as many as 150,000 views on YouTube. I’m skeptical that we have sufficient evidence that the protests will pick up more support, however, just based on YouTube views, and we also have news of disagreements among protest leaders which may sap its energy.
Fundamentally, these protests face an uphill battle in picking up mass support. Protest leaders like Kamnan Mano and Sondhi will find it difficult to mobilize progressives who are most likely to dislike the Anutin government as a whole; at the same time, most conservatives still see Bhumjaithai as their best bulwark against a People’s Party or Pheu Thai-led government. Although Anutin’s popularity has declined considerably in recent months (if we believe the NIDA poll), the Bhumjaithai government does appear to have a certain Teflon quality to it, and Anutin has not yet committed a grievous blunder that would spark mass demonstrations.
My assessment for now is this: the Bhumjaithai government, having been in power now for over a year, is certainly facing more attacks and a greater level of expression of discontent than it did in its first few months. But I’m unconvinced that any of the threats, three-pronged it may be, currently pose anything close to an existential level of danger for Anutin’s premiership. Plenty of Thai prime ministers have survived far worse. At the same time, however, the buildup of these attacks do generate a level of pressure on the government, and they create a permission structure of sorts for scrutiny to be ramped up further. Bhumjaithai’s second year is unlikely to be as smooth sailing as its first.
One suspects that Idea made matters more tempting for Sirichok by stating publicly that she did not know who he is because she may had been born too late.

