Can Anutin Win?

What we've learned from his first month

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul. Image Credits: Royal Thai Government

It’s been a busy week in Thai politics, with major developments from both the Bhumjaithai government and also in Pheu Thai, with former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra resigning as party leader. I’ll write another post soon looking at what Pheu Thai’s political strategy may look like with Paetongtarn out and Thaksin Shinawatra in prison. For today, a look first at Bhumjaithai.

Imagine, for a moment, that you are Anutin Charnvirakul. You became prime minister, rather unexpectedly. You are leading a minority government that could fall at any moment, should the opposition People’s Party — with whom you share little ideologically — withdraw its support. You are now almost one month into what you have pledged to be a four-month premiership, with a dissolution of parliament anticipated at the end of January at the latest. You therefore have only a few months to win an election. It’s a tall order for such a short time frame.

Of course, we are not Bhumjaithai strategists (but hello there to any who are reading this post!). I think, however, that there is value to thinking through Anutin’s ideal election scenario and see whether or not Bhumjaithai and the government it leads is matching up with this scenario. Thanakorn Wangboonkongchana, the Minister of Industry (who recently joined Bhumjaithai), predicted that the party can win 120 seats at the next election, which could place it in a position to lead another coalition government. Is this achievable? It probably is. I think that the Bhumjaithai playbook probably looks similar to this four-step plan.

1. Bolster Bhumjaithai’s core strength: winning local constituencies.

Bhumjaithai knows that all politics is local, and winning local constituencies has always been one of their strengths. This time, however, Anutin is taking this capability to the next level. Bhumjaithai has been building a fearsome death star of local clans. Some prominent examples below:

• The Wichiansilp clan of Kanchanaburi province recently defected from Pheu Thai to Bhumjaithai. This allowed Bhumjaithai to handily win a by-election in Constituency 4 of Kanchanaburi last week, where the Bhumjaithai vote increased from a mere 1,730 in 2023 to 53,648.

• Several prominent political families in the South have defected from their parties to Bhumjaithai, including the Bunyamanee clan in Songkhla (from the Democrats) and Chumpol Julasai’s followers in Chumphorn (from United Thai Nation). Other clans in the South, such as the Kanjana family in Surat Thani and the Losathapornpipit family in Trang, are reportedly considering such moves.

• Members of the Rattanaseth and Pattama families, prominent in Nakhon Ratchasima province in the Northeast, also announced their moves from Palang Pracharath and Pheu Thai, respectively.

• Even the top leaders of other parties are moving. Deputy Prime Minister Suchart Chomklin, who is prominent in Chonburi province, officially defected from United Thai Nation to Bhumjaithai. So did Santi Promphat (recently serving as secretary-general of Palang Pracharath), who is influential in Phetchabun province.

Based on just their increased local strength alone, Bhumjaithai is probably due to win a significant number of constituency seats that they were previously uncompetitive in.

2. Secure “quick big wins” with immediate feel-good impact.

The Anutin government has emphasized the need for “quick big wins” that can be launched within four months. The Prime Minister has already gotten perhaps the most important quick big win off the ground: the Khon La Khrueng (“Let’s Go Halves”) scheme. The benefits of this policy are obvious: everybody is already familiar with it, it puts money into pockets immediately, and it stimulates the economy. Within the first day of registration, the cap of 20 million recipients was reached. That’s almost forty percent of the 52 million eligible voters in Thailand. Other quick big wins are on the radar. Anutin is also preparing a package of policies aimed at reducing energy costs.

Is old-fashioned economic “populism” going to work? The answer is not clear here. The Khon La Khrueng scheme didn’t end up doing much for former prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha at the last election, and Pheu Thai lost to the Move Forward Party despite having promised 10,000 baht for all Thais. But ceteris paribus, Anutin and Bhumjaithai would much rather have the feel-good wind behind their sails leading up to the general election than not.

3. Shore up Bhumjaithai’s conservative credentials to attract former United Thai Nation and Palang Pracharath voters.

I’ve written before about how Bhumjaithai has, since 2023, been building up a new brand as genuinely conservative party. (See here, here, and here). With the United Thai Nation and Palang Pracharath parties in the weakest state they have ever been, Bhumjaithai has a chance to build itself up as the main option for conservative voters who are looking for a post-Prayut alternative to Pheu Thai and the People’s Party. During his policy speech to parliament, Anutin set out policies that can clearly appeal to the conservative electorate, including abandoning Pheu Thai’s casino legalization policy and pledging a referendum on two agreements with Cambodia.

But whether the conservative brand will hold may depend on Bhumjaithai’s ability to protect the constitutional status quo. Its alliance with the People’s Party includes a promise to kick-start the process of writing a new constitution. That, of course, is a road fraught with challenges. Bhumjaithai has already set out a vision for a Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) that differs markedly from the People’s Party — an appointed CDA rather than an elected one. (See a run-down of the differences here). But tactical mistakes from Bhumjaithai¹ led to Parliament deciding that the PP draft would be the main draft for consideration (although the Bhumjaithai draft was also approved). There is still a long road ahead, but if the constitutional drafting process moves according to the PP’s vision, expect Bhumjaithai’s partnership with the PP to come under further scrutiny from its right.

4. Become a credible party of government.

Anutin did much to shore up his governing credentials by appointing several technocrats to his government, something rarely seen in party-driven cabinets. It has provided Bhumjaithai with a much-needed economic team, although these technocrats have not officially joined the party and it is unclear whether they will remain in office if Bhumjaithai returns to power with a majority government.

But one of those appointments have already backfired. This week, Deputy Finance Minister Vorapak Tanyawong resigned following allegations linking him to Cambodian scam centers. (Vorapak denies the accusations, saying that he “never been involved in any fraud, scams, or illegal business activities, in Cambodia or anywhere else.”) The rapid resignation of a minister only a month into a new government’s term undoubtedly generates unwelcome headlines. But it also underscores one of Bhumjaithai’s vulnerabilities. It is already dealing with attacks from Pheu Thai on the Khao Kradong case and the Senate collusion case and it can ill-afford another reason for voters to lose confidence in the prime minister’s judgement.

Some urban voters with little affection for Bhumjaithai may have been willing to take a chance with Anutin if they did not like Pheu Thai or the People’s Party. But with the Democrat Party recently revitalized, they may also decide to “head home” if the scandals add up. And should Bhumjaithai not make headway with new voters that traditionally have not given them much thought, how much further they can expand their electoral footprint will come under question.

1. The main mistake being allowing parliament to reject the Pheu Thai draft, which thus allowed Pheu Thai to swing its votes behind the People’s Party draft.